The Impact of IFRS-based Chinese Accounting Standards on Accounting Conservatism by Cheng, Xueqing









The Impact of IFRS-based Chinese Accounting 
Standards on Accounting Conservatism  
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 







Key words: IFRS convergence, conservatism, information asymmetry, monitoring costs, 
state-owned enterprises, state-owned banks




I would like to thank all those who supported me during my writing. 
 
I am sincerely grateful to Dr Lenka, my supervisor, for her constant encouragement and guidance 
at all the stages of my research. She provided me with valuable advice in academic research. Her 
helpful suggestions, incisive comments and constructive criticism have made great contributions 
towards the completion of this thesis. She has provided tremendous help in writing literature 
reviews and developing an analytical framework, which deserves gratitude than I can find words 
to express. Indeed, it is impossible to complete this thesis without her relentless efforts in 
modifying and perfecting my draft. In addition, I am greatly indebted to Dr Didem for her 
valuable suggestions in the process of writing my thesis. I do appreciate their professional 
guidance, encouragement and patience during the process of writing. They spent a considerable 
amount of time reading my draft and proposing recommendations for further revisions. 
 
I would also like to express my gratitude to all of its teachers and staff at the university for 
providing us with a superior learning environment. 
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family, who have been always assisting 
and supporting for me. 
 
  
 ii / 203 
 
Abstract 
In 2007, China implemented mandatory accounting standards reforms in an effort to converge 
with the IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards). The new accounting system in 
China is undergoing rapid change in order to adapt to the increasingly complex economic 
situations. The tremendous changes in the standards related to conservatism mean the 
stakeholders of the financial reporting, especially the standards-setting board, investors and 
government, cannot neglect how the IFRS convergence accounting standards affects the 
conservatism of Chinese-listed enterprises. Therefore, this thesis employs listed Chinese 
enterprises as a research sample to empirically examine the correlation between accounting 
system reforms, and the conditionally and unconditionally conservative financial statements of 
Chinese public enterprises. 
For the conditional conservatism, this thesis takes the listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 
2010 as a sample and uses the accrual cash flow model (2005) and Basu model (1997) to 
investigate the impact of IFRS convergence standards in 2006 on conditional conservatism. This 
thesis finds that after the implementation of IFRS-convergent standards, Chinese-listed 
enterprises employ less conservative accounting policies because the IFRS convergence altered 
the ex-ante information asymmetry and monitoring costs of China’s listed firms. This empirical 
finding is significant and robust under both the accrual cash flow model and Basu model. Further, 
this thesis explores the in-depth mechanism of the effects of the new standards, which has the 
following findings: 
1. After the implementation of IFRS convergence, the decrease in the degree of conditional 
conservatism is higher for enterprises with the more complex business model (or more 
information asymmetry), which supports the assumption that IFRS convergence increases the 
comparability of financial reports and disclosure environment and reduces information 
asymmetry. 
2. After following IFRS convergence, the reduction in the degree of conditionally conservative 
accounting is higher for non-state-owned enterprises compared with companies with 
state-owned enterprises.  
3. The reduction in the degree of conditionally conservative accounting is higher for firms with 
more debt-monitoring costs than firms with less monitoring costs, which supports the 
assumption that IFRS convergence reduces monitoring costs of debt holders. 
4. After following Chinese new standards, the reduction in the degree of conditionally 
conservative accounting is higher with firms who borrow from state-owned banks compared 
with firms who borrow from non-state-owned banks.  
For unconditional conservatism, this thesis also tests and finds the existence of unconditional 
conservatism among China’s listed companies in the sample period (2002-2010) and the IFRS 
convergence accounting standards have improved the unconditional conservatism level of the 
listed companies in China. Before 2006, there were serious idle fixed assets that were not 
depreciated for the listed Chinese companies under former standards. Changes in the 
requirements of the IFRS-based standards for this issue will increase unconditional conservatism. 
In addition, this thesis finds that the increase in the degree of unconditionally conservative 
accounting after the implementation of the IFRS-based standards is higher with state-owned 
enterprises compared with companies with non-state-owned. The main reason leading to this 
result is that the state-owned enterprises had more serious idle fixed assets issue before 2006.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Purposes and backgrounds 
The Chinese accounting standards was revolutionised in 2006 to a major extent when China implemented 
mandatory accounting system reforms in an effort to integrate with the IFRS (Tweedie, 2006). The 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBEs), including one basic standard and 38 specific 
standards for dealing with specific issues, was implemented in force on 1st January 2007, after which all 
Chinese public firms should follow the ASBEs in preparing their financial reports. The ASBEs nearly 
cover every field of the IFRS. The development of the ASBEs was in accordance with the IFRS’s purpose 
of offering higher comparable and quality accounting information. The ASBEs have higher requirements 
for financial reports of listed companies in China, especially in areas related to fair value measurements, 
business combinations and related party disclosure, fundamentally improving the accounting practices in 
China.  
 
The most significant difference in Chinese standards of 2006 is the re-introduction of a fair value model, 
which use related valuation in current markets to reflect the value of assets and liabilities. In the new 
Chinese standard, the fair value model has been reintroduced into various fields involving accounting 
valuation, such as intangible assets, investment property, non-monetary assets exchange, revenue 
recognition, debt restructuring, etc. The conservative accounting principle means that accountants tend to 
accelerate the recognition of expenses and losses and delay the recognition of revenue (Al-Sakini and 
Al-Awawdeh, 2015). However, the application of the fair value measurement demonstrates that the 
attitude of the Chinese standards-setting board to conservatism is changing. 
 
Although the conservatism has existed for more than 500 years, its effects are gradually weakening with 
the rise of the IFRS in recent decades. IFRS requires or encourages companies to adopt the fair value 
measurement in several selected fields. In addition, the US FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) 
also made several important decisions to champion the adoption of fair value, such as the FASB in 2001 
prohibited companies amortizing goodwill (Jennings, et al, 2001).  
 
After the establishment of China in 1949, its social system and economy began rapidly changing. With 
this change, China’s accounting system is also undergoing rapid change in order to adapt to different 
economic situations. China’s history of economy and accounting development can be divided into three 
periods: the planned economy period (1949-1978), planned commodity economy period (1979-1992), and 
socialist market economy period (after 1992) (Wang, et al, 2009). Since its establishment, China has 
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undergone considerable market-oriented reforms. However, the conservatism was denied in the Chinese 
accounting system during the first two periods (1949-1978 and 1979-1992). Chinese government, which 
is also the accounting standards-setting board in China, condemn conservatism as ‘hypocritical’ and 
banned this principle during these periods (1949-1978 and 1979-1992). 
 
During the socialist market economy period, China went through changes in their accounting system three 
times (in 1992, in 2001, and in 2006). The rapid change and development of the Chinese economy caused 
a lack of experience while building an accounting system to suit the new economic system. China 
therefore had to learn from internationally accepted accounting standards. However, there persists the 
issue that the Chinese economy and market are significantly different than those of Western countries like 
the USA, UK and Germany - countries which the Chinese accounting system mainly draws from. 
Therefore, previous standards in 1992 and 2001 only introduced some very basic concepts and methods 
and are strongly conservative. With the deepening of economic globalization, new Chinese standards (the 
ASBEs) in 2006 drew extensively from western accounting standards, for example, the fair value 
measurement model was introduced into particular areas (e.g. the accounting of financial instruments). 
These changes indicate that the effect of conservatism principles in the financial reporting of 
Chinese-listed companies is reducing or may be even disappearing.  
 
In this context, the main aim of this thesis is to study how new Chinese standards (the ASBEs) affect the 
level of conditional and unconditional conservatism in the financial reports of Chinese public firms. 
Firstly, this thesis systematically reviews the relevant literature on conservatism and measurement 
methods. Then, this thesis investigates the effects of new Chinese standards on the conservatism in the 
financial report of listed enterprises and its influencing mechanism. In particular, this thesis examines the 
validity of all hypotheses that the adoption of new Chinese accounting standards induces the changes in 
conservatism of Chinese-listed enterprises, as well as the in-depth mechanism of the effects of the ASBEs 
in China. 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
In the conditional conservatism area, the convergence of IFRS alleviates the information asymmetry 
between external stakeholders and managers, by improving the disclosure environment and reducing the 
monitoring costs between the principal and the agent. 
 
Before the IFRS convergence in 2006, the information asymmetry in Chinese stock market was extremely 
high. The IFRS as public goods can not only improve the comparability of financial reports and 
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accounting information but also can enhance the firm’s information disclosure environment (Beuselinck 
et al., 2009). As a result, the improved disclosure environment and decreased ex-ante information 
asymmetry moderate an agent’s demands for accounting conservatism.  
 
The IFRS adoption could also alleviate principals’ demands for bad-news through reducing the 
monitoring costs of the principal. If the monitoring costs decline, the principal is more inclined to directly 
supervise agents’ efforts rather than to use incentive agreements (Jayaraman & Shivakumar, 2013). As a 
result, debtholders are expected to demand less conditional conservatism after China’s convergence with 
the IFRS. 
 
Therefore, IFRS convergence should reduce the conditional conservatism in China’s listed firms because 
of the alleviation of ex-ante information asymmetry and monitoring costs. Given the discussions above, 
this thesis posits that the implementation of new accounting standards has reduced the degree of 
conditional conservatism in public companies in China. Moreover, this thesis further examines the 
moderating effects of four factors in influencing the association between accounting standards change and 
a firms’ conditional conservatism: state ownership of companies; complexity of business model; state 
ownership of banks; and financial constraints (financial leverage of business) of companies. 
 
As a result, the core inference of this thesis is that: as new Chinese accounting standards are largely 
convergent with the IFRS, they can be recognized as a set of high-quality and comparable accounting 
standards; and accounting quality and comparability of the Chinese-listed companies should be improved 
and the information asymmetry and monitoring costs would therefore be mitigated. This improvement 
would reduce the demand of shareholders and debtholders for conditional conservatism. In order to verify 
the above inference, the specific research objectives here are as follows: 
1. First of all, the underlying research objective of this thesis is to examine whether the implementation 
of new Chinese standards makes the listed companies adopt a less conditionally conservative 
accounting policy. 
2. Then, this thesis investigates more deeply whether the implementation of the new standards in China 
mitigates the information asymmetry and monitoring costs, and thus reduces the demand of 
shareholders and debtholders for conditional conservatism. 
3. Finally, considering that the difference in the ownership structure in China affects the level of 
demand for conditional conservatism (Chen, 2010), this thesis also investigates whether there is a 
correlation between cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism and the kind of 
ownership structure of public enterprises and banks, i.e. whether the company or bank is a SOE. 
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In unconditional conservatism area, the impact of the ASBEs can be reflected in the changes in 
requirements for capitalisation and depreciation and amortization. The new standards allow the 
development expenditures that meet the conditions of capitalization to be capitalized and accounted as 
intangible assets, which in turn reduces unconditional conservatism. Companies under the former 
standards could not depreciate idle fixed assets. However, the new standards in Article 14, ASBE No. 4 no 
longer allow recognizing idle fixed assets, which in turn increases unconditional conservatism. Since the 
impact of changes in capitalisation is far less than that in depreciation, this thesis, therefore, posits that the 
implementation of new accounting standards has increased the degree of unconditional conservatism in 
public companies in China. Therefore, the specific research objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
1. This thesis investigates whether the implementation of the new standard makes the unconditional 
conservatism of listed companies increase. 
2. Then, considering that the state-owned enterprises have more serious idle fixed problems, this thesis 
also studies whether the unconditional conservatism of state-owned enterprises has been increased to 
a greater extent. 
 
1.3 Research methods 
The research method is mainly quantitative research based on cross-sectional time series regression 
analysis. The aim of this thesis is to explore how new Chinese ASBEs have affected the conservatism of 
Chinese public enterprises. The models employed in this thesis include the Accrual cash flow method, 
which is developed by Ball and Shivarkumar (2005) and used for measuring conditional conservatism, 
and the book-to-market value (BTM) model, which is mainly developed from the work of 
Feltham-Ohlson (1995) and used for measuring unconditional conservatism.  
 
Models for testing conditional conservatism 
For testing conditional conservatism, the accrual cash flow model is the main method employed in this 
thesis. The doubt over the efficiency of China’s share market means that simply relying on Basu’s (1997) 
model, which assumes market efficiency, is not sufficient. To avoid this problem, this study tests 
accounting conservatism by mainly observing the relationship between operating cash flows and accruals 
in financial statements with the accrual cash flow measurement method proposed by Ball and 
Shivarkumar (2005). However, given that Basu’s work (1997) is widely recognised and extensively used 
for measuring conditional conservatism, the conditional conservatism measurement method developed by 
Basu (1997) is used as a supplementary measurement method.  
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Moreover, the supplementary empirical models for testing conditional conservatism are derived from the 
work of Basu (1997), who has proposed a set of measurement models for accounting conservatism based 
on the differences in the timeliness with which share markets react to bad and good earnings news. Givoly 
et al. (2007) refer to Basu’s (1997) measurement models for accounting conservatism differential 
timeliness measures, which have been employed by Watts (2003) to empirically test accounting 
conservatism. Deriving from Basu (1997) and Watts (2003), there are two measurement methods often 
used for measuring conditional accounting conservatism: the earnings share return measurement method 
and the earnings accruals measurement method. However, given the fact that the shares of many listed 
companies in China do not fully circulate in the market, many factors unrelated to conservatism may 
affect the ability of share price in reflecting publicly available news information. This means that the 
earnings share return measurement method may not be applicable to the Chinese market. Furthermore, 
Basu’s (1997) method and accruals measurement method are very similar to each other. Therefore, Basu’s 
(1997) methods are used as supplementary tests of conditional conservatism with an understanding of 
their limitations when applied to the Chinese share market, and also to increase comparability with extant 
research on accounting conservatism in China. 
 
Models for testing unconditional conservatism 
The main model used for testing unconditional conservatism in this study is the book-to-market value 
(BTM) model developed by Beaver and Ryan (2000), which measures unconditional conservatism based 
on the book-to-market value ratio of the equity. It is worth noting that the effectiveness of the BTM model 
for measuring unconditional conservatism depends on the efficiency of the capital market, i.e. the degree 
to which information is readily available to investors, since market efficiency affects the market value of 
the equity. Given that the efficiency of China’s share market is questioned by many researchers (Thiele, 
2014; Beltratti et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2010; Chang and Ren, 2014), the accuracy of the market value of 
net assets in Chinese-listed companies may be limited. This is likely to be one of the major limitations of 
this study. However, due to the lack of other better alternatives to test unconditional conservatism, the 
book-to-market value (BTM) model is still employed. 
 
All related data in the methods employed in this thesis is collected from the CSMAR database (China 
Securities Markets and Accounting Research Database). In order to ensure the ultimate ownership 
information, this thesis additionally verifies validity of the data using the WIND database, which is also 
widely used by both academic scholars and analysts in China. The initial sample includes entire public 
companies in Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange from 2001 to 2010, which is collected from the 
CSMAR. The final sample for conditional conservatism consists of 11,909 firm-year observations and the 
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sample for unconditional conservatism includes 6,776 firm-year observations.  
 
1.4 Statements of gap and contributions to knowledge 
Improved understanding of conditional conservatism in China in the absence of the efficient market 
assumption 
Most of the empirical studies regarding conditional accounting conservatism in China to date have relied 
on the conservatism measurement models of Basu (1997) by evaluating the asymmetric timeliness of 
losses and gains recognition, including the earnings persistence measurement model (Kung et al., 2008), 
the earnings share return measurement model (Cullinan et al., 2012) and the K-W model (Khan and Watts, 
2009). Especially noteworthy here is that the conservatism measurement models proposed by Basu (1997) 
are based on the efficient market assumption. The theoretical rationale behind the conservatism 
measurement models proposed by Basu (1997) is that bad and good news is reflected symmetrically and 
in a timely manner in efficient markets through share returns. However, the higher timeliness of 
recognising bad earnings news reflects the existence of conservatism in financial reporting practices 
(Basu, 1997). Therefore, all conservatism measurement models proposed by Basu (1997) rely on the 
underlying assumption that share returns in an efficient market can efficiently reflect all publicly available 
‘news’. 
 
While most of the empirical studies regarding conditional accounting conservatism in China to date have 
relied on Basu’s conservatism measurement models (1997) and, in turn, Basu’s (1997) assumption of 
efficient market, the efficiency of the Chinese share market is questioned by many academics. 
Groenewold (2004), for example, concludes that the Chinese share market is, to a large extent, inefficient 
or low-efficient. A number of studies (such as, Laurence et al., 1997; Liu et al., 1997; Long et al., 1999; 
Lima and Tabak, 2004) conducted before the introduction of the ASBEs have proved that the share market 
in China is weak–form efficient, meaning that share returns do not incorporate all publicly available 
information. On the other hand, later studies such as Chong et al. (2011) and Lim and Brooks (2009) have 
suggested that the efficiency of the share market in China has increased since 2006. Despite this 
improvement, most researchers agree that the efficiency of the share market in China is generally less 
than stock markets in countries with more developed financial systems. In light of the relative inefficiency 
of the Chinese share market, using Basu’s share return-based measurement methods of accounting 
conservatism (1997) risks producing misleading and inaccurate results about conservatism of 
Chinese-listed companies. Therefore, there exists an empirical gap in extant research regarding the impact 
of IFRS convergence on conditional conservatism. 
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Therefore, the first contribution of this thesis is the improved understanding of conditional conservatism 
in China without relying on the efficient market assumption. To avoid the issues caused by the doubt over 
the efficiency of the share market in China, the accrual cash flow measurement method of accounting 
conservatism developed by Ball and Shivarkumar (2005) will be employed, rather than the earnings share 
return measurement models proposed by Basu (1997) as in many previous similar studies. By using this 
model, this thesis will test for conditional conservatism through the asymmetric influence on regression 
coefficients of accruals related to good and bad earnings news in companies’ financial statements, rather 
than share returns, thus avoiding the ambiguity over the efficiency of the share market in China. As a 
result, this thesis will contribute to the existing body of knowledge with a more theoretically-sound 
methodology, which is unfettered by the efficiency of the Chinese share market, although Basu’s (1997) 
models will still be used as a complementary test for comparison.  
 
Fresh insights into unconditional conservatism in China after the implementation of the ASBEs  
Conditional conservatism is a phenomenon where companies more timely recognize losses caused by 
‘bad news’ than gains caused by ‘good news’. By contrast, unconditional conservatism means that 
companies at the initial recognition of liabilities or assets adopt accounting treatment methods to defer 
revenue recognition or accelerate expense recognition. Most of the research to date regarding the 
conservatism of Chinese public companies concerns only conditional conservatism, which is reflected in 
the differences in the timeliness with which ‘bad’ earnings news and ‘good’ earnings news is recognised 
(e.g. Cullian et al, 2012; Lin and Tian, 2012; Kund et al, 2008, etc.). However, by examining the 
differences between the ASBEs introduced in 2006 and the previous Chinese standards, it is evident that 
the fundamental changes ushered in by the ASBEs are likely to affect the unconditional conservatism of 
Chinese public enterprises.  
 
For example, in accounting for the asset value of investment property, ASBE 3 stipulates that the fair 
value measurement model should be used if the investment property can be determined by the fair value 
method reliably, in which case no depreciation or amortisation is needed in the future. There is a 
fundamental difference in the PRC GAAP, the previous standards in China, which considered investment 
properties as fixed or long-term assets subject to depreciation or amortisation. Apparently, this change is 
likely to decline the level of unconditional conservatism of Chinese public firms. Moreover, the ASBEs 
revised standards regarding capitalisation and depreciation and amortisation. In the PRC GAAP, 
companies did not depreciate idle fixed assets and could not use accelerated depreciation methods. 
However, Article 14, ASBE No. 4 states that enterprises shall depreciate all fixed assets and allow 
accelerated depreciation method, which is obviously to increase the degree of unconditional conservatism. 
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These changes in the ASBEs regarding the recognition of assets and liabilities are likely to result in a 
higher or lower level of unconditional conservatism of Chinese-listed enterprises. For example, the 
elimination of recognition of idle fixed assets under former standards and the introduction of accelerated 
depreciation methods will strengthen unconditional conservatism. In this regard, by exploring the degree 
of unconditional conservatism of Chinese public enterprises following the ASBEs, this thesis will provide 
fresh insights into how the degree of unconditional conservatism is impacted by the new standards. 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This section briefly introduces the structure of this thesis. Chapter Two focuses on the literature review 
and discusses various definitions of conservatism, accounting standard setters’ perspective on 
conservatism, relevant empirical studies, and, more importantly, the distinction between conditional and 
unconditional conservatism, looking at their similarities and differences. The literature review also 
discusses the motivation and demand for conservatism in the Chinese context. Importantly, a set of 
relationship maps of relevant stakeholders that prompts the use of conservative accounting practices is 
developed in this chapter. It offers an overview of the relevant stakeholders who impact the decision to 
take conservative accounting practices in China. In order to study further the influencing factors of IFRS 
convergence on the demand for conservatism, the literature review also establishes a causal diagram for 
Chinese IFRS convergence on conservatism. 
 
Chapter Three discusses the application of conservatism methods in China. This chapter critically 
discusses the existing conservatism measurement models that are appropriate in China, based on the 
review of various measurement methods of accounting conservatism.  
 
Chapter Four develops the hypotheses for conditional and unconditional conservatism. Then, Chapter 
Five outlines the conditional and unconditional conservatism measurement methods. Based on analyses in 
Chapter Three, the accrual-cash flow method and the BTM method are baseline models for measuring 
conditional and conditional conservatism, respectively. Moreover, Basu’s (1997) method and Qing’s 
(2007) method are used for the robustness test. Chapter Six describes the sample and the data. Chapter 
Seven and Eight present results and analyses for conditional and unconditional conservatism, respectively. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review  
2.1 Relevant definitions of conservatism 
Conservatism is a non-negligible characteristic of financial statements and an important principle in 
measurement and recognition. Basu’s study (1997) demonstrated that the conservatism is a phenomenon 
which has existed in accounting practice for over 500 years. The concept of conservatism can be traced 
back to the medieval era. Traders as early as the 14th century began to calculate the value of their 
inventories using the Lower-of-cost-or-market rule (LCM hereafter). LCM is an accounting method used 
at the end of the fiscal year where the value of the ending inventory should be based on the comparison 
between the cost and market price. If the inventory price in the market is below its cost, the inventory cost 
should be accounted according to its market value. Otherwise, if the cost of inventory is below the market 
price, the cost of the inventory should be accounted according to the cost at which it was purchased. LCM 
is a revision of the historical cost principle. The LCM rule was introduced into practice and book in the 
17th century, and later incorporated into commercial law. The LCM principle can be seen as an early 
example of conservatism. 
 
Conservatism has long been regarded as the most fundamental accounting principle in valuation (Sterling, 
1970). At the beginning of the 20th century, conservatism was believed to be a dominant principle and 
should be considered first provided it conflicts with other accounting principles (Chatfield, 1974). 
However, the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (SFAC2) developed by the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) stated that conservatism principles are not always more important 
than other main principles. 
 
Chinese Ministry of Finance in 1985 promulgated “The Accounting Regulations of the People's Republic 
of China for the Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment”, which introduced the principle of 
conservatism into the accounting standards (Wang, et al, 2009). The introduction of the conservatism 
principle is regarded as the beginning of Chinese accounting standards to converge with international 
standards. 
 
2.1.1 Conservatism defined by accounting standard-setting bodies 
A precise definition is essential for discussing the merits of conservatism. However, the definition of 
conservatism varies across academic and policy debates. Even though conservatism has an essential 
function in accounting theory and practice, it has different definitions in different countries and regions. 
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As a result, various standard-setting bodies around the world have different interpretations and definitions 
for conservatism. 
 
The US Accounting Principles Board (APB) first regarded the conservatism principle as a primary 
qualitative feature which makes accounting information useful, declaring that “managers, investors, and 
accountants have generally preferred that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of 
understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets" (APB, 1970, para. 171). This 
definition intuitively leads to the impression that conservatism leaves accounting valuations off firm’s 
real value. If investors fully accept the firm's valuation recognized by the accounting report, financial 
conservatism will reduce the value relevance and in turn mislead investors in their investment and 
management decisions. After that, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB is the organization to 
replace APB in 1973) realized that the principle of conservatism did not mean blindly underestimating 
income and assets. Under the old principle of conservatism developed by the APB, firms could 
deliberately understate the value of assets. The FASB emphasizes that the conservative accounting 
information does not mean that firms can deliberately and consistently understate net incomes and assets. 
The definition developed by the APB may lead to the abuse of the principle of conservatism. This 
potential issue may decline the quality of financial reports and accounting information, resulting in failure 
to prepare "true and fair" financial statements. 
Moreover, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) introduced "Prudence (Conservatism)" 
into the Conceptual Framework as a basic principle in financial reporting, declaring that “the inclusion of 
a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgments needed in making the estimates required under 
conditions of uncertainty, such that assets or income are not overstated and liabilities or expenses are not 
understated” (IASB, 1989, para. 38). The IASB draws on the FASB’s experience and related research and 
emphasizes that conservatism does not mean an artificial undervaluation of incomes and assets, or 
overstatement of liabilities and costs. IASB (2010) excluded conservatism from qualitative characteristics 
in the Conceptual Framework, placing more emphasis on the disclosure of fair value by accounting 
information systems. However, conservatism was reintroduced into the new Conceptual Framework of 
2018, and the IASB emphasizes that “Neutrality is supported by the exercise of prudence. Prudence is the 
exercise of caution when making judgments under conditions of uncertainty…” (IASB, 2018, para. 2.16). 
Since then, conservatism (Prudence) is no longer an independent principle in the new Conceptual 
Framework of 2018. 
 
According to the Basic Standard in the ASBE in China, a company should maintain prudent accounting 
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principles and should not overestimate income and assets, or undervalue costs and liabilities. However, 
this view has already been challenged. FASB, in the SFAC2 (1980, para. 95) pointed out that when 
applying the principle of conservatism, financial reports should not include deliberate or inconsistent 
underestimations of profits and net assets, but should be based on cautious judgment of uncertainty, and 
aim to guarantee that the risk in the business environment is deliberated carefully. Therefore, when the 
multiple estimated cash flows are equally likely in the future, the more cautious one should be recorded 
under the principle of accounting conservatism. However, when the possibility of multiple estimated cash 
flows is different in the future, companies should not blindly adopt a more conservative estimate. In the 
Conceptual Framework of 2010, the IASB also holds a similar view. 
 
In general, standard-setting bodies have recognized that "accounting conservatism" is related to 
uncertainties. When accounting conservatism is applied, there are often "measurement errors" or 
"conscious bias". Due to the influence of behaviourism, standard-setters have shifted research 
perspectives to the motives of these acts, and defined accounting conservatism based on the motivation 
driving accounting choices. For example, in British and American cultural context, the secret reserve of 
the company is in conflict with personal property. In Germany and other civil law countries before 2005, 
however, this was not the case. These different perspectives on accounting conservatism make it difficult 
for standard-setting bodies to establish a uniform and accurate definition of accounting conservatism 
across different countries. With the continuous development of equity capital markets, standard-setting 
bodies are more concerned about the function of accounting information to equity investors (Watts, 2003). 
Policymakers have considered conservatism as potentially reducing the value relevance or exacerbating 
information asymmetry.  
2.1.2 Conservatism defined by empirical studies 
The conservatism is defined as underestimating the value of enterprises, which does not only appear in 
the implications of accounting textbooks or accounting standards but also in academic studies. Since 
accounting standard-setting bodies have varying definitions of accounting conservatism, they cannot be 
used directly for guiding the development of the measurement models in the empirical research. Instead, 
scholars provided more specific and verifiable definitions, as well as measurement models employed to 
determine the level of conservatism. While there are disparities in the specific forms of "the bias", as long 
as net assets or net profits are undervalued, accounting information is considered to be conservative.  
 
Conservatism is not a new accounting concept. For example, the statement by Bliss (1924) suggests 
accounting conservatism is classic but more radical. However, this definition does not consider the effects 
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of accounting earnings staging, and therefore, it has not been widely promoted. Paton (1948) pointed out 
that conservatism refers to the efforts of accounting personnel to underestimate net assets or net income 
through a variety of possible ways. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued that conservatism can be 
defined as the effort by accountants to report the lower price in all valuations of relative assets, higher 
prices in all valuations of debt, and the accounting practice of recognizing costs before revenue. 
 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) believed that, when the book value of net assets is less than the market value, 
accounting conservatism might apply. This definition of accounting conservatism makes market-book 
ratio an index for accounting conservatism. Then in 1997, conservatism was redefined by Basu in 
accounting research. He provided the most recognized definition, expressing conservatism as the 
accountants’ tendency to more rigorously verify “good news” compared to “bad news”. "Bad news" refers 
to the items of negative economic benefits while “good news" refers to the items of positive economic 
benefits. Thus, the effects of "bad news" are recorded in a timelier manner, while the effects of "good 
news" are recorded gradually. 
 
Basu's (1997) definition assumes that a company's accounting system processes a firm’s information flow 
news-by-news. The principle of conservatism is evidenced in the accounting system's asymmetric attitude 
towards different input news. For good news, accounting systems need more stringent verification 
conditions. While for bad news, accounting systems increase the timeliness of information disclosure. 
Therefore, the definition of conservatism in the research of Basu (1997) is conditional on the nature of 
news, which is classified as the conditional conservatism by later studies. 
Basu (1997) enriches the understanding of conservatism by studying in depth the procedure of the 
conservative accounting information processing. First, conservatism means that the accounting 
information processor needs extra effort when it comes to handling good news about the company's 
operations. The underlying logic is that the manager of the company has the incentive to overstate the 
earnings of the company1. Therefore, conservatism would not underestimate the value of the entity but 
instead, act as a means of corporate governance by correcting the manager's biases in overestimating the 
firm’s value. In other words, conditional conservatism would increase the value relevance. 
The second point inspired by Basu (1997) is that conditional conservative accounting discloses the 
company's bad news in a more timely manner, which increases the timeliness and value relevance of 
 
1 Manager’s overstatement motivations include manager career considerations, imperfect manager compensation mechanisms, 
use of stock options in manager compensation, and personal ambitions of establishing corporate empire, as discussed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Watts (2003) 
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when bad news occurs. Bad news is more relevant information for both creditors and equity investors due 
to their asymmetric payoff utility. The creditors focus more on the solvency of the company or the 
downward risk of operating performance. Equity investors, though theoretically able to diversify their risk, 
also need to keep abreast of bad news to deter managers from investing in negative NPV projects. 
Another more recent academic example comes from Jiang and Yang (2016), who interpreted conservatism 
as a firm’s disclosing strategy on the summary statistics of its fundamental performance by merely 
signaling the bottom limit of the firm’s performance. Jiang and Yang (2016) suggested that financial 
statement users can learn the entire statistical distribution of a firm’s performance from the disclosed 
bottom limit of value-added. 
 
2.2 Conservatism classification  
The book value of a firm disclosed by accounting usually falls below its value in the stock market (Watts, 
2003). Scholars explain this phenomenon by redefining conservatism or related mechanisms. According 
to their influences, theoretical studies (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver & Ryan, 2005) divide 
conservatism into conditional and unconditional conservatism.  
 
2.2.1 Conditional conservatism 
Conditional conservatism arises from the inconsistent recognition speed of negative and positive 
economic news, which is manifested in the fact that the negative economic news is more timely 
recognized in accounting earnings compared to the positive economic news. In empirical research, “bad 
news” is usually defined as the economic news resulting in losses; “good news” is usually defined as the 
economic news resulting in earnings. As a result, the nature of events directly affects the speed at which 
earnings or losses are recognized. Conditional conservatism in some studies is also called news-dependent 
conservatism (Chandra, 2004), ex-post conservatism (Richardson & Tinaikar, 2004; Pope & Walker, 1999) 
or income statement conservatism (Ball et al, 2000; Pae et al, 2005). If companies’ accounting policies are 
conditionally conservative, losses caused by “bad news” are confirmed timely through the impairment of 
assets, whereas earnings caused by “good news” are not confirmed immediately in the book value of 
assets but recognized over time. In the empirical study of Basu (1997), positive and negative share returns 
can be employed to capture “good news” and “bad news”, respectively. He proved that "bad news" is 
recognized in a more timely fashion, but "good news" is more persistent in the future. Since the timely 
recognition of losses in conditional conservatism alleviates the agency costs, the effectiveness of 
compensation and debt contract will be improved (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). The examples of 
conservatism principles, which those new to accounting are most likely to learn first, are the impairment 
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of assets, provisions, the lower-of-cost-or-market model, and so on.  
 
2.2.2 Unconditional conservatism 
This type of conservatism is related to the under-recognition of net accounting assets through 
conservative accounting treatment methods. Unconditional conservatism means that the accounting 
system will defer confirming earnings or accelerate confirming expenses at the initial recognition of 
liabilities or assets, which leads to higher market value of the company than its book value. Therefore, 
unconditional conservatism can help to explain the permanent difference between the net assets of a 
company measured in accounting terms and the market value of the enterprises’ shares. Unconditional 
conservatism in some studies is also called news-independent conservatism (Chandra, 2004), balance 
sheet conservatism (Pae et al, 2005), or ex-ante conservatism (Richardson & Tinaikar, 2004). The 
accounting treatment methods in unconditional conservatism remain consistent in the changing business 
environment in the future, once the valuation methods are adopted at the initial recognition (Watts, 2003). 
Unconditional conservatism implies that to some extent "bad news" in the future has been predicted and 
confirmed, since accelerated expenses recognition, which is employed as a preventive measure to confirm 
losses before the "bad news" happens, and the conservative method have been adopted at the initial 
recognition. A typical case is the expensing of R&D costs rather than capitalization. Other examples of 
unconditional conservatism consist of the accelerated depreciation method, expensing advertising costs, 
historical cost method, and LIFO method if prices are reducing (Watts, 2003). 
 
Accounting scholars pay much less attention to unconditional conservatism than conditional conservatism. 
According to statistics by Ruch and Taylor (2015), of the 34 studies reviewed in their research, 24 
concern conditional conservatism. On the one hand, there is not enough theory supporting the advantages 
of unconditional conservatism. On the other hand, scholars implicitly recognize that unconditional 
conservatism will reduce the earnings quality, due to the persistent bias generated at the initial recognition 
of assets. 
 
2.2.3 Similarities and differences  
Unconditional and conditional conservatism may interact with each other in function. In many ways, the 
function of unconditional conservatism is line with conditional conservatism, such as minimizing the 
economic uncertainty and litigation costs, counteracting the conflict caused by information asymmetry, 
reducing tax costs, and averting criticism for short of monitor (Watts, 2003). In fact, both kinds of 
conservatism will cause undervaluation of the book value of companies.  
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However, there are also some important differences. Unconditional conservatism utilizes only information 
known at the inception of the asset’s life, whereas conditional conservatism will be affected by future 
information. In addition, these two kinds of conservatism have different focuses: the former is more 
focused on the difficulty of confirming accounting information and the effect of such recognitions on 
earnings in the future; whereas the latter is more concerned with the elimination of earnings manipulation 
in cases when managers have a motivation to overvalue earnings to improve the enterprises’ performance 
and gain rewards under the compensation contract. The key difference between conditional and 
unconditional conservatism is that former can offer new information to improve the contract effectiveness. 
In addition, it is worth pointing out that most of the extant research only focuses on one of these types and 
rarely studies the interaction term between them.  
 
Beaver and Ryan (2005) showed that there is no definite correlation between unconditional and 
conditional conservatism. Qiang (2007) in his empirical research examined four motivations of 
conservatism: contract, taxation, litigation, and regulation, while conservatism was separated into 
unconditional and conditional conservatism. Qiang’s study (2007) supported that contract motivation 
generates demands for conditional conservatism; litigation motivation generates demands for both 
unconditional and conditional conservatism; and regulation and taxation motivation are related to 
unconditional conservatism. Qiang’s results (2007) demonstrated that both kinds of conservatism have 
distinct functions in regulation, taxation and contract, however they have similar function in litigations. 
Moreover, he indicated that unconditional conservatism is negatively related to conditional conservatism, 
since unconditional conservatism can even curb the use of conditional conservatism. He believed that the 
undervaluation at initial recognition of assets (unconditional conservatism) offsets the recognition of 
losses related to “bad news” at the subsequent recognition of assets. As a result, there is a negative 
correlation between conditional and unconditional conservatism, and different demands can be met by the 
two forms of conservatism. 
 
Lafond and Watts (2008) believed that users of financial reports do not merely accept earnings as a 
measure of company value. They emphasized the interaction of accounting information with other sources 
(such as analyst forecasts) throughout the company's information disclosure environment. Specifically, 
accounting information serves as "hard" information subject to rigorous audits and could discipline other 
information sources such as analyst forecasts. As a result, the financial statement users will still benefit 
from the accounting information disclosure even though the accounting information per se diverges from 
the actual value of the company since it improves the overall information environment of the company. 
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This argument, in fact, weighs more upon the reliability of accounting information compared to relevance 
or timeliness. According to this argument, both forms of conservatism are valuable to users of financial 
reports. 
Depending on the results of various academic studies, it can be found that conditional conservatism is in 
fact principle-oriented, which allows managers to have greater autonomy in making discretionary 
accounting policy decisions. By comparison, unconditional conservatism does not provide sufficient 
discretionary accounting decision space for firms’ managers due to the strict restrictions on accounting 
standards. Therefore, unconditional conservatism is generally considered to be rule-oriented (Beaver and 
Ryan, 2005). 
 
2.3 Conservatism motivations and demands of China’s listed 
companies for conservatism 
Extant literature has demonstrated a wide spread and long-term existence of accounting conservatism, 
which shows that there must be an inherent economic mechanism that justifies the existence and 
development of this accounting practice. Watts (2003) summarized significant empirical evidence and 
provided four causes of accounting conservatism: contracts, litigation, regulation and taxation. This thesis 
will also analyse the demand of China’s listed companies for conservatism in terms of these four causes. 
 
2.3.1 Contract motivation 
Watts (1993) believed that debt and compensation contracts are the primary reason for the demand for 
conservatism. Based on contract theory, an enterprise is a combination of a series of contracts (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Differences in contractual arrangements may lead to different opportunistic behaviour 
of contract parties, and the value of the firm will be declined by this opportunistic behaviour. The cost 
generated by this opportunistic behaviour is defined as the contract cost in contract theory. In a market 
that is reasonably predictable, the principal party need to bear the entire contract costs generated by this 
opportunistic behaviour, which gives them the motivation to restrict opportunistic behaviour. On the 
whole, the principal has less information than the agents, and this information asymmetry may cause 
agency issues, such as "moral hazard" or "adverse selection" (Watts, 2003; Hart, 1991). The opportunistic 
behaviours of agents can be anticipated and restricted by rational principals through contracts (Grossman 
& Hart, 1986). It is worth noting that this mechanism is costly in implementing, since managements may 
produce sub-optimal decisions in certain situations if the freedom of managers to make decisions is 
limited (Myers, 1977). Thus, minimizing the contract costs is the main goal in the contract design in order 
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to maximize the enterprise value. Watts (2003) pointed out that contracts include not only formal 
contracts, including management personnel compensation contracts and debt contracts, but also informal 
contractual arrangements including articles of association and rules, enterprise control systems, etc. 
Accounting data is used for various types of contracts and accounting has a major function in setting 
contractual terms and monitoring the implementation of these clauses. In this case, accounting as an 
internal mechanism can help each participant of the contract to reduce agency costs through accounting 
information (Agency costs mainly comprise monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss), thereby 
increasing the value of companies. This generates the need for the verifiability and timeliness of 
accounting information (Dechow et al, 1998). Watts (2003) pointed out that the contract is the initial 
source of accounting conservatism. Conservative accounting information can reduce adverse selection 
and moral hazard generated from limited term of office, limited liability, asymmetric pay, and information 
asymmetry. Therefore, conservative accounting information can decline the possibility of managers 
infringing creditors and shareholders’ interests (Watts, 2003).  
 
On the whole, each participant in the enterprise utilizes accounting information to alleviate agency costs, 
thereby increasing the overall value of the company. This creates the need for timely and verifiable 
accounting information. Conservatism is actcually an asymmetry of timeliness and verifiability. The 
demand for conservatism stems from the asymmetric benefits of the parties in the contract. The following 
information will be divided into two parts for specific analysis. 
 
Contract between shareholders and creditors (debt contract) 
In debt contracts, accounting conservatism protects the interests of creditors in three ways: first, 
accounting conservatism restricts overpayment to shareholders and reduces the possibility of shareholders 
gaining profits at the expense of creditors’ losses (Narayanan and Burkart, 2005). Second, accounting 
conservatism confirms economic losses in a more timely manner. When bad news occurs, the creditors 
are informed more promptly, which can protect their rights and interests effectively and more quickly 
(Zhang, 2007). Third, accounting conservatism restrains the opportunistic behaviours of managers (Watts, 
2003). 
 
To return to the first, accounting conservatism restricts overpayment from debt companies to shareholders. 
The principal agent theory explains the existence of agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders 
(Ahmed et al, 2002). Managers and shareholders may deprive the creditor’s wealth. When the company 
experiences financial difficulties, this agent conflict is particularly serious. For example, excessive 
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dividends to shareholders, debt overhang, asset conversion, etc., will result in the transfer of creditors’ 
wealth to shareholders, thereby increasing creditors’ default risk. The effective contract theory holds that 
the reduction of conflicts between the principal and the agent is in the best interest of all participants. The 
debt contract is designed to reduce agency costs between companies and creditors. To reduce the conflict 
of dividend policy between companies and creditors, the debt contract usually limits the dividend policy, 
including direct and indirect restrictions. Accounting conservatism is an indirect restriction on dividend 
policy. Conservative accounting results in lower cumulative returns, retained earnings, and corporate 
assets, which limits the dividend payment and to a certain extent, reduces the possibility of companies 
paying excess dividends to shareholders. 
 
Ahmed et al (2002) found that the degree of conservatism is improved as the conflict between creditors 
and shareholders become more serious. In the serious conflict between creditors and shareholders, the 
conservatism has more major function in reducing excessive dividends. Accounting conservatism can 
restrict the payment of dividends to shareholders, suppress the managers (or shareholders) overestimating 
assets and profits, and decline the possibility of managers implementing negative net present value (NPV) 
project by using creditors’ funds to pay dividends to shareholders, and overestimating earnings and assets. 
These benefits of accounting conservatism help to shield the interests of creditors and alleviate the 
interest conflict between the creditors and shareholders. When managers choose conservative accounting, 
the credit rating is higher because the conservatism reduces the creditors’ risk. The study by Ahmed et al 
(2002) thus provided evidence suggesting that debt contract is the major reason for the existence of 
accounting conservatism, as it can alleviate the conflict between creditors and shareholders, decrease the 
cost of debt, as well as increase the value of the enterprise. 
 
Second, conservative accounting has accelerated the timely recognition of economic losses and timely 
protection of creditors’ interests. In the debt contract between the creditors and companies, creditors can 
only withdraw the interest and principal, provided that the business performance of companies is great, 
but they may not take back their principal providing the company goes bankrupt. Due to this asymmetric 
return, the minimum value of firms is especially important to creditors. Zhang (2007) discussed the 
correlation between conservatism and post default rate. His research stated that accounting conservatism 
supplies a timely indicator to the creditors that companies may be in breach of contract, which helps the 
creditors to make favourable decisions. Since accounting conservatism reduces creditors’ risk, creditors 
prefer to obtain lower levels of interest rates. Therefore, conservatism is beneficial to both creditors and 
debtors. Watts (1993) also found that accounting conservatism could delay payments to shareholders, 
which is conducive to the protection of creditors’ interests. At the same time, conservatism also helps 
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companies postpone payments to tax authorities and managements, which guards the interests of 
shareholders.  
 
Third, accounting conservatism suppresses managers’ opportunistic behaviours. Watts (2003) believed 
that the lack of restrictions on management’s opportunistic conduct will lead to major deviations in 
financial reporting. Because managers tend to overestimate accounting income and net assets, the 
asymmetrical recognition of gains and losses offsets this bias by managers to some extent. 
 
In short, satisfying the demand of creditors for conservatism not only benefits creditors but also benefits 
all participants in a contract. Accounting conservatism alleviates the agency conflict between creditors 
and shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs and increasing corporate value. This increased corporate 
value will be shared among all corporate-related stakeholders, thereby increasing each stakeholder’s 
interests.  
 
The demand of China’s listed companies for contracts between shareholders and 
creditors 
Much literature concerning the application of conservatism in China examines the impact of the debt and 
the nature of ownership on accounting conservatism, and it is generally believed that the shareholders 
have a more intense influence on the enterprise information than the creditors. 
  
Using data from China’s listed companies, Sun et al. (2005) found enterprises with the increased ratio of 
debt in their capital structure employ more conservative accounting practices than those with the low 
proportion of debt. However, Sun et al. (2005) noted that for the state-controlled enterprises, the effect of 
debt in influencing the degree of accounting conservatism was significantly smaller. Using data from a 
sample of high-tech enterprises in Zhongguancun (similar to the US Silicon Valley), Zhang et al (2003) 
found that the gearing ratio of private enterprises is a major factor in their bankruptcy, which is not the 
case for state-owned enterprises. This means that the constraints of debt are weaker for China's 
state-owned enterprises than for private companies. Therefore, the debt contract under these 
circumstances is unlikely to create an intense demand for conservative accounting information in China’s 
state-owned enterprises. 
 
Zhu and Chen (2006) found that when the proportion of bank loans in their borrowings is low, the 
accounting conservatism of private listed enterprises is more significant compared to that of 
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state-controlled listed enterprises. However, as the proportion of bank loans increases, the accounting 
conservatism of private listed companies is not obviously different from that of state-controlled listed 
enterprises. The findings of this research illustrate that the correlation between the proportions of bank 
loans in a company’s borrowings has a major effect on the conservatism of the public company's 
accounting information. Zhu and Chen (2006) found evidence suggesting that commercial banks in China 
have lower requirements for the accounting conservatism of state-owned enterprises. They believed that 
commercial banks’ lower requirement on the conservatism of China's state-owned enterprises is primarily 
due to China's special property rights. In particular, a "quasi-debt" relationship exists between 
state-owned commercial banks and state-owned enterprises, as they are both owned by the state. This 
"quasi-debt" relationship weakens the commercial banks’ demand for the accounting conservatism of 
state-owned enterprises. ("Quasi-debt" is a kind of debt in which the creditor is also the owner of a 
company.) 
 
Contract between shareholders and management (compensation contract) 
In the compensation contract, conservatism is often utilized to limit opportunistic and over optimistic 
tendencies of management. Since management under an earnings-based compensation contract may 
blindly increase the size of the business to build a business empire, their interests may be inconsistent 
with the interests of shareholders. Because of asymmetric information, inconsistent interests between 
managers, shareholders and incomplete contracts, Watts (2003) found that managers may hide loss 
projects and only report profitable projects. Conservative financial reports are conducive to investors 
reducing managers’ over-optimistic tendencies, and to identifying loss-making projects early, which can 
shield shareholders’ interest and increase firms’ value. 
 
Managers are motivated to recognise economic gains early and defer their recognition of economic losses. 
First, when managers' compensation is calculated and distributed on the basis of accounting income, 
managers may overestimate current accounting income and future cash flows. Second, managers may 
implement certain negative NPV (net present value) projects to meet their own prerequisite consumption 
(on-the-job expenditures), such as managers blindly expanding business in order to establish a corporate 
empire. Although these projects will eventually have an adverse effect on the enterprise, managers may, 
through delayed confirmation of economic losses, delay the adverse impact on the company until the end 
of their management period. 
 
Managers have the ability to confirm economic gains earlier and confirm economic losses later. Managers 
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have more private information regarding the company than other business participants (shareholders and 
debt holders). Managers can release information on economic gains in a timely manner or delay 
information on economic losses, but other groups and even auditors cannot directly observe this private 
information. It can be accomplished in two ways. First, managers can directly relax the recognition 
criteria for economic gains and tighten the recognition criteria for economic losses, which is reflected in 
financial reports where economic gains are confirmed in a timely manner and economic losses are 
confirmed in a delayed manner. Because only the management has this private information, other groups 
cannot judge whether it is reasonable. Second, managers directly convert unrealized economic gains into 
realized gains by selling assets or delaying the sale of assets that have suffered losses. 
 
The demand of Chinese-listed companies for contracts between shareholders and 
management 
The ownership structure of a business can be divided into the Anglo-Saxon corporate structure based on 
the separated ownership, and the centralized structure represented by Asian and European firms. As 
mentioned earlier, the agency costs mainly arise from the opportunistic tendency of managers in the 
process of implementing a contract of managers to investors. Under different ownership structure, this 
conflict can be resolved in different ways. Shares or equity of Anglo-Saxon companies are decentralized, 
resulting in the need for conservative accounting information. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) found that 
the more centralized the equity of a company, the less conservative its accounting policies will be; when 
the equity of a company is more dispersed, the conservatism is higher because private communication is a 
means of information transmission. 
 
However, the United States has built a comprehensive regulatory system and market system in contrast to 
many other countries, which requires the presence of major shareholders (substantial shareholders) who 
can strengthen the supervision of management, thereby protecting the interests of investors. Gorton and 
Schmid (2000) found that presence of major shareholders in German banks can significantly improve the 
operating performance of companies. The strengthening of control by the management of companies due 
to a substantial shareholders’ presence can directly reduce the reliance on accounting information. 
Therefore, it will result in lesser demand within these listed companies for conservatism. 
 
To protect the state-owned assets, shares of public firms on Chinese capital markets can be classified into 
the state-owned shares, tradable shares, and legal person shares. The Chinese government has restricted 
the transfer of shares other than the tradable shares. In general, the level of share concentration in China is 
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extremely high. Provided that the decentralized (or dispersed) ownership is defined by a listed firm 
without any shareholder (substantial shareholder) who hold more than 10% of the total shares, only 1.28 % 
of Chinese public firms met the definition of dispersed ownership by the end of 2006 (Yu, 2008). On 
average, the shareholding ratio by the largest shareholder in Chinese public firms was 36.47% (Yu, 2008). 
By the end of 2006, the public enterprises with the largest shareholders holding over 30% of total shares 
account for 58.68% of Chinese public firms, and the public enterprises with largest shareholders holding 
over 50% of total shares account for 21.69% of Chinese public firms (Yu, 2008). Thus, most of the 
substantial shareholders (major shareholders) in Chinese-listed firms have the ability to affect the firms’ 
management. Liu et al. (2003) found that the Chinese government directly or indirectly control 84% of 
the listed firms eventually, of which the Chinese government directly control 8.5% of the listed firms and 
indirectly control 75.6% of the listed firms by the pyramid holding model. From the actual nature of 
controlling shareholders, most Chinese public enterprises are controlled by the government in direct and 
indirect ways. 
 
Obviously, due to the status of state-owned shares and the centralized ownership, Chinese public 
enterprises resolving the conflict between participants in the compensation contract cannot entirely 
depend on public disclosure like in the United States. In contrast, substantial shareholders can directly 
affect or even control managers to alleviate asymmetric information. Thus, the structure of ownership 
leads many shareholders in China to have lesser motivation than in the United States against opportunistic 
behaviour of management through conservative accounting. 
 
Although the controlling shareholder may directly participate in the reduction of the conflict in the 
compensation contract, it will create new issues: controlling shareholders (or substantial shareholders) 
may deprive and seize the interests of minority shareholders, especially in the case of insufficient legal 
protection for investors. Due to the separation of cash flow rights and control rights caused by the 
pyramid structure in firms or groups, substantial shareholders may tunnel the interests of minority 
shareholders through the dividend payments, the transfer of assets and other ways (Johnson et al., 2000). 
In addition, Claessens et al. (2000) found that pyramid ownership structure and cross-holdings are very 
common in Asian markets. The controlling shareholders in these ownership structures can utilize little 
capital expenditure to obtain a lot of control rights, which lead to more serious "tunnelling" (substantial 
shareholders seize the interests of minority shareholders). This phenomenon is also supported by the 
study by Fan & Wong (2002), they found that with the increasing degree of separation of control rights 
and cash flow rights, the firms’ accounting transparency in East Asia is worse. Fan & Wong (2002) also 
believed that the higher separation degree will not only lead to a higher possibility of encroaching on the 
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interests of minority shareholders, but will also help major shareholders encroach and hide the 
encroachment by manipulating accounting, leading to a decline in accounting transparency. In addition, 
evidence from Ahorony et al. (2005) also illustrated that the substantial shareholders of Initial Public 
Offerings companies (IPO companies) have a tendency of "tunnelling" through earnings management 
(such as, related party transactions). Chen et al (2003) also considered that "tunnelling" is very serious in 
Chinese-listed firms. Therefore, the minority shareholders have an intense demand for conservative 
accounting information against the "tunnelling" behaviour of controlling shareholders. However, because 
of the lack of real control rights and an imperfect legal system, minority shareholders are unable to 
generate an effective need for conservatism. Although minority shareholders can express their wishes 
selling their owned shares, the inalienability (the state-owned shares) or difficult transferability (legal 
person shares) of shares held by controlling shareholders ensure that the controlling shareholders are not 
impacted significantly. Therefore, the demand of minority shareholders cannot create a strong incentive 
for the controlling shareholders. To summarize, this Chinese ownership structure makes the demand of 
minority shareholders for conservatism difficult to influence the company's decisions. 
 
2.3.2 Litigation motivation 
This is recognized as another contribution to theory in conservatism. Beaver (1993) and Watts (1993) 
found that litigation under the Securities Act in the United States strengthens conservative accounting 
information in financial reporting practice since the litigation risk is more significant if net assets and 
earnings are over-reported. Furthermore, the auditors are frequently prosecuted after enterprise 
bankruptcy since auditors issue an unqualified audit opinion for the financial reports under overestimated 
assets and income figures. Kellogg (1984) also proved that the ratio of overestimated and underestimated 
litigation faced by auditors was 13: 1. Therefore, when auditors publish audit reports, they are required to 
reflect more on conservative accounting. Therefore, because of the more significant litigation risk 
expectations of overvaluation than that of undervaluation, auditors and companies have motivations to 
report conservative net assets and earnings. Thus, Kothari et al. (1998) considered that overestimated net 
assets and earnings have a higher litigation risk than underestimated net assets and earnings, which can 
reduce litigation costs and shield the interests of the investors.  
 
Vertical study of litigation 
Kothari (1998) pointed out that the Securities Act before 1966 led to very little litigation, which provided 
an explanation for the contrastingly rapid increase of conservatism after the 1960s in empirical studies. 
Basu (1997) took US public companies from 1963 to 1990 as the research object to examine changes in 
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conservatism on a time series. Basu (1997) followed Kothari’s (1988) division of change phases of the US 
litigation system, and the data was divided into four periods: 1963 to 1966, 1967 to 1975, 1976 to 1983 
and 1984 to 1990; the growth of litigation in the four periods were low, high, low, high, respectively. Basu 
(1997) proved that conservatism significantly improved and the response of earnings to bad news (the 
economic losses) was more timely than to good news (the economic gains) during high litigation growth 
periods (namely, during periods when the auditor takes greater responsibility; the confirmation of the bad 
news is timelier). Moreover, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) verified the stimulating effects of a single 
economic system structure on accounting conservatism. This study showed that the corporate under a 
high-quality justice system reflects bad news more in the income statements than those in a low-quality 
justice system. Moreover, the powerful implementation of the Securities Act (they adopted data on Global 
Vantage including 38 countries, but about two-thirds companies were from GB, USA and Japan) may 
slow the confirmation of good news on income, but the weak implementation does not. In conclusion, 
litigation can increase accounting conservatism. Furthermore, in countries with a perfect legal system and 
a high degree of protection for the investor, management will provide more conservative accounting 
information.  
 
Horizontal study of litigation 
Ball et al. (2000) used Basu’s method (1997) to examine international cross-sectional distinctions between 
conservatism under the continental law (or common law) (e.g. USA, UK, and Canada) and under the civil 
law (or code law) (e.g. Germany, France and Japan), to confirm the different degrees of asymmetry 
timeliness in earnings in different countries. Ball et al. (2000) proved that the conservatism of the public 
enterprises under civil law is lower than under the common law, which is ascribed to the different 
backgrounds of financial reporting from a legal and institutional environment point of view. Moreover, 
Ball et al. (2000) explained that due to an increased degree of investor protection in the common law 
system, firms’ management and auditors are more likely to adopt more conservative accounting policies 
in order to reduce litigation risk. They also noticed that under the common law system, the conservatism 
of companies in the United Kingdom was lower than in other countries, which was attributed to the 
generally lower levels of litigation risk in the UK than in other countries. 
 
Moreover, Huijgen and Lubberink (2005) compared the distinctions in conservative accounting between 
British multinational enterprises listed on US exchanges, and the British companies not listed in the US. 
They found that the financial reports of British enterprises listed on the US exchanges were more 
conservative. On the other hand, they also showed that the existence of a potential and external litigation 
 25 / 203 
 
risk increases accounting conservatism. 
 
Litigation environment for China’s listed companies 
Watts (1993, 2003) indicated that overvalued net assets and earnings lead to litigation against firms and 
auditors more often than undervalued net assets and earnings. The shareholders can directly litigate 
against the firm, which constitutes direct litigation costs, and shareholders directly litigate against auditors, 
which constitutes indirect litigation costs. Therefore, a management that targets decreasing the total 
litigation cost will voluntarily, or urged by auditors, report conservative accounting information. Hence, 
the degree of conservatism is expected to increase with litigation costs. In general, litigation belongs to 
the ex post relief measures in the law which aim to protect minority shareholders' interests. 
 
If the legal system in China can guarantee that the interests and rights of minority shareholders can be 
protected by some remedy measurements (e.g. class actions) when minority shareholders’ rights have 
been invaded, this is conducive to improving the expected gains in litigation. One useful remedy 
measurement could offset the loss caused by the violation of minority shareholders’ rights by substantial 
shareholders and management. Therefore, the firm’s potential litigation risks and costs will be increased 
by overvaluing earnings and net assets. Subsequently, in order to decline litigation risks and costs, the 
firms will have an intense incentive to employ conservative accounting policies under the legal system 
that can effectively protect shareholders' rights.  
 
An effective judicial procedure, class action, can be taken to protect shareholders rights. Class action 
refers to the majority of members having common interests where, due to the excessive number of such 
members, one or several persons on behalf of all members sue or are sued. In the United States, the 
litigations under the Securities Act were relatively few when class action was not allowed before 1966 
(Kothari, 1988). Class action originated in the United Kingdom in the twelfth and thirteenth-century, and 
it was formally introduced into "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" in the United States in 1996. Since 
early 1980s, class action as an effective judicial procedure has been used to shield the interests of 
shareholders in the United States. Meanwhile, it had also become the common means for shareholders’ 
civil claims (besides Anglo-American countries, the other countries and regions allowing class actions 
include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan. Among these countries and 
areas, except for South Korea and Taiwan, others are common law countries). Accordingly, the 
responsibility of management and auditors gradually increased as class action provides an effective way 
for shareholders to protect their rights.  
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Supreme People's Court in China released a “Notice of the Supreme People's Court on the Relevant Issues 
concerning the Acceptance of Cases of Disputes over Civil Tort Arising from False Statements in the 
Securities Market” (hereinafter referred to as Notice). The local court is allowed to provisionally accept 
civil securities claims arising from misrepresentations following the “Notice” issued in 2002. Article IV 
in the “Notice” states that civil compensation arising from misrepresentation can be accepted by the local 
court in the form of individual or joint action. This provision excludes the most effective legal approach 
to prevent and punish illegal acts in negotiable securities proved in the United States and other countries 
through class actions. It increased the difficulty and costs of civil claims for investors. Moreover, for a 
variety of practical reasons, the Supreme Court temporarily allowed only a single (individual) litigation 
whereas the necessity was joint litigation (joinder). In China, the joint action is also far from achieving 
the desired effect in punishing false information, insider trading and earnings manipulation by listed 
companies and thereby protects the interests of investors.  
 
From a historical perspective, the commercial law in China stems from the civil law system and has been 
greatly influenced by German commercial law. Under the code law (civil law system), the judge must 
decide cases in strict accordance with statute and the extended interpretation is very limited, which may 
result in a relatively low efficiency of the implementation of the law. Insiders of a company can take 
advantage of loopholes, which the law does not expressly prohibit, to violate the interests of investors 
without penalty. In factual cases, this can easily result in the rights of investors not being guaranteed. 
 
For example, before the introduction of "Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Trying Cases 
of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market" (hereinafter referred to as 
"Provisions") on January 9 2003, the securities civil suits for compensation of minority shareholders 
against listed companies were often inadmissible. Even if it was admissible, the court would take the 
initiative to adjust and adopt litigation settlement to terminate the proceedings. Although the securities 
civil litigation has been more clearly defined after the introduction of "Provisions", the disadvantageous 
position of minority shareholders has still not improved significantly. The jurisdiction of civil litigation is 
owned by the Intermediate People's Court in the place where the issuer or public enterprise is located or 
where the defendant is located, which requires that investors go to the Intermediate People's Court where 
the defendant, public enterprise or issuer are located to undertake prosecution. This means investors who 
are not from these areas should go to court in the place where the public enterprise is located in to 
undertake prosecution. In addition, since the finance and personnel of the district court depend largely on 
the local government, the local government is inclined to protect local public firms due to the political 
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influence of public companies and the local protectionism. The judge often has a prejudice considering 
the influence of the violating listed company, while ignoring the interests of minority shareholders. 
  
Moreover, a lot of Chinese-listed companies coexist with state-owned assets, and even in some 
Chinese-listed companies (such as, state-owned enterprises), state-owned assets hold a dominant position. 
Thus, if the private property rights conflict with the state-owned property rights, the government as the 
possessor and controller of state-owned enterprises will give more consideration to the interests of 
state-owned assets in designing specific policy and law related to the share market (Zhang, 2005).  
 
In the last few years, Chinese government has tried to solve these problems. The "Securities Act" was 
officially issued on 1 January 2006, which stresses the protection for the rights of minority shareholders. 
This "Securities Act" has strengthened the protection of the interests of minority shareholders to a certain 
degree. With the development of the legal system in China, litigation in the future may offer a powerful 
explanation for enterprises adopting conservative accounting policies. However, during the sampling 
period of this thesis, the Chinese legal system was not yet completely mature. For instance, the "Securities 
Act" has provisions for the misrepresentation, however does not offer any provision for insider trading, 
market manipulation, fraud and other illegal acts. These provisions are still relatively general or lack 
operability, although the new "Securities Act" has introduced some provisions in the relevant areas. For 
instance, Article 203 in new "Securities Act" requires that “Where anyone violates the present Law by 
manipulating the securities market, suspect shall be ordered to dispose the securities as illegally held 
thereby according to law…", but there are no relevant definitions about what behaviour constitutes market 
manipulation. Due to the uncertainty and concealment of the stock market, it is a challenge for the 
government to accurately define and effectively regulate the insider trading, market manipulation and 
other illegal acts. Provided that the scope of the illegal act is not clearly defined, the relevant legal 
provisions cannot work.  
 
In the last few years, the Chinese government has worked hard to promote the capital market 
infrastructure construction (e.g. relevant legal and regulatory systems and so on) and promulgate a few 
securities acts and provisions. Chinese new accounting standards have more detailed and stricter 
regulations on the information disclosure of listed firms. As the litigation costs are improving, the impact 
of litigation on accounting conservatism will continue to grow in the future.  
 
Therefore, during the sample period of this thesis, China's legal system was insufficient and legal 
litigation risk could not put pressure on the erring companies. Litigation only provides very limited 
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interpretation for earnings conservatism in practice in China.  
 
2.3.3 Taxation motivation 
Taxation also is a motivation for adopting conservative accounting policy. The definition and scope of 
income in taxation is not exactly the same as in accounting. In fact, accounting and taxation are not 
always same purposes. Accounting accounts for the financial results of an enterprise in accordance with 
accounting standards, and provides real and relevant information for corporate stakeholders (including 
banks, debtors, potential investors) to make right decisions (Nobes and Parker, 2002). However, taxation 
calculates the income, cost, profit and income tax of the enterprise according to the tax law, and its 
purpose is to ensure the full realization of state taxation, regulate the economy and provide useful 
information to the state tax authorities (James and Nobes, 2002). Thus, the revenue in tax reporting is 
often different from those in financial reporting due to the different purposes of taxation and accounting. 
However, due to both accounting standards and tax law developed by the government in China, the 
relation between taxation and accounting is complex.  
 
There has long been a debate regarding the correlation between accounting and taxation. From a broader 
perspective, the correlation model between accounting and tax can be classified into: Anglo-Saxon model 
(separation model of taxation and accounting), and Continental model (the model of tax dominating the 
accounting, based on the determination of taxable income). The separation model of taxation and 
accounting (or Anglo-Saxon model) is widely adopted in the UK and the US. This model lacks a link 
between accounting and taxation. Both accounting and taxation meet different users of financial 
information. Subsequently, due to different purposes of accounting and taxation, the Anglo-Saxon model 
generates differences in revenue. Hence, companies under the Anglo-Saxon model need to calculate 
deferred tax when preparing tax reporting. By contrast, in a lot of European countries such as Germany 
and France before IFRS convergence in 2005, GAAP is dominated by tax regulation. Under this 
continental model, the calculation of revenues and expenditures in the financial report should comply 
with the tax regulations. In addition, this model is considered to decrease the decision-making 
effectiveness of financial statements.  
 
For the Anglo-Saxon model, which is mainly employed in the United States, taxation as an interpretation 
of accounting conservatism is relatively new and can be traced back to 1909 (Watts, 2003). Under the 
Anglo-Saxon model, the company should proceed from the pre-tax accounting profit and consider the 
impact of a series of adjustment factors to obtain income tax expenses. These factors mainly include the 
permanent differences, temporary differences, etc. Therefore, the company has an incentive to defer 
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revenue by adopting conservative accounting policies (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). In order to decline 
current tax, firms intend to accelerate recognizing loss and delay recognizing gains. The inconsistencies 
of recognizing incomes and expenditures (conservatism) defer part of the tax payment, which decreases 
the present value of taxes. 
 
When the taxable income is linked to reported earnings, the company can reduce the current value of the 
tax through deferred recognition of revenue and accelerated confirmation of costs or expenses, which 
generate the company's demand for accounting conservatism (Watts, 2003). Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) also found that taxation factors motivate corporates towards consistency in income figures in 
accounting reports and taxable income in the US. As long as the company's operating profit, taxable 
profits and interest rates are positive, companies have an incentive to delay the confirmation of revenue to 
reduce the present value of tax. Qiang (2007) examined the data of US-listed companies and believed that 
the taxation factor is one of the reasons for conservatism, especially unconditional conservatism. In this 
study, some exceptions that existed in some scandal companies, such as former WorldCom, are 
highlighted. Due to inadequate capitalization, which was caused by an aggressive strategy, WorldCom 
had to change its interconnection expenses with other companies to capital expenditures to get a tax 
refund within a few years. Meanwhile, this company also utilized various provisions including deferred 
taxes, bad-debt provision and accrued expenses in previous years to offset its interconnection expenses. In 
this way, the income of the company was magnified and used to manipulate its share prices. Obviously, 
although the inflated income will increase the company’s tax, the advantage of manipulating share prices 
motivates the company to magnify its taxable income by using different methods. Therefore, it is hard to 
say that taxation affects accounting conservatism based on these examples. 
 
Therefore, in the high degree of separation model, taxation may not provide an effective explanation for 
conservatism. Desai (2003) considered that because of the separation between the tax system and the 
accounting system, tax factors can only affect the accounting earnings weakly. Thus, taxation as a factor 
may not necessarily support the reasons for companies adopting conservative accounting policies in 
financial reporting. The accounting and tax models in the UK and the US from a global perspective are 
typical Anglo-Saxon models. In the countries with the Anglo-Saxon model, the separation of accounting 
income and taxable income has had a tendency to expand in recent years (Manzon and Plesko, 2002; 
Desai, 2003).  
 
Different from the separation model, for the model of tax determining accounting practices mainly used in 
France and Germany before 2005, accounting regulation is in line with the tax regulation. However, under 
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the Franco-German model, tax mainly determines the financial report rather than the other way around. 
Because the tax dominates accounting regulations, companies’ economic activities that are accounted 
must be in accordance with the requirements of these taxation laws. For example, the factors for the 
depreciation of fixed assets, which include the useful life, residual values are strictly limited by the tax 
law. For the separation model of taxation and accounting, companies can choose different methods to 
calculate the depreciation costs based on the actual economic activities. However, under the 
Franco-German model, the depreciation method adopted by the company must meet the relevant 
provisions in the tax law. Subsequently, companies who can get tax preferences need to set up a separate 
account to record the different amounts of depreciation costs. Therefore, the incentives of tax for 
conservatism also have been weakened to some extent. Consequently, in the two models of accounting 
and tax, the incentives of tax for conservatism are very limited. 
 
Taxation environment for China’s listed companies 
The history of accounting development in China can be divided into three periods: the planned economy 
period (1949-1978), planned commodity economy period (1979-1992), and the socialist market economy 
period (after 1992) (Wang, et al., 2009). During the planned economy period and planned commodity 
economy period, the special system determined the taxation and accounting model in China. During these 
two periods, the economic activities were totally determined by the government and nearly all of 
companies were state-owned. Therefore, the main purpose of accounting was to record the revenues of 
companies. Moreover, it also needed to provide guidelines on the final accounting of revenue and 
expenditure. Meanwhile, the accounting system mainly depended on the requirement of taxation and 
fiscal policy. It means that there was no difference in incomes between tax and accounting rules. Since 
1992, with the gradual integration of China’s standards with the international standards, the disparity 
between tax rules and accounting rules have shown a trend of gradual divergence. After the 
implementation of "Accounting System for Business Enterprises" in 2001, this trend was particularly 
evident. Dai et al. (2005), and Dai and Yao (2006) provided relevant experience evidence for this change. 
As provided by the basic guidelines of “Accounting System for Business Enterprises", enterprises’ accrual 
accounting should be based on the current period regardless of whether the cash is received or paid. 
However, tax law has not fully recognized the applicability of accrual. The recognition of enterprises’ 
revenues and costs are aligned to the cash basis accounting. The separation between tax rules and 
accounting standards is directly affected by the reform of the accounting standards. In particular, the 
re-introduction of conservatism as a basic principle directly leads to the widened degree of separation 
between the accounting system and tax regulations. The separation model of taxation and accounting 
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reduced the incentives of tax in using conservatism principles in financial reporting. Because of the 
separation of financial accounting and income tax accounting, the demand of public enterprises for 
conservatism is significantly declined; not only that, Chen and Li (2001) even found that local 
governments use fiscal and tax measures to help the listed companies to manipulate profits. 
 
In addition, regulatory system in Chinese capital markets is different to other countries that apply IFRS. 
Due to strict requirements for listing qualification, companies are primarily inclined to increase 
performance to satisfy the listing standards, rather than hide performance for tax breaks. Cai et al. (2003) 
found that in the majority situation, Chinese firms are more inclined to improve their profitability by the 
earnings management in order to comply with regulatory policies, satisfy listing standards and secondary 
offerings, or avoid delisting. This can prove that the earnings management of public enterprises in China 
is not tax minimization-oriented. 
 
In summary, in the high degree of the separation between tax rules and accounting standards, or in the 
mode where taxation determines accounting, the incentives of taxation for use in the conservatism 
principle are relatively weak. Only under the model in which tax rules follow accounting standards, can 
the incentives of taxation for use in the conservatism principle in financial reports be maximized. 
However, as long as the tax law persists in implementing the principle of certainty and the principle of 
truthful deduction, the incentives of taxation for conservatism are greatly compromised. Thus, taxation 
has a lower ability to explain the reason for enterprises adopting conservative accounting in the Chinese 
context.  
 
2.3.4 Regulation motivation 
Last but not least, regulation is a significant reason of appearance and existence of conservatism. As 
mentioned by the political cost hypothesis, firms are inclined to understate income by adopting 
conservative accounting policies to avert attention from those who have an eye on high profit industries, 
such as lobby groups or trade unions. Watts (2003) indicated that the overestimated income or net assets 
are likely to generate higher political costs compared to underestimated net assets or net income.  
 
Moreover, investors (debt holders and shareholders) have demand for conservative reports which has 
already been discussed in in the previous section. Therefore, investors will be more dissatisfied with the 
relevant regulatory bodies (accounting standards-setting bodies) if listed companies over-report profits or 
assets than if they under-report profits or assets. This is due to when the company is overvaluing assets, it 
is likely to cause “tunnelling”, allowing investors to take advantage, especially major shareholders. 
 32 / 203 
 
Subsequently, the increased pressure from investors on the setting bodies who establish official reporting 
standards forced them to formulate accounting standards in a conservative manner to avoid criticism from 
investors. Therefore, the setting bodies who establish the official reporting standards and regulatory 
bodies also have an incentive to introduce the conservatism principle into standards. It is similar to the 
asymmetric cost of litigation in that the political cost (criticism) of standard-setting bodies to the 
accounting practice is asymmetrical. 
 
Furthermore, Watts (1977) believed that the loss of overvalued assets or income is easier to be observed 
and exploited than the forgone interest of undervalued assets and income. This phenomenon also provides 
incentives for standards-setting bodies to adhere to conservatism principles, and it apparently led to the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ban on overvalued assets in the first 30 years (Zeff, 1972; 
Walker, 1992). From the perspective of regulation, it shows that accounting should be conservative. Ball 
et al. (2000) found that the United Kingdom, which has contract requirements similar to Australia and 
Canada, had significantly lower levels of conservatism because of lower accounting regulations when 
compared to the accounting conservatism in different countries at the international level, which supports 
the accounting regulation being a motivation for accounting conservatism.  
 
Theoretically, the accounting system regulates the generation process of accounting information and it 
will affect the level of conservatism in the financial report in the future. Therefore, once the 
standards-setting bodies find that companies have the behaviour of overestimating the value of assets or 
income, the setters will take more stringent punitive measures or develop more conservative accounting 
standards. In this way, the standards-setting bodies affect the company's accounting conservatism. Barth 
et al (2006) compared 411 enterprises from 24 countries between 1990 and 2004 that changed from 
applying their national GAAP to applying IAS. Barth et al (2006) found that after the company started 
applying IAS, the earnings management in the financial statements became lower; the recognition and 
confirmation of loss was timelier (higher conservatism); the value relevance of accounting information 
was higher, and the cost of capital was lower than before. This proved that IAS brings improvement to 
accounting quality and conservatism.  
 
Moreover, Srivastava, and Tse (2008) found that from 1972 to 2006, the degree of conservatism in public 
companies in the US continued to increase, both from the more timely confirmation of losses and the less 
timely confirmation of profits. Furthermore, they found that regulators issued many accounting 
regulations for high-tech industries in recent years, such as SOP 97-2 (Software Revenue Recognition), 
SAB 101 (Revenue Recognition), SFAS 86 (Software Development Costs), SFAS 121 and SFAS 144 
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(Impairment of Long-Term Assets), SFAS 123 (Accounting for Stock Options), SFAS 142 (Impairment of 
Goodwill), etc. These accounting standards require enterprises to employ conservative accounting 
practices. As a result, the level of conservatism in high-tech industries has grown faster than in other 
industries, and the difference between the two has happened because of the less timely confirmation of 
gains in the high-tech industry. This supports the regulation explanation for accounting conservatism. 
 
Bushman and Pitroski (2006) no longer follow the dichotomy division of Ball et al. (2000), which simply 
divides law systems into the common law system and the civil law system, and subdivides into four areas: 
the legal and judicial system, the securities law, the political economy, and the taxation system. They 
believed that these four aspects affect the behaviour of managers, investors, regulators and other market 
participants, which in turn affects the motivation of financial report-makers, and therefore accounting 
conservatism. After investigation and analysis, they found that the first three aspects (the legal and 
judicial system, the securities law, and the political economy) have a significant impact on conservatism, 
but the impact of tax law is not significant. 
 
Ball et al. (2003) studied differences in conservative accounting in the four East Asian regions: Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia. Historically, accounting standards implemented in these four regions 
all originated from common law. However, the motivations of the financial report-makers of these four 
regions, including managers and auditors, are similar to those of the civil law system. The research result 
shows that the timeliness of accounting earnings in these four regions is similar to that of the civil law 
system and the level of conservatism in these regions is also similar to that of the civil law system, which 
is lower than that of the common law system. Therefore, they came to the conclusion that the accounting 
standards do not determine the quality of the financial report. On the contrary, the impact of the 
motivation on the financial reporting results dominates. For those countries that want to strive for 
higher-quality financial reporting, changing managers’ and auditors’ motivations may be more important 
than changing accounting standards. 
 
However, Holthausen (2003) pointed out that the sample period selected by Ball et al. (2003) is 1984 to 
1996, but the IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee, which was reorganized to become 
IASB on April 1 2001) began its Improvements and Comparability Project in 1987, and these new 
standards were not implemented until 1995. Therefore, the results by Ball et al. (2003) do NOT indicate 
that accounting standards have little or no impact on the conservatism of accounting practices or the 
quality of financial reports. This may be due to the fact that the accounting standards in the sample period 
are not conservative enough, which leads to the dominance of the financial report makers’ motivation in 
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determining the conservatism degree of accounting practice. Holthausen (2003) also believed that the 
high quality of international financial reporting standards may possibly reduce the adverse effects of 
financial report makers’ motivation, thereby improving the conservatism and quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
In addition, in reality, it is often difficult to assess to what extent the standard-setting bodies strengthen 
the use of the conservatism principle for their own interests. In fact, through the development of a 
conceptual framework or similar guidelines, standards-setting bodies can reduce these risks to some 
extent.  
 
Watts (2003) pointed out that the accounting regulators once encouraged accounting conservatism, but 
recent accounting standard-setters seem to ignore them and advocate a "neutral". Watts (2003) also 
emphasized that although regulation factors have an impact on accounting conservatism, regulators 
increasingly pay attention to prejudice caused by accounting conservatism and advocate more value 
relevance of accounting information (even the relative concept of prudence has been removed from the 
conceptual framework of IFRS since 2010). 
 
Regulatory environment for China’s listed companies 
Since the establishment of China, all accounting standards have been set by the government. Therefore, 
over different economic times, Chinese government has had a completely different attitude towards 
conservatism, which directly affects the development of accounting standards. Moreover, ideas and 
theories depend on the specific economic and social environment. As mentioned above, the history of 
China’s accounting system can be divided into three periods, which include the planned economy period 
(1949-1978), planned commodity economy period (1979-1992), and socialist market economy period 
(after 1992).  
 
In the planned economy period, China adopted a highly-centralized planned economy system and a 
financial system of unified revenue and expenditure. In this highly centralized management system, the 
functions of government and enterprise were not distinguished, and the law of value and role of the 
market were ignored. Specifically, the government set and adjusted unified product prices, and the 
enterprises’ assets were changed upon production price changes, such changes being resolved by state 
funds. In other words, the risk was borne by the state. Second, the enterprise funds mainly came from 
state funding and the National Bank. That means the enterprises belonged to the government, with no risk 
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of bankruptcy. Third, commercial credit between enterprises was prohibited and monetary settlement 
organized by the National Bank, which was the credit centre and settlement centre; therefore, companies 
did not carry risk with regard to accounts receivable. 
 
In the planned economy period, the government took all the risk as the sole owner of the companies in 
China. Moreover, even if there was a risk, due to offset between enterprises, it would not have much 
impact on the national economy. Under this system, in the production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption, the enterprises lacked decision-making power. Correspondingly, companies in this highly 
centralized planned management system did not undertake any responsibility for the results of an 
operation. Therefore, companies would not have any business risks either. Companies simply executed 
the national unified accounting system, and prepared financial statements in accordance with the 
directions of superiors. Accounting reflected the economic activity without relating to the conservatism 
issue in accounting treatment. 
 
In this period, the government as the sole owner of Chinese enterprises did not have the motivations to 
use conservatism. Therefore, the standards-setting board as a government department did not have 
incentives to develop conservatism. Until the 1990s, accounting conservatism was even regarded as a way 
of Western accounting scholars catering to capitalists to conceal their high profits, or an accounting theory 
for valuation in order to gain the trust of short-term creditors (“what is Conservatism?"- Communication 
of finance and accounting 1982 (08), 2016). Before 1992, the accounting standards did not provide any 
incentives to use the conservatism principle in accounting treatment. 
 
Therefore, the special social and economic background of China influenced the government to have 
different views for conservatism in these first two periods. The standards-setting boards as a government 
department forbid the conservatism principle standards. This condition did not change until the socialist 
market economy period. 
 
In the socialist market economy period, China experienced deep accounting system changes three times 
(in 1992, in 2001, and in 2006). During the process of accounting standards reforms and the regulatory for 
China's listed enterprises, the requirements for conservatism of accounting information can be regarded as 
from weak to strong. Since 1992, conservatism was explicitly introduced into Chinese GAAP. Since then, 
conservatism had been gradually improved until the ASBE in 2006. Since other incentive factors of 
conservatism (especially litigation and taxation) may not provide enough explanations as mentioned 
before, it provides a good opportunity for research under this background and in this area. Therefore, 
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China's research in this area is still relatively abundant. Moreover, 2001 is a significant time point since 
after 2001, the accounting information from Chinese public enterprises has generally become 
conservative, but not before 2001 (Chen & Huang, 2006).  
 
Through the research of Chinese public enterprises between 1993 and 2003, Chen and Huang (2006) 
found that the degree of conservatism in China gradually improved after 1998, and financial reporting of 
public enterprises since 2001 have shown conservatism. By comparing the distinctions in accounting 
earnings quality between pre- and post-2001 periods of the accounting system reform, Zhu (2006) proved 
that in the post-2001 period, conservatism, timeliness and the earnings quality had been improved 
significantly, suggesting that regulation changes can significantly affect conservatism. Zhu (2006) also 
emphasized the necessity of reforming the other relative systems (Corporate governance, and capital 
market). The study of Zeng et al. (2008) demonstrated that the accounting information of Chinese-listed 
firms is already conservative in general. Conservatism means that the losses are confirmed timely, but 
gains are verified strictly. They found that accounting policy regulation for the listed companies enhance 
accounting earnings conservatism of the listed companies, but this was mainly due to more timely loss 
recognition. Moreover, Li (2007) found that the establishment of a credit file system in Chinese capital 
markets is indeed able to improve the accounting information quality of public firms to a certain degree 
and therefore Li considered that regulation can directly influence conservatism in China. 
 
But some studies have argued that the companies with losses are the main cause of conservatism found in 
early literature. Li and Li (2005) studied the earnings conservatism of Chinese loss public enterprises and 
earnings conservatism of entire share markets, and found that the earnings conservatism of entire share 
markets in previous studies is not real conservatism. However, the loss companies showed conservatism 
for the whole sample. They believed that China's delisting control system makes listed companies in loss 
years choose conservative accounting policy, and not use conservative accounting policy when in profit 
years. Qu and Qiu (2007) also believed that the impact of the accounting system on accounting 
conservatism is small, and they also found that the conservatism improvement after the implementation of 
accounting standards in 2001 comes mainly from the loss companies based on the results of yearly 
analysis. Chen and Huang (2006) used a component regression method to study the conservatism change 
with corporate earnings changes. Their empirical results showed that high levels of company earnings 
will increase the recognition of good news, which include higher profit and lower expenses and reduce 
recognition of bad news and therefore accounting conservatism is lower; low levels of company earnings 
will increase recognition of bad news and reduce recognition of good news and therefore accounting 
conservatism is higher. This result proved that public enterprises with different income levels have 
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different conservatism characteristics in China.  
 
Moreover, in the relationship between accounting standards regulation and accounting information 
conservatism, the study result of Niu and Wang (2006) showed that the accounting policy regulation has 
an inverted U-shaped relationship with accounting information conservatism and the quality of 
accounting information. Namely, with the strengthening of accounting policy regulation in public 
companies, conservatism in accounting information will increase from low to high and can improve the 
accounting information quality of public enterprises. However, after reaching a certain threshold, the 
growth of conservatism of accounting information will damage the accounting information quality of 
public enterprises. It can be seen from the existing research results that Chinese accounting quality before 
2006 was at a low level. That means the accounting conservatism in China’s listed companies seemed to 
have room to increase before 2006. Therefore, the strengthening of accounting policy regulation for the 
public enterprises in China will help the improvement of conservative accounting information from the 
lowest to the highest level and will also increase the quality of the financial statements of Chinese public 
enterprises. However, accounting information conservatism also has a cost: only when the relationship 
between benefit and cost of accounting information conservatism is confirmed, can conservatism in the 
listed companies achieve an optimal level and quality of accounting information of listed companies can 
attain the optimal level. 
 
2.4 Relationship map of stakeholders in incentives of conservatism 
The relationship map can be built by extracting stakeholders from theories that are partly based on the 
theories of conservatism. On this basis, factors which can control the effect of demand by one stakeholder 
for conservatism to another stakeholder are added into the relationship map. Thereby, a completed 
relationship and influence map can be established. This map can be used to analyse the demand of the 
stakeholders for conservatism and how the conduct of one stakeholder affects other stakeholders. 
 
From the previous section of this thesis, it can be drawn that accounting conservatism is derived from 
cautious reaction to uncertainty. Because of information asymmetry, the accounting information users 
who lack information relative to other parties in the company have an incentive to encourage conservative 
accounting information (contract, litigation, and regulation) (Watts, 2003). On the contrary, the company's 
insiders can use their dominant position of information asymmetry against taxation. Therefore, the 
motivating factor for conservatism can be discovered by understanding the demand of all the parties 
impacted by information asymmetry and by analysing this from different angles. Therefore, based on the 
stakeholders’ relationships and status with regard to information asymmetry of different parties, a 
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relationship map can be established that clearly shows the process of impact of a variety of factors and 
parties on conservatism as a whole. 
 
First, for the contract factors, there are three main stakeholders including creditors, shareholders or 
investors, managers (Watts, 2003). Among the three parties, if all shareholders, including major, medium 
and small shareholders, are seen as a whole, or even the shareholders and managers are seen as a whole, 
creditors are regarded as the most unfavourable ones under the information asymmetry and take an 
inferior position to get relevant information about the company (Ahmed, 2002). Therefore, creditors are 
more concerned with the lowest valuation of the net assets of the company with minimum solvency. This 
will drive creditors into having motivations and demands to use conservative accounting information to 
avoid the company intentionally overestimating assets to get more loans. The company's demand for 
loans allows the company to provide conservative accounting information to meet the requirement of 
creditors (Chen et al, 2010). Therefore, the basic influence of creditors on the company is positively 
correlated to the extent of liabilities of the company. If the company does not have liabilities or relevant 
plans, the creditors’ demands will not affect the company.  
 
In addition, in the main stakeholders of contract, shareholders or investors are the second party in the 
absence of information. They are poorer than managers but better than creditors under information 
asymmetry. Although shareholders or investors are the company's actual owners, they have access to less 
relevant information about the company compared to managers (Watts, 2003). In order to offset overly 
optimistic opportunism and confine blind business expansion by managers, shareholders or investors also 
have motivations and demands for using conservative accounting information to guard against such 
managers’ behaviours. The extent of the need for a shareholder for conservatism largely depends on the 
degree of the concentration of ownership and participation of shareholders in management. From the 
point of view of a contract, this is the main reason that the accounting of private companies is 
significantly less conservative than listed companies (Ball et al., 2005). Moreover, when shareholders are 
subdivided into the major, medium, and small shareholders, the position of medium and small 
shareholders under the information asymmetry is significantly inferior to major shareholders. The 
medium and small shareholders have the demand for conservatism to regulate the major shareholders. 
Hence, the position of all shareholders depends on the ownership structure of the company. 
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Second, for the litigation factor, there are three main parties including investors, auditors, and managers. 
Investors own less information than managers and have demands for using conservative accounting 
information. The influence investors have on managers and auditors is based on the degree of legal 
protection for investors. This explains the reason for accounting conservatism of listed companies in 
common law countries being higher than in civil law countries (Ball et al., 2000) and the conservatism in 
US-listed companies changing with the change in litigation pressure (Basu, 1997). Although auditors 
themselves do not have requirements for conservatism, the legal litigation pressure from investors urges 
auditors to use conservative accounting information to transfer the risk. Therefore, the magnitude of the 
risk of litigation will directly affect the degree of requirements auditors have regarding conservative 
accounting information. It is the same with the contract: managers, among the three parties, own the most 
complete and extensive information regarding the company. Managers as parties who undertake the 
ultimate risk of litigation have the motivation to opt for higher levels of accounting conservatism.  
 
Figure 2.4.2. Relationship map for litigation factor 
InvestorsManagers
Auditors
The degree of legal 
protection for investors
The size of the risk of litigation The degree of legal protection for investors
 
(Source: Author) 
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Third, for the taxation factor there still exists three main parties, composed of the relevant state tax 
authorities, shareholders, and managers. Due to the separation of ownership and management of 
enterprises, the value of interests between owners and managers is difficult to coordinate (Desai, 2003). 
However, the purposes of owners and managers are basically the same, reducing the current tax liability 
and improving the current value of the business when considering the taxation independently. Therefore, 
shareholders and managers can be viewed as one party – inside of the company. In addition, the taxation 
factor is different from the other three factors. For the other three factors, due to the asymmetry of 
information, the disadvantaged parties use accounting conservatism to regulate and affect the advantaged 
parties. In the taxation factors, company insiders (shareholders and managers) use its dominant position 
under the information asymmetry against the outside of the company, the national tax authorities, to 
reduce current tax. The demand of a company for conservatism is mainly based on the degree of 
separation between accounting and taxation (Desai, 2003). Among the parties, government and relevant 
tax authorities are a weak side under information asymmetry, and they have an incentive to use tax law 
and regulations, such as the provisions for highest proportion of provision for bad debts, to prevent the 
behaviour of excessive undervaluation manipulated by shareholders or investors, and managers.  
 
Figure 2.4.3. Relationship map for taxation factor 
Managers Shareholders
The insiders of company
The relevant state tax authorities
The outsiders of company




For the regulation factor, there exists four main parties: the setters and regulators of accounting standards, 
investors, auditors, and managers. Due to the huge number of medium and small investors, investors are 
the disadvantaged party under the information asymmetry compared to the others. As previously 
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mentioned, investors, especially medium and small shareholders and creditors have relatively strong 
requirements for accounting conservatism (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al, 2005; Chen et al, 2003). When the 
demands of investors cannot be met by means other than litigation，the investors will be dissatisfied with 
standard-setters and regulators and may criticize them. Therefore, the extent of influence from investors 
on accounting standards-setting boards depends on the magnitude of risk of criticism. Therefore, 
standards-setting boards will establish strictly conservative accounting standards. Then, managers 
(especially accountants) and auditors have to follow these conservative standards. As a result, the extent 
to which standards affect conservatism is determined by the level of regulatory efforts.  
 
Because of the regulation of accounting standards and pressures from the litigation risk, auditors both 
actively (risk transfer) and passively (standards regulation) require managers (mainly referring to the 
accounting personnel) to keep accounting information more conservative. Finally, the manager is the most 
advantaged party under the information asymmetry. In the regulation factor, the manager (here mainly 
refers to accounting personnel) needs to obey the requirements of accounting standards and audit to 
prepare conservative accounting reports. For managers, they can be subdivided into accounting personnel 
and other managers. In general, although the accounting personnel themselves have to follow the 
accounting standards and the requirements of auditors to generate conservative accounting information, 
they do not have a demand for accounting conservatism. Furthermore, the accounting personnel 
themselves, unlike other managers, do not have demands to work against accounting conservatism, but 
may be driven by the demands of the executive team (e.g. CEO and CFO of the firm). 
Figure 2.4.4. Relationship map for regulation factor 
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Finally, based on the relationship of four figures, the whole relationship of all parties (or stakeholders) can 
be established (please see Figure 2.4.4). Each block in this relationship map represents one stakeholder of 
conservative accounting information. It includes a total of eight specific stakeholders: creditors, medium 
and small shareholders, major shareholders, accounting personnel, other managers, auditors, the setters 
and regulators of accounting standards, and the relevant state tax authorities. In different studies and 
theories on the motivations of conservatism, several specific stakeholders may be considered as a whole 
to be studied, such as shareholders (consisting of medium and small shareholders and a major 
shareholder), managers (consisting of accounting personnel and other managers), investors (consisting of 
shareholders and creditors), insiders of the company (consisting of shareholders and managers), and 
outsiders of the company (consisting of auditors, the setters and regulators of accounting standards, the 
relevant state tax authorities). This is mainly determined by the different purposes and objects of the 
research. 
 
Figure 2.4.5. The whole relationship map of all parties 
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Each ellipse represents one condition or basis of one party’s influence on the next party. For example, the 
extent of liability of the company decides whether the demand of creditors for conservatism influences 
the company and what the extent of such influence is. Therefore, the ellipses in this map are a kind of 
‘Switch’ which can decide whether a group of stakeholders’ demand for conservatism can influence or 
transfer to other stakeholders.  
 
The demand of stakeholders for conservatism is not completely independent of the ‘Switch’. For example, 
in Figure 2.4.1, the company with a high debt ratio will increase the demands of creditors for 
conservatism in general. However, the ‘Switch’ does not always affect demands of stakeholders. In China, 
since most banks are state-owned, the state-owned companies with a high debt ratio may get policy 
support from the government, which makes the demands of creditors for conservatism less evident. 
Therefore, in order to unify general and special situations, this thesis considers first to determine the 
‘switches’ and the extent to which they transfer conservatism demand, and then according to the actual 
situation, analyses the degree of demand from stakeholders. 
 
The condition or basis of influences between stakeholders or stakeholders’ groups, such as the weakest 
effect and strongest effect, can be regarded as positive or negative relationships. However, the conditions 
of the weakest and strongest effects are the ideal situation. Actually, these conditions are rare or even 
absent. Based on the information asymmetry, the figure can be divided into three layers. The first layer 
includes the medium and small shareholders, creditors. Both of them take the most disadvantaged 
position under the information asymmetry. Creditors and medium and small shareholders in the contract 
theory and litigation theory are the main demanders for conservative accounting information. The second 
layer includes auditors, the setters and regulators of accounting standards, and the relevant state tax 
authorities. They themselves do not have a strong demand for conservatism like the parties in the first 
layer. However, due to the purposes of reducing costs (political costs, regulatory costs and litigation costs) 
and risks, auditors and the setters and regulators of accounting standards will encourage, regulate or 
monitor the company using conservative accounting information. The relevant state tax authorities will 
allow a certain degree of conservative accounting because of the state’s protection of investors and other 
reasons (such as provision for bad debts). The third layer comprises major shareholders and managers. In 
contract and litigation theory, they have an incentive to fight against conservatism and are the main 
regulated objects. However, in litigation and tax theory, they also have some motivation to make the 
accounting information conservative. However, these motives are weakened in China due to various 
negative factors such as imperfect law in litigation and separation of taxation and accounting systems 
(Dai et al. 2005; Dai and Yao, 2006). 
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In many studies (Watts, 2003; Basu 1997; Zhang, 2007), medium and small shareholders, and major 
shareholders are treated as a whole part - shareholders. The position of the whole group, the shareholders, 
under the information asymmetry is not fixed, such as the ownership structure of listed companies in the 
US being highly dispersed. Subsequently, there is no major shareholder. Meanwhile, the overall position 
of shareholders will be located in the first layer. All shareholders will have a strong demand for 
conservatism. In contrast, if the ownership structure of a company is highly concentrated and is owned by 
one or several persons who are involved in the operation and management, the overall position of 
shareholders will be located in the third layer. Consequently, shareholders in the highly concentrated 
company will have less or even no demand for conservatism (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2005). However, if 
the ownership structure of listed companies is concentrated and there exist a large number of medium and 
small shareholders such as China’s listed companies, all shareholders will be divided into two parties 
including medium and small shareholders with demand for conservatism, and major shareholders against 
conservatism. In this case, whether all the shareholders show a demand for conservatism will be decided 
by the strength of both sides. The power of both sides is affected by the standards, the legal system, 
governance, etc. Therefore, in the study of conservatism of listed companies, if the shareholders are seen 
as a whole, the ownership structure of various countries and different companies need to be discussed. 
Moreover, not only can this figure be applied to listed companies, but also can be used in private 
companies. The main difference between the two kinds of companies is the ownership structure and 
management mechanisms. Overall, the most disadvantaged party under the information asymmetry has a 
demand for conservative accounting information. In contrast, the most dominant party (managers) under 
the information asymmetry has motivations against conservatism. 
 
Analysis of the influence of new accounting standards on conservatism based on the relationship map  
Based on these relationship maps and the foregoing literature review, it can be found that the regulation 
factor is determined by other factors. The regulation factor explained the impact of the development of 
accounting standards on conservatism. Therefore, it will be incomplete if the regulation factor is treated 
independently. Standards are a process to seek concerted action for one target or multiple targets in a 
group. Diversification of economic stakeholders and heterogeneity of interests have expanded the 
stakeholders of accounting standards to the entire public, which requires different content and different 
levels of accounting information from different perspectives. Therefore, many stakeholders are involved 
in the process of accounting standard-setting.  
 
As mentioned earlier, investors’ demand for conservatism will affect accounting standard-setting in terms 
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of conservatism. In turn, the quality of accounting information also affects investors’ demand for 
conservatism. This demand for conservatism from investors can be explained by contract theory and 
litigation theory. The managers as the users of accounting standards keep accounting information and 
reports in accordance with accounting standards. The reasons for managers working against conservatism 
can also be explained by contract theory. In addition, the relationship of tax regulation and accounting 
standards will decide the extent of conservatism. Hence, the regulation factor is not an independent 
explanation and needs a supplement of other explanations. The new ASBE in China, compared to former 
standards, are generally considered to be of higher quality and comparability and closer to the IFRS, since 
the new ASBE are largely convergent with the IFRS. The IFRS convergence in China not only improves 
comparability in financial reporting but also enhances a company’s information disclosure environment 
and disciplines the financial intermediary industry. Since the conditional conservatism of the listed 
companies is determined by the demand of shareholders and debtholders, the improvement from the IFRS 
convergence in China would reduce this demand. Therefore, on the basis of the relationship map, this 
thesis will establish causality flow in the subsequent part (section 2.6 and 2.7) to further explain and 
analyse the impact of the IFRS convergence on the demand for conservatism. 
 
2.5 Consequences of conservatism 
This section reviews the effect of conservatism on earnings quality, information environment, monitoring 
strength, the risk of moral hazard, the likelihood of adverse selection, firm value, and the cost of capital. 
Extant research on the influences of conservatism on financial statements is primarily concerned with its 
impact on the earnings quality. The study by Dechow et al. (2010) analyzed the definition of earnings 
quality in the extant researches and common proxy variables in measurement. They contended that the 
definition of earnings quality has not yet reached a consensus, which, this thesis posits, may be caused by 
the distinction in scholars' perceptions of how to use the accounting information (for example, valuation 
versus contract). 
George and Gary (2015) studied the influences of conditional conservatism on the earnings, and found 
that the predictability and persistence of reported earnings decrease through conditional conservatism. 
The study by Chen et al. (2013) supported a negative correlation between conditional conservatism and 
earnings persistence found in previous studies and also found that the pricing multiples on earnings are 
declined by the adverse influences on earnings persistence. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2013) also found 
that pricing multiples and earnings persistence are higher for unconditionally conservative earnings than 
for conditionally conservative earnings. 
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Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) and Kim and Kross (2005) provided the evidence that as the degree of 
conditional conservatism increases, the capability of earnings in forecasting future operating cash flows 
will increase, however the capability of earnings in forecasting future earnings will decline. Extending the 
research of Kim and Kross (2005), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) proved a positive relation between 
conditional conservatism and the predictability of future cash flows, and a negative correlation between 
conservatism and the predictability of future earnings. The results of these studies are mainly due to the 
fact that the temporary fluctuations in earnings will improve timeliness of bad news recognition, leading 
to less predictable and persistent earnings from one period to the next. 
In general, if more information is provided rather than less, information asymmetry will be mitigated. 
Thus, the timely recognition of losses is typically theorized to mitigate information asymmetry. 
Conversely, information asymmetry may be exacerbated by deferred recognition of gains due to hidden 
future information. Information asymmetry also may be exacerbated by unconditional conservatism, since 
analysts and investors may conceal information related to the company value, assuming there is no other 
source of such information. 
In addition, LaFond and Watts (2008) proved that information asymmetry is positively correlated with 
conditional conservatism and believed that information asymmetry is a major reason for the generation of 
conditionally conservative accounting. Moreover, LaFond and Watts (2008) also contended that critics of 
conservatism have misunderstood the positive relationship as information asymmetry being caused by 
conservatism. They theorized that there is demand from stock market investors to alleviate the influences 
of information asymmetry through conservative accounting (2008), and thus conservatism will generate 
within an asymmetric information environment. 
The research by Hui et al. (2009) supported the conclusions of LaFond and Watts (2008): they (2009) 
found a negative association between conservatism and voluntary disclosure, suggesting that the timely 
recognition of bad news can be used as an alternative for voluntary disclosure. Therefore, they (2009) 
believed that conditional conservatism reduces the demand for disclosing bad news. 
Most current findings provided ex-post evidence that conditional conservatism conduces to the 
improvement of business decisions. Findings by Francis and Martin (2010) presented that conservatism as 
a tool can restrict management’s investment in negative NPV projects. Because of the existence of 
conditional conservatism, the loss from negative NPV projects is comfirmed more timely than gains from 
positive NPV projects, which increases the possibility of abandoning negative NPV projects and investing 
in positive NPV projects. In particular, they found that there is a positive correlation between the expected 
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acquisition profitability and asymmetric timeliness of earnings, which is line with that it is more 
profitable to invest in conservative companies. 
Louis et al. (2012) theorized that due to excess cash holdings in negative NPV projects, the investment 
becomes inefficient, meaning that the market value of every additional dollar in cash holdings is worth 
less than one dollar. Since the investment in negative NPV projects can be suppressed to some extent by 
the timely loss, Louis et al. (2012) found that conditional conservatism can improve the market value of 
cash holdings. This indicates that the efficiency of cash holdings in investment will be improved with the 
increase of conditional conservatism. 
 
2.6 Causality flow from conservatism to firm value 
The causality flow from conservatism to firm value arises from motivations, the relation map, and the 
consequence of conservatism discussed earlier in this thesis. Conditional conservatism can improve the 
quality of accounting information in two ways. First, it makes it more difficult for the manager to 
overstate the earnings by setting a higher threshold for verifying the good news (Basu, 1997). Second, 
conditional conservatism can suppress the motivation of the manager to withhold bad news and even 
speed up the disclosure of bad news (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Conditional conservatism improves 
earnings quality and thus can better discipline other information sources such as financial analysts 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010). As a result, conditional conservatism improves the overall information 
environment of the enterprise. In the pre-contract phase, declining information asymmetry due to 
conditional conservatism can lead to the lower likelihood of adverse selection. In post-contract phase, 
conditional conservatism strengthens the principal’s ability to monitor the agent’s work to reduce the risk 
of moral hazard. In the setting of the repeated game, conditional conservatism lightens the company's cost 
of capital and eventually positively affects the enterprise’s value. 
Therefore, the sequence of the primary causality line from conditional conservatism to firm value is as 
follows: 1) conditional conservatism positively affects earnings quality (Kim and Kross, 2005; 
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010); 2) conditional conservatism positively affect the firm’s internal and external 
information environment (Louis, Lys and Sun, 2014); 3) conditional conservatism facilitates stronger 
monitoring (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007); 4) conditional conservatism reduces the moral hazard (Kim 
and Zhang, 2013; Francis and Martin, 2010; Kravet, 2014; Lara, Osma and Penalva, 2016; Francis, Hasan 
and Wu, 2013); 5) conditional conservatism reduces the likelihood of adverse selection (Kim et al., 2013; 
Hui, Matsunaga and Morse, 2009); 6) conditionally conservative accounting reduces the cost of capital 
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(Lara, Osma and Penalva, 2011; Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008); and 7) conditional conservatism 
positively affects firm value (Louis, Sun and Urcan, 2012; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). Based on what 
has been discussed above, the main causality line can be established. 
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(Source: Author) 
In addition to the main causality line which focuses on the efficient contracting theory, scholars also 
pointed out a few other logical branches. Hui, Klasa and Yeung (2012) argued that conditional 
conservatism can positively affect the perceptions of firm’s customers and clients, which results in better 
performance of the company. LaFond and Watts (2008) suggested that conditional conservatism can also 
decrease the possibility of insider trading, and thereby reduce the information asymmetry between 
informal contracting parties. Both additional causality links share the same direction with the 
efficient-contracting story, that is, conditional conservatism positively impacts firm value.  
 
The figure also needs to contain the causality relating to unconditional conservatism, which is mainly 
discussed by Beaver and Ryan (2005). Expenditure, such as research and development (R&D) and 
advertising, incurred by most of the intangible assets formed internally are expensed, which gives rise to 
unconditional conservatism. As aforementioned, few empirical studies investigate either cause or 
consequence of unconditional conservatism. Qiang (2007) is one exception who evaluates the 
determinants of both conditional and unconditional conservatism within the framework provided by Watts 
(2003). 
 
The figure below demonstrates the whole causality flow of current literature on conservatism, which 
covers most arguments of existing studies. Each arrow connects a pair of cause and consequence with the 
arrow direction indicating causality. The three rectangles encircled by a dashed oval are the factors that 
directly affect the firm value. Thus, this thesis observes an unbroken causality chain from conditional 
conservatism to firm value, which is also one of the main contributions of this thesis.  
 
As this thesis mentioned earlier, the articles which discuss the consequences of conditional conservatism 
assume that ineffective contracting schemes will not be eliminated immediately by the market. Along 
with the progress of evolution, companies overall become more conservative. Therefore, at each observed 
time point, the variance in the degree of conservatism among different companies is the difference in 
company efficiency. This assumption contradicts the argument of an efficient market with rational players. 
In an efficient market, the firm value can, in turn, affect the firm's choice of its conditional conservatism 
level. As a result, the causal chain becomes a closed loop. Moreover, given the business, Darwinian law 
would eliminate inefficient companies, and the financing costs (the oval-shaped part) would ultimately 
affect the conservatism of the surviving company. 
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(Source: Author) 
2.7 Analysis for the influence of Chinese IFRS convergence on 
conservatism based on causality flow  
In the end of section 2.4, this thesis utilizes the relationship map to analyze the impact of the Chinese new 
standards and find that the IFRS convergence in China will affect the demand of the shareholders and 
debtholders for conservatism. In order to further study the influencing factors of IFRS convergence on the 
demand for conservatism, a causality flow of conservatism is established in section 2.6 based on the 
relationship map. This section will analyze and discuss the specific impact of the IFRS convergence 
(section 2.7.1) and establish a causal diagram for Chinese IFRS convergence on conservatism (section 
2.7.2).  
 
2.7.1 Effects of China’s IFRS adoption 
China’s new accounting standards implemented from January 1 2007 focuses on improving the 
accounting information quality and strengthens the concept of providing useful accounting information 
for decision-making by investors and the general public. In addition to adapting to Chinese socialist 
market economy, the new accounting standards are convergent with international financial reporting 
standards to satisfy the demands of China's economic globalization. 
 
International convergence of China’s standards will increase the comparability and quality of financial 
reporting on a global scale. Some studies have confirmed that the accounting standards convergence 
reduced the discrepancies in financial reports from different countries and promoted cross-border 
investment (DeFond et al, 2011, Gordon et al, 2012, Jones and Finey, 2011, Barth et al, 2012). Moreover, 
some literatures focusing on the accounting information quality proved that the quality of information 
disclosure (Daske and Gerbhard, 2006) and earnings information content (Landsman et al. 2012) 
improved after the convergence. 
 
Improved accounting information quality 
China’s new accounting standards emphasized the requirements for the quality of accounting information. 
In addition, the new basic standard highlights the goals of financial accounting: providing users 
(including investors, creditors, governments and related departments, and the general public) of financial 
reports with accounting information related to an enterprise’s financial situation, cash flows and operating 
results; reflecting the performance of the enterprise’s management responsibilities; and helping users of 
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financial reports to make economic decisions. 
 
Compared to former standards, the new standards have more comprehensive and detailed requirements 
for accounting information. In addition, China’s Ministry of Finance has also published the "Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises - Application Guide" and "Explanation on Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises". These publications include not only the addition and revision of specific 
accounting standards, but also the formats of various financial statements and consolidated financial 
statements, and the "accounting and main accounting processing" in line with the new standards. These 
changes are conducive to improving the accounting information quality. 
 
Improved comparability of accounting information 
The new standards, originating from the fact that China's market economy has gradually matured, draw 
on international practices as much as possible to converge with IFRS. The IFRS convergence has 
effectively narrowed the gap between China's accounting standards and international accounting 
standards and improved the degree of comparability between the accounting information of Chinese 
companies and various other companies in the world. Therefore, the implementation of the new 
accounting standards system will greatly improve the comparability of Chinese public enterprises’ 
accounting information with the Hong Kong market, European and other overseas markets, which is more 
conducive to cross-border comparisons and investment. 
 
Improved capital market development 
The improvement and development of the capital market is the internal driving force for the reform of 
accounting standards. In recent years, China's capital market has developed rapidly with more than 1,300 
listed companies. The effectiveness of China's securities market is constantly improving. This has 
increased the need for the disclosure of accounting information, as well as the quality of accounting 
information.  
 
Moreover, high-quality corporate accounting standards are a necessary guarantee for the adequate and 
effective disclosure of accounting information in a well-functioning capital market. The new accounting 
standards have directly led to the full disclosure of accounting information and have improved the quality 
and content of accounting information. Under the new standards, a large amount of relevant information 
can be easily communicated to the outside world, which not only helps investors make better decisions, 
but also promotes the efficient operation of the capital market. 




Under former Chinese accounting standards, the unreasonable and low transparency in the disclosure of 
accounting information intensified the information asymmetry between the investor and the company 
management. The new accounting standards adopt information-disclosure methods in line with 
international standards, and have a better quality of information disclosure, therefore improving corporate 
governance. Most of the research conclusions proved that high-quality accounting information disclosure 
can objectively and truly reflect the corporate governance objectives and performance. Therefore, there is 
an interactive correlation between accounting standards and governance: on the one hand, the disclosure 
of accounting information promotes the optimization of corporate governance; and on the other hand, 
corporate governance is conducive to improving the quality of accounting information (Zhu and Cheng, 
2006). 
 
2.7.2 Impacts of Chinese IFRS–adoption on conservatism 
The causal flow and the effect on the conservatism of Chinese IFRS–adoption is shown in the figure 
below. With improved quality, comparability, and transparency of accounting information disclosure, 
IFRS-based accounting standards could alleviate the information asymmetry between different 
contracting parties and could also mitigate the monitoring costs of debt between the agent and principal. 
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(Source: Author) 
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Improved disclosure environment 
After the convergence, improved quality of information disclosure and earnings information 
content will significantly improve the disclosure environment of China's capital market, 
which will alleviate the information asymmetry between companies and external stakeholders. 
Information asymmetry is a major cause of external stakeholders' demand for conservative 
financial reports. Therefore, it is foreseeable that IFRS-based standards will ultimately 
alleviate companies’ information asymmetry, and the improved disclosure environment 
moderates demand for accounting conservatism. 
Firm’s State Ownership 
Compared to non-State Owned Enterprises (non-SOEs), State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
have lesser incentives to disclose information to outsiders. Since CEOs of SOEs are usually 
former or current bureaucrats in Chinese government, Fan et al. (2007) found that these CEOs’ 
compensation and promotion may be evaluated more by various social and political factors 
than by financial and operating performance. Moreover, SOEs enjoy the government’s 
implicit insurance (Cull & Xu, 2000). If the politically beneficial SOEs fall into financial 
difficulties, SOEs can turn towards the government for financial assistance. Therefore, there 
should be sufficient distinctions between SOEs and non-SOEs in the effect of IFRS-based 
standards on the need for conservative financial reports. 
Reduced monitoring costs 
In China, new standards may also decline principals’ (debtholders) needs for bad news by 
reducing the monitoring costs of debt. In this case, the monitoring costs of debt refer to the 
cost of principal monitoring and guaranteeing that the agents can actually perform the 
contract. Therefore, Jayaraman & Shivakumar (2013) found that lower monitoring costs 
would make the principal more inclined to directly monitor the agent's work than to employ 
incentive agreements. Due to decreased monitoring costs, debtholders, especially the banks, 
will be motivated to exercise their control rights on firms’ operation and directly supervise 
companies’ management. Thus, debtholders will demand for less conservatism after Chinese 
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IFRS convergence. 
Bank’s State Ownership 
It is also driven by the fact that most banks are controlled by the government which is more 
concerned with politics than commerce. Thus, given the low level of incentives for 
monitoring borrowers, banks owned by the Chinese state will have lower demands for 
conservative financial reports. Therefore, non-SBs (non-State-owned Banks) and SBs 
(State-owned Banks) have different needs to secure sufficient net assets to repay loans. 
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Figure 2.7.1 demonstrates the causality flow of the effect of China’s IFRS adoption on 
conservatism. As conditional conservatism varies depending on the changes in stakeholders’ 
demand, this thesis focuses on studying the impact of IFRS-based standards on the demands 
for conditional conservatism. It can be found from figure 2.7.1 that four main factors affect 
the demand for conditional conservatism: ex-ante information asymmetry, monitoring cost, 
corporate governance, and creditor’s ownership. Dashed ovals are the proxies that can 
measure these four main factors affecting the demand for conditional conservatism. Since this 
study focuses on the impact of IFRS-based standards on the demand for conditional 
conservatism, This thesis use the watts-based framework (contracts, litigation, regulation and 
taxation) to simplify the figure 2.7.1 to figure 2.7.2, which can make the factors this thesis 
will study clearer and more pronounced. These impacts of new standards on the changes in 
demands for conditional conservatism will be further discussed in the hypothesis section. 
Differing from the conditional conservatism, changes in unconditional conservatism are 
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Chapter Three: Application of accounting 
conservatism measurement methods in 
China 
The efficiency of the Chinese share market and its impacts on the applicability of accounting 
conservatism measurement methods 
One of the most important features of the capital market in China, affecting the application of 
accounting conservatism measurement methods in China, is the relatively low level of market 
efficiency in the Chinese share market. Market efficiency refers to the degree to which market 
prices of assets reflect all the available information. This concept was first developed by 
Eugene Fama who categorised market efficiency into three levels: strong-form efficiency, 
semi-strong form efficiency, and weak-form efficiency (Fama, 1970). Based on this theory, 
market efficiency refers to the ability of the share market to incorporate new information. The 
different degrees of market efficiency have different implications depending on the degree to 
which available information is incorporated in share prices. In a weak-form efficient share 
market, share prices reflect information contained in the historical prices of the share; in a 
semi-strong form efficient market, share prices reflect all the publicly available information; 
in a strong-form efficient market, share prices reflect both publicly and privately available 
information (Ogden et al., 2003).  
 
Due to the many regulatory restrictions in the Chinese stock market, such as the segmentation 
of the stock market into A and B shares, the overwhelmingly dominant role of the banks in 
Chinese financial system and the existence of non-tradable shares in the Chinese stock market 
prior to the stock market reform in 2006, it was generally believed that the Chinese stock 
market is much less efficient than mature stock markets, e.g. the US and the UK. With 
research evidence showing that the share market in China is not even weak-form efficient 
according to Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis (EMH). For example, studies such as 
that of Mookerjee and Yu (1999), Darrat and Zhong (2000), and Seddighi and Nian (2004) 
tested the efficiency of the stock market in China and proved that the Chinese stock market 
was not weak-form efficient. Moreover, there was also evidence to suggest that the efficiency 
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of the Chinese stock market has been improving as a result of improvements in the 
effectiveness of market regulation and liquidity. For example, in a longitudinal study using 
China’s share market data between 1992 and 2001, Li (2003) proved that the efficiency of the 
Chinese stock market has been gradually improving over this period.  
 
For the period between 2000 and 2010, which is the focus of this study, Chong et al. (2011) 
investigated the profitability of various trading strategies in the Chinese share market and 
found empirical evidence confirming the weak-form efficiency of the Chinese stock market 
since the split share reform in 2006. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2010) found that the 
efficiency of the Chinese stock market was still significantly weaker than the US stock market, 
pointing to persistent mispricing in the Chinese stock market. In one of the latest studies on 
the efficiency of the Chinese stock market, Carpenter et al. (2014) found evidence proving 
that the efficiency of the Chinese share market has been increasing steadily in terms of share 
price informativeness after a series of structural reforms.  
 
The efficiency of the Chinese stock market has significant implications for accounting 
conservatism measurement methods that incorporate market-based measures, e.g. the market 
value of equity, share return and earnings response coefficient (ERC). Such accounting 
conservatism measurement methods include the net asset measurement method, the earnings 
and accruals measurement method based on earnings persistence, the earnings-share return 
measurement method and the event research measurement method. Apart from the net asset 
measurement method, all of these accounting conservatism measurement methods are 
developed based on the Basu model, which is designed to capture conditional conservatism 
and is heavily reliant on efficient market hypothesis. The measurement methods for 
conditional conservatism were discussed in the method chapter, i.e. the earnings persistence 
measurement method, the earnings-share return measurement method, and the earnings 
response measurement method, all measure conservatism in terms of the asymmetric 
timeliness in recognising good earnings news and bad earnings news.  
 
The assumption underlying these conditional conservatism measurement methods is that the 
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stock market is efficient in the sense that share returns reflect all publicly available news in a 
timely and efficient fashion. Based on this assumption, bad earnings news and good earnings 
news are symmetrically reflected in stock prices and share returns. This means that any 
asymmetry in the timeliness with which bad/good earnings news that is reflected in share 
returns is purely a result of conservatism in financial reporting practices. Thus, it makes the 
measurement of asymmetry in the timeliness with which bad/good earnings news is reflected 
in share returns a viable model of measuring conditional conservatism. Given the link 
between share market efficiency and the symmetry in the timeliness with which earnings 
news is reflected in share returns, understanding the efficiency of the Chinese stock market is 
of great significance if conservatism measurement methods relying on the efficient market 
hypothesis are to be applied in measuring Chinese A share market.  
 
3.1 Factors that have influenced the efficiency of the Chinese 
stock exchange and their implications for conservatism 
measurement methods 
3.1.1 Restrictions to trade in A shares and B shares 
The stock market in China was first developed in the early 1990s as part of the market reform 
of the Chinese economy. In order to attract international capital flow while avoiding their 
adverse impacts, the Chinese government implemented a two-class share market system in 
both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, both of which trade two separate classes of 
shares, A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are only available to the residents and legal persons 
in the People’s Republic of China, excluding Hong Kong and Macau. On the other hand, the 
B-share is settled in Hong Kong dollars or US dollars and is only available to foreign 
investors. 
 
There was also mixed evidence regarding the efficiency of the Chinese share market with 
regards to the A-share and B-share market. For example, Wang et al. (2004) found evidence 
indicating that the A share market (available only to domestic investors) is weak-form 
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efficient, while the B-share market (available only to foreign investors) is not. The reason for 
this, according to Li (2003), is that domestic investors in China’s A-share market have better 
access to information than foreign investors in the B-share market.  
 
In February 2001, the Chinese government decided to relax the rules, preventing domestic 
investors from trading in B shares, and allow foreign investors to trade in the A-share market 
on a limited scale. The elimination of the restriction to trade in A-share and B-share markets 
has helped to improve the efficiency of both the markets, according to empirical findings 
from Chan et al. (2006) and Fifield and Jetty (2008). Prior to the elimination of this restriction, 
investors in both A-share and B-share markets faced constraints in accessing market 
information. From the perspective of domestic A-share investors, because of the Chinese 
government control over the media in China, their access to market information is restricted 
and incomplete; from the perspective of foreign B-share investors, their lack of understanding 
about the particular economic and business environment in China, as well as the difficulty of 
accessing information about domestic companies, meant that it was often more difficult for 
them to access information about Chinese companies who were listed on the B-share market 
(Hung, 2009). According to the empirical findings of Fifield and Jetty (2008), the lifting of 
the restrictions to trade A-shares and B-shares has had a positive effect on the pricing 
efficiency of both Chinese A-share and B-share markets as it has helped both domestic and 
foreign investors to get more complete company and market information and improved the 
speed with which information is distributed to investors. Importantly, Hung (2009) tested the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in Chinese A-share and B-share stock markets both before 
and after the release of the restrictions to trade in A-shares and B-shares and found that only 
A-shares traded in Shanghai Stock exchange met the criteria for weak-form EMH prior to this 
regulatory change, while A-shares and B-shares traded in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchange were found to be weak-form efficient after the regulatory change. Hung’s (2009) 
finding offers significant evidence regarding the improvement in the efficiency of the Chinese 
share exchange following the release of the restrictions to trade A-shares and B-shares in the 
Chinese share market.  
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In particular, deBondt et al. (2010) used a fundamental-based model to investigate booms and 
busts in China’s stock market from 2000 to 2009, and found evidence suggesting that the 
A-shares market was weak-form efficient after 2005, while the B-share market was not 
efficient. They suggest that this was because of the greater size and trading volume of the 
A-share market, leading to significantly better market liquidity and in turn higher efficiency in 
price discovery. Huang et al. (2008) and Beltratti et al. (2012) also found similar results 
confirming the superior efficiency of the A-share market. Thus, for the objective of this thesis, 
market-related data, e.g. share price and share return, will be obtained from companies listed 
in the A share market.  
 
3.1.2 Transformation of non–tradable shares into tradable 
shares (split share reform) 
The Chinese share market is unique in its large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
listed on Chinese stock exchanges. When the Chinese stock market was first established in 
1990, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese corporate sector was comprised of SOEs. As 
these SOEs became listed companies on the stock market, state ownership in these companies 
was diluted. In an effort to retain control of SOEs after they became listed companies, the 
Chinese government devised a special class of shares, known as non-tradable shares, which 
entitled its owners to the same rights of ordinary shareholders but could not be traded publicly. 
Non-tradable shares in the Chinese share market were typically owned directly by the Chinese 
government or by financial institutions that were ultimately owned by the Chinese 
government.  
 
The segmentation of tradable and non-tradable shares in the Chinese share market created a 
host of problems and adversely affected the efficiency of the Chinese share market. Because 
holders of non-tradable shares could not directly trade their shares on the open market to earn 
profits, they were incentivised to make profits by tunnelling funds from listed companies or 
embezzling state assets, leading to poor corporate governance (Feng et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the presence of a large number of non-tradable shares significantly constrained 
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the liquidity of the Chinese share market, adversely affecting the stock market’s efficiency in 
price discovery, which in turn affected the efficiency with which share prices reflect available 
information (Genevieve and Wei, 2005). At the end of 2005, as much as two thirds of the 
shares listed on the Chinese share market were non-tradable, thus severely compromising the 
liquidity of the Chinese share market, which in turn adversely affected its efficiency (Mattlin, 
2007). 
 
In April 2005, the China Security Regulatory Commission, the official regulator of the 
Chinese share market, announced the turning of non-tradable shares into tradable shares. This 
transformation process was known as the ‘split share’ reform, and was completed by the end 
of 2006, by which time all non-tradable shares were transformed into tradable shares 
(Beltratti et al., 2016). The elimination of non-tradable shares significantly improved the 
efficiency of the Chinese share market as it allowed for better opportunities for investors to 
share risks and offer higher and more stable market liquidity. For example, using the Chinese 
stock market data from 2006 to 2015, Beltratti et al. (2016) found empirical evidence showing 
that efficiency of the Chinese share market had been improving since the split share reform. 
In particular, Beltratti et al. (2016) found that there was no existence of valuation errors with 
regards to the market value of public companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges and suggested that the Chinese share market became weak-form efficient after the 
split share reform. Similarly, focusing on the A share market, Yi and Liu (2011) found 
empirical evidence supporting the weak-form efficiency of the Chinese share market and 
improvements of market efficiency after the split share reform. 
 
3.1.3 Lift of the ban on short selling  
Short selling was banned in the Chinese share market until 2010. This ban likely had adverse 
impacts on the efficiency of the Chinese share market, particularly in relation to market 
valuations (Chang et al., 2014). Many researchers believed that restrictions on short selling 
adversely affected market efficiency. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), for example, found that 
constraints on short selling hinders price discovery in stock markets, especially in relation to 
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negative information. Comparing international stock markets with different rules regarding 
short selling, Bris et al. (2007) measured the loss of market efficiency as a result of short 
selling constraints and found that negative information is reflected in prices more efficiently 
in markets where short selling practices are allowed. Similarly, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) 
found that price efficiency is higher in markets with less restriction on short selling.  
 
Given the large body of empirical studies confirming the negative impacts of short selling 
constraints on market efficiency, particularly the efficiency with which negative news is 
incorporated in stock prices, it can be expected that the long-standing ban on short selling in 
the Chinese share market prior to 2010 had negative impacts on the efficiency of the Chinese 
share market, especially the efficiency with which negative information was reflected in firms’ 
shares prices and market values. When the ban on short selling in China’s share market was 
lifted in 2010, market efficiency was expected to improve. In support of this hypothesis, 
Chang et al. (2014) investigated the changes in the efficiency of the Chinese share market 
after the ban on short selling was lifted. They found that short selling activities helped to 
improve market efficiency by eliminating over-pricing more efficiently. Therefore, the release 
of the ban on short selling in the Chinese share market significantly improved the efficiency 
of the Chinese share market, especially with regards to incorporating negative news in share 
prices and market valuations, according to the empirical findings of Chang et al. (2014).  
 
3.2 Implications of China’s share market efficiency for the 
application of conservatism measurement methods in China 
At present, there are five main categories of the measurement method in accounting 
conservatism in the research literature: net assets measurement method; earnings and accruals 
measurement method; earnings–share return measurement method; accrual–cash flow 
measurement method; and event research method. Table 3.1 presents these methods with the 
relative literatures. Before discussing the suitability of these methods in China, it is first 
necessary to understand these methods. However, for the convenience and fluency of reading, 
and to reduce the amount of repetitive discussion on methods, the methods used in this study 
 67 / 203 
 
will be reviewed and discussed in detail in the respective method sections. For example, the 
Accrual – cash flow method and Basu method used to detect conditional conservatism will be 
discussed in Section 5.1 and 5.2: Method development for measuring conditional 
conservatism, and the BTM method used to test unconditional conservatism will be discussed 
in Section 5.6: Method development for measuring unconditional conservatism, while other 
methods will be discussed in the appendix. To understand other methods or for questions 
about certain methods during the discussion, please refer to Appendix-Methods Review. 
Table 3.1 Conservatism measurement method 
Categories of measurement 
method 
Specific indicators or method Representative literature 
Net assets measurement 
method 
Valuation model Ahmed (2001) 
Feltham - Ohlson (1995) 
The market value to book 
value ratio (MTB) 
Beaver and Ryan (2000) 
Earnings and accruals 
measurement method 
Earnings persistence Basu (1997)  
Brooks and Buckmaster 
(1976)  
The degree of skewness and 
fluctuation of earnings and 
accruals 
Ball et al. (2000) 
Cumulative accrual Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
Earnings – share return 
measurement method 
The ratio of regression 
coefficients of earnings on the 
‘good news’ to ‘bad news’  
Basu (1997), Khan and Watts 
(2009) 
 
The ratio of R2 of earnings on 
the ‘good news’ to ‘bad news’ 
Pope and Walker (1999) 
Accrual – cash flow 
measurement method 
The ratio of regression 
coefficients and R2 of accrual 
on the ‘good news’ to ‘bad 
news’ 
Ball et al.（2005） 
Event research method  Earnings response coefficient 
measurement (ERC) 
Basu (1997) 
Share returns measurement McNichols（1988） 
(Source: author) 
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While there are a host of different measurement models for conservatism, the assumptions 
underlying these methods, as well as their limitations, should be considered in relation to the 
particular features of the share market in China when applying them to measure conservatism 
in the financial reporting of listed companies. Therefore, the following sections discuss 
special features of the capital market in China, such as the efficiency of the Chinese share 
market, as well as the applicability of these accounting conservatism measurement methods 
by analysing how features of the share market in China affect the assumptions, limitations, 
advantages, and disadvantages of the accounting conservatism measurement methods in a 
Chinese context.  
 
3.2.1 Implications for unconditional conservatism measurement 
methods 
3.2.1.1 Valuation model measurement method 
The valuation model method, which is summarised from the study of Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995), measures unconditional conservatism in firms’ accounting policies by looking at how 
conservative accounting policies affect the operating assets. In the valuation model, the 
market value of a firm is a linear function of abnormal operating earnings, operating assets at 
the beginning of a period, capital expenditures, or current investments in the operating assets 
(Ahmed et al., 2002). Therefore, the assumption underlying this method is that the share 
market is efficient in correctly pricing the value of a firm based on its abnormal operating 
earnings, operating assets, capital expenditures or current investments. Given that both 
A-share and B-share investors face constraints in accessing company and market information 
prior to the release of the restrictions to trade in A-shares and B-shares, the lack of efficiency 
in the Chinese share market prior to the release of the restrictions to trade in A-shares and 
B-shares meant that investors might not have all the information they need to correctly price a 
firm’s value based on its abnormal operating earnings, operating assets, capital expenditures 
or current investments. Following the release of the restrictions to trade in A-shares and 
B-shares, the effectiveness of this measurement method is likely to improve with better 
market efficiency. Prior to 2005, the significant proportion of non-tradable shares in the 
 69 / 203 
 
Chinese share market also adversely affected its efficiency in price discovery as a result of 
poor liquidity, while the ban on short selling before 2010 limited the efficiency with which 
negative information was incorporated into share prices. All of these factors are likely to 
adversely affect the effectiveness of the valuation model method through their adverse 
impacts on the market’s ability to efficiently incorporate information into a firm’s value.  
 
Although information on operating assets at the beginning of a period, capital expenditures or 
current investments in operating assets based on which the valuation model method is 
developed, are all readily and fully available to investors through mandatory financial reports, 
the constrained access to complete company and market information in China’s stock markets 
is likely to have contributed to the lack of efficiency in China’s stock market. In measuring 
unconditional conservatism, goodwill as the dependent variable in the valuation model 
method is susceptible to the lack of market efficiency in the pricing of firm values. Therefore, 
the valuation model method is influenced by market data through goodwill which is 
calculated by subtracting the book value of equity from the market value of equity.  
3.2.1.2 The implications for the book value-to-market value (BTM) 
ratio measurement method  
The BTM method measures unconditional conservatism by comparing a corporate’s book 
value with its market value. Therefore, the level of conservatism is evaluated in terms of the 
degree to which the ratio of book value to market value of net assets is smaller than one. In 
particular, the bias component of the BTM ratio, which is caused by the phenomenon in 
which the book value of a company’s assets is consistently lower than their market value, 
relates to accounting practices that persistently generate unrecorded goodwill and is ex-ante 
and news independent in nature and therefore captures unconditional conservatism. Since the 
BTM method relies on part of the ratio of book value to market value to measure the degree 
of unconditional conservatism, its effectiveness is inevitably subject to the stock market’s 
efficiency in price discovery. In this regard, the efficiency of the Chinese stock market 
gradually improved with structural reforms (the release of restrictions to trade in A shares and 
B shares in 2001, the transformation of non-tradable shares into tradable shares in 2005, and 
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the lift of the ban on short selling in 2010). The significant obstacles to market efficiency 
before these reforms meant that the effectiveness of the BTM method to measure the level of 
unconditional conservatism in the financial statement of Chinese public enterprises was 
curtailed to various degrees from 2001 to 2010.  
 
3.2.2 Implications for conditional conservatism measurement 
methods 
3.2.2.1 Earnings and accruals measurement model 
This measurement method is based on the theory that accounting conservatism causes 
accruals to be asymmetric as gains are only partially accrued and losses are fully accrued, and 
the capitalisation of future cash flows associated with losses means that losses result in 
significantly larger accruals than gains. Consequently, accounting conservatism will result in 
negative accruals and understated cumulated accruals, which can be used to measure 
conditional conservatism. There are three variants of this measurement method: one based on 
earnings persistence, one based on the skewedness and fluctuations of earnings and accruals, 
and one based on cumulative accruals.  
 
The earnings persistence measurement method measures conditional conservatism through 
the asymmetric persistence between unexpected decreases and increases in earnings. On the 
other hand, the skewedness and fluctuations of earnings and accruals measurement method 
measures conditional conservatism through the asymmetric incorporation of economic 
income into accounting income. Both the methods are developed from the Basu model, and 
thus rely heavily on the efficient market hypothesis, as the market price of a firm’s shares is 
central to the models used in both measurement methods. Therefore, the applicability of these 
two variants of the earnings and accruals measurement method in China is influenced by the 
efficiency of the Chinese share market, with their effectiveness expected to improve as the 
efficiency of the Chinese share market improved from 2001 to 2010.  
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On the other hand, the cumulative accruals variant of the earnings and accruals measurement 
method measures conditional conservatism through the correlation between accounting 
accruals and earnings. This variant of the earnings and accruals measurement method is not 
reliant on the efficient market hypothesis like the other two variants, as accounting earnings 
accruals are independent of market prices. Therefore, the applicability of this variant of the 
earnings and accruals measurement method in China would not be affected by the significant 
changes in the efficiency of the Chinese share market from 2001 to 2010.  
 
3.2.2.2 Earnings-share return measurement model 
As the name suggests, the earnings-share return measurement method relies on the 
asymmetric timeliness of the incorporation of bad news and good news in earnings to 
measure the degree of conservatism. Based on the Basu (1997) model, this measurement 
method is heavily dependent on the efficient market hypothesis as the market price of a firm’s 
share and share return play critical roles in the models underpinning this measurement method. 
Due to its reliance on market share price and share return, the applicability of the 
earnings-share return measurement method in China would be heavily influenced by the 
changes in the efficiency of the Chinese share market from 2001 to 2010, thus making it 
unreliable for measuring the conditional conservatism of Chinese public enterprises.  
 
3.2.2.3 Accrual – cash flow measurement model 
Accrual-cash flow measurement method measures conditional conservatism based on the 
theory that correlation between accounting accruals and current period cash flows is greater in 
periods when economic losses are recognised than in periods when economic gains are 
recognised. According to this method, the accrual process captures economic losses in a more 
timely fashion than economic gains. Therefore, the difference between the timeliness with 
which the accrual process captures economic gains and losses can be used as a measure of 
conservatism. Both accounting accruals and cash flows are independent from the stock 
exchanges. This means that unlike other conditional conservatism measurement methods, the 
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effectiveness of the accrual-cash flow measurement method for measuring conditional 
conservatism in China is not affected by the significant varies in the efficiency of the Chinese 
share market during the period of 2001–2010. 
 
3.2.2.4 Event research measurement model 
The event research measurement method measures conditional conservatism through the 
differences in the timeliness / persistence with which bad /good news is reflected in earnings. 
There are two variants of this measurement method: the earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
measurement model and the skewedness of share returns distribution measurement model. 
 
This variant of the event research measurement method measures conditional conservatism in 
terms of the degree to which share return distributions are more negatively skewed during 
earnings announcement dates than during non-earnings announcement dates. Because this 
variant of the event research measurement method relies mainly on share returns to measure 
conservatism, it also relies on the efficient market hypothesis, i.e. the share market needs to 
be efficient in the sense that investors are able to readily access information about a firm, 
either through firms’ voluntary disclosure or investors’ own discretionary information search 
during non-earnings announcement dates. The skewedness of share returns distribution 
measurement method is based on the assumption that the investors learn about the 
information of a firm through its voluntary disclosure and their own discretionary information 
search during non-earnings announcement dates. This assumption limits the applicability of 
this variant of the event research measurement method in China for the period 2001 to 2010, 
as the poor corporate governance before the split share reform in 2005 and the lack of 
complete information for both A and B share investors before 2001 severely handicapped 
investors’ ability to fully learn about companies’ information in the Chinese stock market. 
Therefore, this variant of the event research measurement method is not particularly suitable 
for measuring the conditional accounting conservatism of companies listed in Chinese share 
market during 2001– 2010.  
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The second variant of the event research measurement method, the earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) measurement method, is developed based on the Basu model and measures 
conservatism through the difference between earnings response coefficient for positive 
changes in earnings and the earnings response coefficient for negative changes in earnings. As 
the earnings response coefficient in this method captures the abnormal return per dollar from 
unexpected earnings, this method also relies on the efficient market hypothesis in the sense 
that it is based on the assumption that accounting conservatism, rather than market 
inefficiencies, would be responsible for causing the different market’s reaction (measured by 
the earnings response coefficient) to good earnings news and bad earnings news. Therefore, in 
light of the significant changes in the efficiency of Chinese share market from 2001 to 2010, 
the effectiveness of this method would also be volatile during this period, making it unreliable 
as a measure of conditional conservatism for listed firms in China.  
 
3.3 Selected measurement methods for conditional and 
unconditional conservatism in China 
3.3.1 Selected measurement methods for unconditional 
conservatism in China 
From the analysis in section 3.2, it can be seen that the valuation model measurement method 
is also not appropriate for the purpose of measuring unconditional conservatism in China 
from 2001 to 2010 compared to the BTM method (Book value to Market value method). Both 
the BTM method and the valuation model measurement method are susceptible to the changes 
in the efficiency of the Chinese stock market. Both the BTM method and the valuation model 
are reliant on the efficient market hypothesis as the market value of firms is central to these 
methods. However, the BTM method is widely recognised and extensively used for 
measuring unconditional conservatism. Therefore, given the significant changes in the 
efficiency of the Chinese share market from 2001 to 2010, the BTM method is chosen as the 
measurement method for unconditional conservatism in China. Most importantly, the BTM 
method is superior to the valuation model method as has been fully discussed in lot of 
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previous researches, but far fewer studies employ the valuation model for measuring 
unconditional conservatism. Thus, although both the valuation model method and the BTM 
method incorporate market-based measures, for lack of a better model, the BTM model as a 
widely recognised method is still used for measuring unconditional conservatism.  
 
3.3.2 Selected measurement methods for conditional 
conservatism in China 
From the analysis in section 3.2, it can be found that the accrual-cash flow model is more 
appropriate for evaluating conditional conservatism in China. Both accounting accruals and 
cash flows are independent from the stock market. This means that unlike other conditional 
conservatism measurement methods discussed in section 3.2, the effectiveness of the 
accrual-cash flow measurement method for measuring conditional conservatism in China is 
not affected by the significant changes in the efficiency of the Chinese share market during 
the period from 2001 to 2010. Therefore, this method is selected as the primary method for 
measuring conditional conservatism in China.  
 
In addition, the earnings-share return measurement method, based on the Basu model, is 
selected as a complementary method for measuring conditional conservatism in China. 
Although the application of this method in China has limitations due to its reliance on the 
efficient market hypothesis, it provides a direct measure of how the stock market reacts 
differently to good/bad earnings news in China. Furthermore, Basu’s work (1997) is widely 
recognised and extensively used for measuring conditional conservatism and the results of 
Basu’s (1997) methods in previous researches are usually consistent with the accrual-cash 
flow measurement method. Therefore, Basu’s (1997) methods are used as supplementary tests 
of conditional conservatism with an understanding of their limitations when applied to the 
Chinese share market, and increase comparability with other relevant research in China. 
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Chapter Four: Hypotheses development for 
conditional and unconditional conservatism 
4.1 Correlation between conditional conservatism and 
IFRS-based standards in China  
The theoretical links between IFRS-based standards and firms’ conservatism could be 
inferred from existing researches. Changes in the requirements of the standards directly affect 
firms’ conservatism. It is, a priori, not clear whether Chinese public corporates are required to 
release more conservative financial reports under the new standard in China. On one hand, 
compared to former standards, the new ASBE in China are generally considered to be of 
higher quality and comparability and closer to IFRS, since the new ASBE is largely 
convergent with IFRS. On the other hand, due to the introduction of fair value model, 
IFRS-based standards will provide more room for companies to report less conservatively. 
Figure 4.1: Structural Estimation Model of IFRS Adoptions and Conditional Conservatism 
 
(Source: Constructed by the Author) 
Besides the direct influence mechanism, the implementation of IFRS-based standards in 
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settings. In particular, IFRS-based standards could improve transparency, alleviate the ex-ante 
information asymmetry among capital market participants, and mitigate the monitoring costs 
between the agent and the principal. Figure 4.1 shows the structural estimation model of IFRS 
adoptions and conditional conservatism. Following Watts’ argument (2003), this thesis 
specifies four intermediate factors including contract, litigation, taxation, and regulation. 
 
Impact of IFRS Adoption on information management 
For a company adopting conservative accounting practices, there are a lot of explanations. 
Blunck (2013) argues that firms will adopt conservative accounting practices for a number of 
different reasons. However, only the contracting explanation is in line with the fact that 
human beings have already been performing conservative accounting ever since accounting 
came into being. The contract motivation argues that conditional conservatism can improve 
the efficiency of debt contracting, compensation contracting and corporate governance, and 
decline the cost of capital and agency conflict, being part of the efficient mechanism 
employed in the organization of the enterprise. Under contract theory, scholars have proposed 
two explanations for conditional conservatism: the role of governance and information.  
 
The role of governance stems from the perspective of the principal (investors) – one who can 
utilize the principle of conservatism to restrict self-service behaviours of management. The 
governance role is supported by a lot of empirical evidence. For instance, conservatism can 
increase the investment efficiency (Lara, Osma and Penalva, 2016) or mitigate the 
overconfidence of the/a CEO (Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Therefore, the improved 
disclosure environment can moderate a principal’s demands for conservative accounting. 
 
The role of information is another explanation based on the view of agency. This view holds 
that the company intends to alleviate the information asymmetry between the agency and the 
capital provider. The information role of conservatism is supported by Lafond and Watts 
(2008) who suggest that the enterprise is more inclined to issue a conservative financial report 
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in a business model with serious ex-ante information asymmetry. Chen et al. (2010) also 
follow the role of information to study the impact of debt contracts in China. The most 
important empirical interpretation for the information role is that the improved disclosure 
environment alleviates demands for conditional conservatism. However, there has been no 
research so far investigating the influencing mechanism between conservatism and IFRS 
convergence in China.  
 
There is vast literature that analyses the causality that the IFRS-based standard in China 
alleviates the ex-ante information asymmetry between managers and external stakeholders by 
improving the disclosure environment. Existing empirical studies have scrutinised the 
correlation between IFRS adoption and economic consequences, for example, the analyst 
forecast (Byard et al., 2011), cost of capital (Li, 2010), or share return synchronicity 
(Beuselinck et al., 2009). A positive correlation has been found in these studies, indicating 
that IFRS not only improves comparability in financial reporting but also enhances companies’ 
information disclosure environment and disciplines the financial intermediary industry. 
 
The scenario of IFRS convergence in China is consistent with that in Europe. Due to more 
comparable accounting standards between them, Chinese public companies are becoming 
easier to screen and research for foreign investors. A cross-border Channel such as QFII 
(Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) or the private takeover market is available to 
foreign investors to facilitate them in making investment decisions pertaining to Chinese 
enterprises. IFRS-based standards can improve their investment efficiency and encourage 
them to gather more information regarding Chinese public companies. This logic also applies 
to the financial intermediaries including M&A (Mergers and Acquisitions) advisors and 
financial analysts. Due to higher comparable accounting information, the financial 
intermediaries would have lower costs in processing related information and have more 
incentives to generate more useful information regarding public companies. Therefore, 
IFRS-based standards in China ultimately decreases ex-ante information asymmetry, which 
will moderate the demand for conditional conservatism. 
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Impact of IFRS Adoption on Monitoring Costs 
In addition, IFRS adoption also mitigates principals’ demands for bad-news by reducing 
monitoring costs of the principal. If the monitoring costs decline, the principal prefers to 
directly monitor agents’ efforts rather than to utilize incentive agreements (Jayaraman & 
Shivakumar, 2013). IFRS adoption would mitigate principals’ monitoring costs. First, as 
China's financial reform has progressed, its capital market has also gradually increased its 
level of openness and internationalization. The improvement of China's capital market is 
conducive to attracting more overseas funds to invest in the Chinese market and will need 
more foreign financial analysts. In addition, the entry of foreign financial analysts will place 
higher demands on information disclosure discipline. Second, more peer companies will 
improve the comparability of information. Third, IFRS-based standards would enhance other 
characteristics of the company's accounting information quality. Due to decreased monitoring 
costs, debtholders, especially the banks, would be motivated to exercise their control rights on 
firms’ operations and directly monitor managerial performance. Thus, debtholders in China 
would have a lower demand for conservative financial reporting in the post-IFRS standards 
period.  
 
In summary, it can be stated that IFRS convergence is negatively associated with the 
conditional conservatism of China’s listed enterprises due to mitigated ex-ante information 
asymmetry and monitoring costs. The mechanism of ex-ante information asymmetry cannot 
be ignored during the sample period of this thesis. This is due to the serious ex-ante 
information asymmetry prior to IFRS adoption in the Chinese share market. It is also driven 
by the facts that the bank loan is main source of finance in China’s market. Moreover, it is 
worth noting that most banks (debtholders) are controlled by the government in China and 
more concerned with politics than commerce. Thus, considering the low level of incentive for 
monitoring debtors, banks owned by the Chinese state would have lower demands for the 
conservative accounting of Chinese public enterprises than private banks. Given the 
aforementioned arguments, the following is the principle hypothesis of this thesis:  
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 H1: Chinese public companies employ a less conditionally conservative accounting 
policy in the post-implementation of IFRS-based standards in 2006. 
 
4.2 Influencing mechanism between IFRS convergence and 
Firms’ conditional conservatism 
Both the regulatory and contracting theories could explain the first hypothesis. From the 
standpoint of policy makers and accounting scholars, it is more interesting to explore the 
detailed influencing mechanism between IFRS adoption and firms’ conditional conservatism. 
Therefore, the second research question of this thesis pertains to the sources of reducing 
conditional conservatism in Chinese public enterprises after IFRS adoption. 
 
The causality flow of effect of China’s IFRS adoption on conservatism is discussed in section 
2.7. Because conditional conservatism varies mainly depending on changes in stakeholder 
demand, this thesis focuses on studying the impacts of IFRS-based standards on demand 
change for conditional conservatism. It can be found that four main factors affect the demand 
for conditional conservatism: ex-ante information asymmetry, monitoring cost, corporate 
governance, and creditor’s ownership. Figure 4.2 is helpful in identifying causality and 
complex relationship in this research. 
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Figure 4.2: Structural Estimation Model with Moderating Effects 
 
(Source: Constructed by the Author) 
As Figure 4.2 illustrates, this thesis relies on different types of contracts to distinguish the 
influencing mechanisms of information asymmetry and monitoring costs. Watts (2003) 
divides the contract into subgroups including compensation and debt contracts. Debt contracts 
could be further classified into public debtholders and private lenders, such as banks. Previous 
studies have shown that different contracting parties have different demands for firms’ 
conditional conservatism. Debtholders have less information asymmetry; therefore, they have 
a stronger demand for conservatism. Their utility is more sensitive to firms’ downward risk. 
As a result, firms’ conservatism level is a function of information asymmetry, debtholder’s 
monitoring incentives, and a firm’s capital structure.  
 
Under the view of conservatism’s informational role, firms are expected to be more 
conditionally conservative with higher ex-ante information asymmetry. This thesis uses the 
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information asymmetry. Given the assumption that the development of equity market’s 
information environment after 2006 would mainly reduce the information asymmetry of 
complex firms, this thesis predicts that business complexity would moderate the influences of 
IFRS-based standards on conditional conservatism of public companies in China. Accordingly, 
the second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a greater negative impact on 
companies with more complex business models in terms of conditionally conservative 
accounting than companies with less complex business models.  
 
Given the critical role of the companies’ ownership in conditional conservatism (Chen et al. 
2010), there should be sufficient differences between SOEs and non-SOEs in the decline of 
conditionally conservative accounting after IFRS adoption, pertaining to the change of 
demand for conservative accounting. Thus, under the condition of constant conservative 
accounting cost, this thesis expects that there is a correlation between cross-sectional 
differences in conservatism and the kind of ownership of public enterprises, i.e. whether the 
company is a non-SOE. 
 
In China, SOE firms are more likely to access bank loans with the intention of compensating 
their inefficient operations (Wang et al., 2008). If the politically-advantaged SOEs fall into 
financial difficulties, they can turn towards the government for a bailout under the normality 
of the soft budget constraint. The Chinese government usually employs one or more of the 
following methods to bail out SOE firms: declining the tax burden, allowing debt-for-equity 
swaps, transferring debt burdens through asset management enterprises, and injecting capital 
to pay off part of the debt. In fact, the government has become a potential insurance provider 
for state-owned enterprises (Xu et al., 2005). 
 
SOE firms also have less incentive to disclose information to outsiders (Fan et al., 2007). 
Since CEOs of SOEs often have work experience as bureaucrats in the government, their 
compensation and promotion are more dependent on various social and political goals than on 
financial and business performance. Due to the lack of a powerful motivation to enhance 
business performance, share-based compensation and clearly delineated profitability targets, 
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direct incentives to manage earnings are relatively lower for CEOs of state-owned enterprises. 
Different from SOEs, non-SOEs are unable to obtain the implicit insurance from the 
government and emphasise greater business performance (Cull & Xu, 2000).  
 
Based on the above reasons, Chen et al. (2010) found that SOEs had less conditional 
conservatism than non-SOEs prior to IFRS adoption. However, with the improvement of 
China’s capital market, more intense market competition and state-owned enterprise reform 
(improving management systems and regulatory systems of various state-owned enterprises), 
the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs is gradually decreasing, and their demand on 
conservatism tends to achieve a similar level. Therefore, SOEs partially offset the impact of 
IFRS adoption on reducing conditional conservatism. After following new Chinese standards, 
the reduction in the degree of conditionally conservative accounting is higher in 
non-state-owned enterprises compared with companies with state-owned enterprises. 
Accordingly, the third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: The implementation of Chinese new standards has a greater negative impact on 
non-state-owned enterprises in terms of conditionally conservative accounting than 
state-owned enterprises.  
 
Since the conditional conservatism demands from the firms with more severe financial 
constraints (high leverage) are primarily driven by debt holders, especially banks, and the 
monitoring costs of debt holders are reduced, it is reasonable to expect a moderating effect of 
financial constraints on these firms’ conditional conservatism after the IFRS convergence. 
This thesis tentatively predicts that compared to the firms with less financial constraints that 
experienced a trivial change in conditional conservatism after IFRS convergence, financially 
constrained firms are more likely to recognise unrealised losses via accruals in a timelier 
manner than unrealised gains after 2006. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is as stated below: 
H4: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a greater negative impact on 
firms with more financial constraints in terms of conditionally conservative 
accounting than firms with less financial constraints. 
 
Under the agency perspectives, an important function of public financial institutions is to 
make up for market failures, improve resource allocation efficiency and maximize social 
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welfare. Since targets of public financial institutions are often non-measurable and multiple, 
they usually have inefficient incentives (Tirole, 1994). State-owned banks (SBs) still allocate 
resources to projects with social benefits. However, there are not enough incentives in the 
contract, which leads managers in SBs to have less efforts (or divert more resources) than 
non-SBs. However, the political theory provides another perspective, arguing that politicians 
are usually self-interested and more inclined to achieve self-goals rather than maximize social 
welfare (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Based on this perspective, politicians will seek personal 
political goals rather than establish SBs to allocate financial resources to projects with social 
benefits, such as offering resources or jobs for political supporters or voters (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998). Therefore, both perspectives believe that SBs compared with non-SBs are less 
effective at and concerned with monitoring the default risk of borrowers.  
 
This conclusion is also supported by the empirical research of Berger et al. (2009). By 
comparing the different types of banks in 23 developed nations from 1994 to 2003, Berger et 
al. (2009) found that state-owned banks were much less efficient than foreign banks, 
especially the Big Four in the state-owned banks. Moreover, information-based theories of 
banking relationships (Stein, 2002) provide another perspective to explain this phenomenon. 
Since foreign banks are headquartered in another country, they have less capacity to deal with 
“soft” (e.g. non-financial) information regarding local companies than “hard” (e.g. financial) 
information. As a result, foreign banks have a higher demand for high quality “hard” 
information and are inclined to lend to conservative companies. Therefore, there is a 
significant disparity between the demand of SBs and non-SBs for the conservatism of 
borrowers. After the economic downturn in 2007-2008, the SBs stepped up their lending 
efforts according to the national policies (four trillion investment plan), which has relaxed 
their demand for conservatism. Therefore, this thesis predicts that after IFRS adoption, the 
conservatism of companies borrowing from SBs will be further reduced and SBs will still 
have lower demand for conservatism. Therefore, the following is the fifth hypothesis: 
H5: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a greater negative impact on 
firms who borrow from state-owned banks in terms of conditionally conservative 
accounting than firms who borrow from non-state-owned banks.  
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4.3 Effects of IFRS adoption on unconditional conservatism  
Unconditional conservatism is generally considered as the accounting treatment method an 
enterprise decides to adopt at the initial stage of the generation of assets or liabilities. The use 
of such accounting methods lead to unrecorded goodwill, which makes the market value of 
companies higher than their book value. For example, expenditures (such as research and 
development [R&D] and advertising) incurred by most of the intangible assets formed 
internally are expensed at the time of occurrence and are directly credited to the current 
profits and losses, requiring enterprises to use the accelerated depreciation method on fixed 
assets or the historical cost method on projects with a positive net present value. 
 
The main impact of new Chinese accounting standards on unconditional conservatism is 
reflected in the changes concerning the requirements of capitalisation, depreciation, and 
amortisation. 
 
The former standard required that the recorded value of internally-generated intangible assets 
should be confirmed according to the registration fee, the lawyers’ fees, and the like. The 
R&D costs incurred before the lawful application should be recognised as current expenses. 
The new accounting standards divide the expenditure of internal research and development 
projects into research expenditures and development expenditures, which mainly refer to the 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets. The research stage indicates the process of gaining new scientific or 
technical knowledge by carrying out creative and planned investigations. The development 
stage reflects that research results or other knowledge can be applied to a plan or a design for 
the production of new or substantially improved materials, devices, and productions. All 
expenditures occurring during the research phase are recognised as expenses accounted into 
the current profit or loss. During the development phase, expenditures that have met the 
conditions of capitalisation can be capitalised and accounted into intangible assets. 
Conversely, if such conditions are not met, the expenditure needs to be accounted directly into 
the current profit or loss. This will reduce the level of unconditional conservatism of the listed 




The new standards in “fixed assets” (property, plant, and equipment) (Article 14, ASBE No. 4) 
states that enterprises shall depreciate for all fixed assets. It is important to note that fixed 
assets that have been fully depreciated and still continue to be used and the land accounted 
with separate pricing shall be excluded from the assets to be depreciated. However, the former 
standards did not allow companies to depreciate idle fixed assets. Therefore, as per those 
former standards, listed companies, in case of poor operating performance, may reduce the 
depreciation to adjust the amount of profits through the adjustment of fixed asset categories 
(listed fixed assets as idle fixed assets). This is done so that financial reports in such cases do 
not reflect the fair and true state of the business. Moreover, it is obvious that the part of 
expenses and costs not recognised into the income statement and the value of assets in the 
balance sheet is much higher than its real value. In fact, such adjustments violate 
conservatism. Therefore, depreciation for all fixed assets by means of a straight-line method 
and accelerated depreciation can guarantee the continuity of costs and expenses in the course 
of business operation, thereby reflecting the value of fixed assets with more accuracy and 
increasing unconditional conservatism. 
 
Therefore, unconditional conservatism of Chinese-listed enterprises is determined by the 
impact degree of both such changes. If the impact of change in the requirement of 
capitalisation is higher than depreciation, unconditional conservatism of Chinese-listed firms 
will be reduced as happened after the IFRS-convergent GAAP in 2006. Conversely, if the 
impact of change with regard to depreciation is higher than capitalisation, unconditional 
conservatism of Chinese-listed firms will depict an increase. Thus, it finally becomes an 
empirical issue whether a change in the standards will lead to the rise or fall of unconditional 
conservatism. 
 
Capitalization of R&D costs in China 
The conditions for the capitalisation of R&D expenditures are relatively strict in accordance 
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with the new standards in China. Most companies did not follow the requirements of the new 
standards for capitalising R&D expenses in line with the conditions of capitalisation, instead, 
they directly expensed all the R&D expenditure. Shao and Sun (2014) studied the 
capitalisation of R&D expenditures of 108 listed high-tech companies in 2013 and found that 
most high-tech companies did not distinguish between the capitalisation and expense of R&D 
expenses in accordance with the requirements introduced by the new standards. They also 
listed the most listed high-tech companies that tend to expense all or most of their R&D costs. 
They analysed the objective and subjective reasons responsible for this situation. The 
objective reasons include the difficulty in project cost collection due to multi-project research 
and development, the difficulty in distinguishing between the research phase and the 
development phase, the difficulty in judging capitalisation conditions during the development 
phase, and the lack of mandatory rules and regulations with respect to R&D expenses. The 
subjective reasons, on the other hand, include capitalisation increasing tax, high profit 
margins and low motivation for profit manipulation, low emphasis on intangible assets, and 
so on. The problems regarding capitalising R&D expenditures are mostly concentrated in 
high-tech companies. In light of this, Shao and Sun (2014) discovered that most high-tech 
companies directly expense all their R&D expenditures, suggesting that change in the 
requirements relating to capitalisation should have a relatively low impact on Chinese-listed 
firms. 
 
Depreciation for idle fixed assets in China 
Before 2006, Chinese companies had a large number of idle assets, which had already become 
a serious problem. In China, idle assets are considered to be those fixed assets that have been 
deactivated for more than one year and are not needed for the time being, or those that have 
been replaced by other new assets due to technological upgrades. The formation of idle assets 
is mainly due to the advancement of science and technology, adjustment in industrial 
structures, poor performance or management, and a shortage of funds. As per the former 
standards, companies could not depreciate idle fixed assets. However, this is not allowed 
under the new standards. Therefore, it can be predicted that this change will obviously 
increase the depreciation of companies if companies have a serious problem concerning idle 
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assets. Many literatures by experts such as Yang (2014), Geng (2013), Yang (2012), among 
others, believe that there is a serious problem of idle assets in Chinese companies. However, 
no one has specifically studied on the scale and changes of idle assets of Chinese-listed 
companies. Due to the lack of research result regarding the changes in idle assets, this thesis 
employs regressions to measure the impact of the standards changes on the depreciation. In 
order to test the effects of new standards on the depreciation of Chinese-listed companies, this 
thesis develops a simple model: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where DEPr is the dependent variable measured as the ratio of depreciation to total fixed 
assets (property, plant, and equipment) and the suffixes i and t denote firm and year 
respectively. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the Chinese-listed firms 
adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. SOE is one if the company is 
eventually controlled by the government and zero otherwise. 












Notes: All continuous variables are winsorized at a 1%. t statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
As Table 8.1 demonstrates, the coefficients on IFRS are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that the depreciation ratio of Chinese public enterprises obviously 
increased in the post-IFRS convergence period. Therefore, it can be observed that the impact 
scope of changes in capitalisation is far less than that in depreciation and is mostly 
concentrated in high-tech enterprises. In addition, it is worth mentioning that most high-tech 
 88 / 203 
 
companies in China directly expense all their R&D expenditures. Due to a higher impact with 
respect to change in depreciation as compared to capitalisation, this thesis posits the sixth 
hypothesis as below: 
H6: Unconditional conservatism of Chinese public enterprises increased posterior to 
implementation of IFRS-based standards. 
Compared to non-SOEs, SOEs face more problems of idle assets and possess a lower 
depreciation ratio. The coefficients on SOEs, therefore, are significantly negative. This can be 
further proven by comparing the coefficient of IFRS across the SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Table 8.2: Comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs in the periods around IFRS convergence 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SOE non-SOEs 
DIFRS 0.0115*** 0.0109*** 
 (6.79) (5.16) 
   
Constant 0.131*** 0.131*** 
 (106.22) (77.94) 
Observations 5036 3780 
Notes: All continuous variables are winsorized at a 1% point. t statistics are shown in the parentheses. 
*, **, *** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
As is demonstrated in Table 8.2, the coefficients on IFRS in SOEs are higher than in 
non-SOEs groups, suggesting that increased depreciation ratio of SOEs is more than 
non-SOEs. Therefore, after following Chinese new standards, the increase in the degree of 
unconditionally conservative accounting is higher in SOEs compared with companies with 
non-SOEs. In light of the above-mentioned discussions, the seventh hypothesis is as follows: 
H7: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a greater positive impact on 
state-owned enterprises in terms of unconditionally conservative accounting than 
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Chapter Five: Research methods for 
conditional conservatism 
Given the discussions above about the inefficiency of the Chinese security market in the 
sample period, this thesis adopts the accrual-based measurement of conditional conservatism 
as the baseline empirical approach. This thesis also examines the main results using Basu’s 
(1997) reverse equation method. The non-tabulated results showed that the empirical findings 
based on Basu’s (1997) method are similar but less significant, probably due to the additional 
noises in the market-based proxy for true economic outcomes. 
 
5.1 Accrual-cash flow method of conditional conservatism 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) researched the role of accruals, e.g. working capital accruals, in 
the asymmetric timeliness in recognising losses and gains in financial reports, which can 
measure conditional conservatism. In empirical research related to conservatism, accruals are 
not exactly the same as the specific accrued items in accounting practices. Accruals are 
defined as earnings minus cash flow from operation, which include changes in receivables, 
inventory, accounts payable and accrued liabilities, taxes payable, depreciation and 
amortisation, other assets and liabilities, and miscellaneous accruals (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). 
 
By definition, the asymmetric timeliness in how losses and gains are recognised can measure 
the conditional conservatism when losses and gains are revised in expectation of future cash 
flow variations in financial statements. As the revision of gains and losses is in accordance 
with revisions of cash flows that are expected to occur in the future, i.e. before gains and 
losses are realised in cash, recognition of losses and gains usually relates to accounting 
accruals, which have essential functions in determining the asymmetric timeliness in the 
pattern of how losses and gains are recognised. As a result, the impact of accruals on the 
asymmetric timeliness in how losses and gains are recognised is related to the measure of 
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conditional conservatism. In addition, because the economic losses and gains in one 
accounting period can be regarded as the operating cash flow in the current period after the 
variation in the PV (present value) of cash flows in future periods have been taken into 
account, an econometric model of (conditional) conservatism can be formulated according to 
how accruals are related to cash flows. 
  
Theoretical foundation 
The theoretical foundation of the accruals-cash flow model is based on the positive 
correlation between accruals and operating cash flow in the current period. This positive 
correlation is caused by the asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of losses and gains; the 
negative serial correlation between accounting accruals and current–period operating cash 
flows is caused by the noise mitigation effect of accounting accruals, i.e. the phenomenon 
whereby accounting earnings are less noisy than operating cash flow in financial statements in 
that it mitigates the transitory noise in cash flows by expensing costs when it is used to 
generated revenue instead of waiting until it is actually paid for. The relationship between 
accounting accruals and operating cash flows is thus determined by these two offsetting 
correlations. Conservatism can be measured by isolating its impacts on the association 
between accruals and operating cash flows, since it only affects the positive correlation 
between accruals and operating cash flow. Because conservatism causes the asymmetric 
timeliness of recognising economic losses and gains in accruals, the positive correlation 
between accounting accruals and operating cash flow of this period is greater in periods when 
economic losses are recognised than in periods when economic gains are recognised. On the 
other hand, no such asymmetry exists for the negative correlation between accounting 
accruals and operating cash flow of current period, which is caused by the noise reduction 
effect, i.e. the phenomenon whereby accruals, in particular working capital accruals, help to 
mitigate the fluctuations in operating cash flows due to changes in a firm’s working capital 
levels. Therefore, conservatism can be measured by the positive correlation between accruals 
and operating cash flow. 
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The asymmetric timeliness in how losses and gains are recognised inevitably involves 
accounting accruals because revisions of expected cash flows are made, at least in part, before 
they are actually realised. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) have demonstrated a positive 
relationship between operating cash flow and accounting accruals, because cash flow is 
positively correlated with the present value of cash flows expected in all future periods in the 
current period. For example, a factory that generates decreased cash flow in the current period 
because of a decrease in competitiveness is likely to have reduced expected future cash flows 
as well. Meanwhile, an income-decreasing accrual is required for the impaired future cash 
flows so that they can be recognised in time, resulting in the positive correlation between 
operating cash flow in the current period and accounting accruals. 
 
The theoretical development of the positive correlation between accruals and operating cash 
flow can be illustrated with the example of a long-term asset. At the beginning of the current 
period, a long term asset is expected to generate a certain amount of future cash flows. When 
the current period ends, however, the arrival of new information causes the future cash flow 
expected to be generated from the fixed asset to be revised. The change in the cash flow of the 
current period is thus the cash effect of the change in the current year’s fixed asset’s value . 
As long as the value of the fixed asset is ‘booked’ on the balance sheet, i.e. it is not a growth 
option, and the change in the asset’s present value causes an accrued loss or gain, the change 
in the cash flow for the current period will be correlated with the accrued part of the 
accounting income in the current period, causing cash flows of the current period and 
accounting accruals to have a positive correlation.  
 
Another important relationship between accounting accruals and the recognising of economic 
losses and gains is the negative serial correlation between operating cash flows for the current 
period and accounting accruals, which is caused by the noise mitigation effect, i.e. the 
phenomenon whereby accounting earnings have fewer fluctuations than operating cash flows 
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in financial statements in that it mitigates the transitory noise in cash flows by expensing costs 
when it is used to generate revenue instead of waiting until it is actually paid for. In particular, 
working capital accruals helps to reduce such noises. Holding long-term accruals of losses 
and gains equal, the noise-mitigating effect of working capital accruals implies that accruals 
and operating cash flows are negatively correlated. It is important to note that, compared with 
the asymmetric positive correlation between accounting accruals and operating cash flows for 
losses and gains, the negative correlation between accruals and operating cash flows is 
symmetric for losses and gains. Therefore, on one hand, there is a positive correlation 
between operating cash flows in the current period and accounting accruals as a result of the 
asymmetric timeliness in how losses and gains are recognised. On the other hand, there is a 
negative correlation between accounting accruals and operating cash flow for the current 
period due to the earnings mitigation effect of the transitory accrued loss component of 
earnings, i.e. earnings caused by transitory accrued losses.  
 
To discriminate between these two opposite correlations between operating cash flows and 
accounting accruals of current period, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) introduced a test made 
possible by the fact that the positive correlation between accounting accruals and operating 
cash flows for the current period is asymmetric due to the effects of conditional conservatism. 
Because of conservative accounting principles, the positive correlation between accounting 
accruals and operating cash flows for the current period is greater in periods when economic 
losses are recognised than in periods when economic gains are recognised. On the other hand, 
no such asymmetry exists for the negative correlation between operating cash flows for the 
current period and accounting accruals, which is caused by the noise reduction effect. 
Therefore, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) hypothesised that the relationship between accounting 
accruals and cash flows for the current period is non-linear due to the asymmetric timeliness 
in the manner of which losses and gains are recognised, which is introduced by conservatism.  
 
Several other studies also support Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) hypothesis of a non-linear 
relationship between accounting accruals and operating cash flows in the current accounting 
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period. For example, in Basu’s study (1997), earnings variables, which are indicators of 
accruals, produce different incremental slopes from cash flows when both are regressed on 
negative stock returns. Similarly, Ball et al. (2000) found that accruals can be determined by 
stock returns (which are indicators of economic losses and gains) through a piecewise linear 
function. 
 
To measure the asymmetry in the correlations between operating cash flows and accounting 
accruals for the current period, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) proposed the following piecewise 
linear model: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (1) 
 
where ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before 
extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the cash flow 
from operation, which can be defined as [earnings before extraordinary items – Δ(working 
capital+ depreciation)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current 
assets) minus Δ(cash) minus Δ(current liability) and plus Δ(current portion of long-term loan). 
DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the operating cash flow < 0 and equal to 0 
if otherwise. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 estimates the conditional conservatism degree of regressed 
firm-year group. 
 
The study of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) showed that the piecewise linear regression of 
accruals on economic losses and gains/cash flows produces significantly better correlation 
than the linear regression of accruals on economic losses and gains/cash flows in previous 
studies. Therefore, this finding confirms the non-linear relationship between operating cash 
flows for the current accounting period and accounting accruals, and the impacts of 
conditional conservatism (which are shown in the asymmetric timeliness in the manner of 
which losses and gains are recognised) on the relationship between operating cash flows for 
the current period and accounting accruals. It should be noted, however, that the extent to 
which the explanatory power of the model is improved with the degree to which it 
 94 / 203 
 
incorporates the loss recognition function of accruals. This finding can be taken as evidence 
for the hypothesis that the function of how accruals recognise losses is the cause of the 
non-linear relationship between operating cash flows for the current period and accounting 
accruals. Furthermore, the extent to which the explanatory power of non-linear regression of 
accruals on cash flows has been improved over the explanatory power of conventional linear 
regression of accruals on cash flows is positively related to the degree to which accruals 
reflect the asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of earnings and losses, i.e. conservatism.  
 
Finally, in relation to the time series property of conservatism, Ball and Shivakumar’s results 
(2005) showed consistently robust asymmetry in the relationship between accruals and 
economic gains, and the relationship between accruals and economic losses, with the 
coefficient on negative cash flow (which is an indicator of economic loss) being consistently 
positive and steadily increasing. This result is in line with Basu’s findings (1997), as well as 
Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) who documented the trend of conservatism. In other words, Ball 
and Shivakumar’s results (2005) showed that the accrual process captures economic losses 
with more timeliness than economic gains. Therefore, the difference between the timeliness 
with which the accrual process captures economic losses and gains can be used as a measure 
of conservatism, hence the accrual–cash flow measurement method of conservatism. In order 
to apply this accrual–cash-flow-based measure of conservatism, a specific model capturing 
the correlation between accounting accruals and operating cash flow, as well as an indicator 
for economic losses and gains, needs to be identified, and regressed using non-linear 
specification, e.g. Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) piecewise linear model. The difference in the 
coefficients of negative and positive operating cash flow in Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) 
piecewise linear model thus measures the degree of conditional conservatism.  
 
Assumptions 
An important assumption in the accounting accruals–cash flow measurement method, 
according to Ball and Shivakumar’s method (2005), is that the information causing revisions 
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to expected future cash flows must be related with current-period cash flows and ‘bookable’ 
losses and gains, i.e. losses and gains that can be confirmed, rather than ‘unbooked’ items 
such as synergies and growth options. It is important to note that the positive correlation 
between operating cash flows of the current period and accruals is based on the assumption 
that some information about future cash flows affects both cash flows in the current period 
and the ‘bookable’ losses and gains caused by revisions in expected future cash flows, 
according to Ball and Shivakumar (2005).  
 
Advantages 
A major advantage of the accounting accruals–cash flow measurement method, which is 
based on the difference in the explanatory power of the non-linear and linear regression of 
accruals on cash flows, is that it discriminates the noise reduction role of accruals from its 
function in the timely recognition of losses. While studies such as Ball et al. (2000) and 
Dechow (1994) have analysed the correlation between accruals and cash flows, they fail to 
discriminate between these two different roles of accruals in the determination of cash flows 
and assume a negative symmetric correlation between accruals and cash flows. The accruals–
cash flow model improves this by introducing non-linearity to the correlation between 
accruals and cash flows by discriminating between the noise reduction and timely loss 
recognition role of accounting accruals, offering a more accurate specification of the 
correlation between accruals and cash flows.  
 
Another important advantage of the accruals–cash flow model is that it can measure 
conservatism without relying on the market-based indicator for economic losses and gains, 
and uses purely book-based indicators for economic losses and gains to measure conservatism. 
To date, most of the measurement methods for conservatism are developed, at least in part, 
based on Basu’s method (1997), which relies on market-based proxies for economic losses 
and gains. Since the financial market may not be efficient, using market-based proxies for 
economic losses and gains makes the measurement of economic losses and gains susceptible 
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to errors caused by market inefficiency. By using book-based proxies for economic losses and 
gains, e.g. the cash flow indicator, change in cash flow indicator, and the industry-adjusted 
cash flow indicator used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), the accounting accruals–cash flow 
method for measuring conservatism can effectively avoid the misleading effects of market 
inefficiencies and directly measure the impacts of conservatism on the relation between 
accruals and the book-based proxies of economic losses and gains.  
 
Disadvantages  
A potential disadvantage of the accounting accruals–cash flow measurement method based on 
Ball and Shivakumar’s model (2005) is that it may be less effective than a market-based 
indicator for economic gains and losses. In their robust tests of the results, Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) found that the improvements in the explanatory power of the piecewise 
linear regression model on the relationship between accruals and cash flows over the linear 
regression model is less significant for model specifications using market-based indicators for 
economic losses and gains than for model specifications using book-value-based proxies for 
economic losses and gains. Since the improvement in the explanatory power of the piecewise 
linear regression model on the correlation between accruals and cash flow over the linear 
regression model relies on the identification of ‘bookable’ accrued losses and gains, this 
implies that market-based indicators of economic losses and gains are inferior to proxies 
based on financial statement information for the purpose of effectively identifying ‘bookable’ 
accrued losses and gains. However, market returns are more significantly influenced by the 
‘unbooked’ element of the balance sheet, such as synergies and growth options, whereas 
financial statement information, such as cash flows and changes in cash flows plays a less 
important role in determining market return. Moreover, Basu (1997) points out that both good 
and bad news often has very little effect on cash flows in the current period. Therefore, the 
accounting accruals–cash flow measurement using a book-value-based indicator for economic 
gains and losses may be less effective than the market-based proxies for economic losses and 
gains, if the market is effective. 
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Another disadvantage of the accounting accruals–cash flow measurement method based on 
Ball and Shivakumar’s model (2005) is the lack of distinction between long-term and 
short-term accruals. According to Guay (2005), when the individual components of accruals 
in Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model are used as dependent variables, the coefficients on 
the independent variables in Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model show very different results. 
More specifically, the coefficients on the independent variables in Ball and Shivakumar’s 
(2005) model are quite similar when the dependent variables are short-term individual 
components of accruals, such as working capital items including inventory and accounts 
receivables. On the other hand, the coefficients of the independent variables in Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2005) model show very different results when dependent variables are 
long-term individual components of accruals, e.g. impairment of goodwill, restructuring 
charges, etc. Guay (2005) suggests that long-term accruals such as impairment of goodwill, 
restructuring charges, and write-down of asset values are more likely to be associated with the 
impacts of conservatism and asymmetry in the timelines of losses and gains recognition. 
Therefore, while the accounting accruals–cash flow measurement method based on Ball and 
Shivakumar’s model (2005) improves upon previous models by introducing non-linearity to 
the relationship between accruals and cash flows, it can be further improved by focusing on 
the relationship between long-term accruals and cash flows to give a more accurate 
measurement of conservatism.  
5.2 Basu’s measurement  
The earnings share return measurement method relies on the asymmetric timeliness of the 
incorporation of good news and bad news in earnings to measure the level of conditional 
conservatism. This measurement method was first explored in detail by Basu (1997), who 
hypothesised and confirmed that the reflection of publicly available bad news in reported 
earnings is more concurrently sensitive and timely than the reflection of publicly available 
good news. 
Theoretical foundation  
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Using share returns to measure the effects of “bad” or “good” news on the timeliness and 
persistence of earnings, Basu (1997) found that earnings are two to six times more sensitive to 
negative returns than to positive returns. Furthermore, the effects of negative returns on 
earnings are less persistent, when compared with positive earnings. In Basu’s (1997) research, 
conservatism can be defined as the tendency for earnings of bad news relating to a company’s 
future cash flow to be recognised in a more timely fashion than good news. As a result, Basu 
(1997) infers that bad news is reflected in reported earnings in a more timely manner than 
good news and that there is a systematic difference between the impacts of bad news and 
good news on the persistence and timeliness of reported earnings.  
 
In devising the theoretical premises of his predictions, Basu (1997) points out that both good 
and bad news often have very little effect on cash flows in the current period, whereas the 
impact of bad news is often immediately incorporated in current earnings. Therefore, Basu 
(1997) theorised that the impacts of both good and bad news on current returns have weak 
associations with current cash flows, whereas ‘bad news’ is more likely to affect accruals and 
be incorporated into the earnings for the current period, leading to his prediction about the 
asymmetric relationship between concurrent association between earnings and return. Under 
conservative accounting principles, the impact of bad news is typically reported as losses, 
which means that the impact of bad news on earnings is timely but not persistent. By contrast, 
the reflection of good news on earnings is less timely, yet more persistent, when compared 
with the impact of bad news. The rationale behind these two inferences, according to Basu 
(1997), is that accountants require more information to verify and confirm the recognition of 
good news, causing the asymmetric timeliness of the reflection of good news and bad news 
on earnings. On the other hand, because the current earnings only partially reflect the 
capitalised value of good news, the impact of good news on earnings is more persistent than 
bad news. Furthermore, because the market’s response to more persistent news is greater, the 
abnormal return of unexpected earnings is also greater for good news, which is more 
persistent than bad news.  
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In Basu’s (1997) empirical tests of the systematically different impacts of good earnings news 
and bad earnings news on the persistence and timeliness of reported earnings, he used 
unexpected annual share returns as proxies for the impact of the news, associating positive 
unexpected annual share returns with good news and negative unexpected annual share 
returns with bad news.  
 
In order to test that the reflection of publicly available bad news in reported earnings is more 
concurrently sensitive and timely than the reflection of publicly available good news, Basu 
(1997) employed the ‘reverse’ regression model by Beaver et al. (1980), in which annual 
earnings are regressed on current annual returns with earnings as the dependent variable. The 
method is specified as the following: 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  stands for the earnings per share for company i in year t, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 stands for the 
market price per share at the start of year t, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 stands for the return of company i from nine 
months before the end of year t to three months after. 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is negative and is equal to zero if otherwise.  
 
Basu’s empirical test (1997) demonstrated that the coefficient of negative market-adjusted 
returns is 6.45 times higher than that of positive market-adjusted returns. Moreover, he also 
found that the explanatory power of negative market-adjusted returns, measured by the 
adjusted R square, is higher than that of the positive market-adjusted return by 10%. With 
these statistics, Basu (1997) concluded that this empirical test supports his prediction, as both 
the difference of adjusted R square and the disparity of slope coefficient between good 
earnings news and bad earnings news confirms that bad news is reflected in earnings on a 
timelier basis than good news. The differences in the timeliness of reflecting bad news and 
good news in earnings, measured by the slope coefficient or adjusted R square in model (2) 
listed above, can, therefore, be considered as a measure of conditional conservatism. In other 
words, the difference in the slope coefficient of negative abnormal returns and positive 
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abnormal returns can be a measure of conditional conservatism. A more significant distinction 
in the slope magnitude of negative abnormal returns and positive abnormal returns indicates a 
higher degree of conservatism, and vice versa.  
 
Advantages  
Basu’s (1997) earnings–share-return-based measurement method of conservatism has several 
strengths. First, in terms of model design, the model is used to find the difference in the slope 
coefficient of negative abnormal returns and positive abnormal returns. The 
earnings-share-return-based measure of conservatism has a better specification of the test 
statistics and standard errors typically found in ordinary least square (OLS) models. Therefore, 
compared with other measures of conservatism that are found using OLS models, Basu’s 
(1997) earnings–share return method is more accurate.  
 
Secondly, the validity of the earnings–share-return-based measurement method of 
conservatism has been tested thoroughly in various different situations, which enhances the 
confidence in its reliability as a measurement method of conservatism. Easton et al. (1992) 
argue that the timeliness of earnings can be improved by lengthening the time frame of data 
analysis. This argument is also supported by the empirical evidence found by Lev (1989), 
Dechow (1994), and Kothari and Sloan (1992). What can be inferred from this argument is 
that the difference in the slope coefficient square of negative abnormal returns and positive 
abnormal returns will be larger if the data analysis time frame is lengthened. Additional tests 
of this inference in Basu’s model (1997) confirmed this, enhancing the reliability of the 
distinction in the slope coefficient of negative abnormal returns and positive abnormal returns 
as a measure of conservatism. Similarly, the additional test on how variation in the legal 
liability exposure of auditors affects the distinction in the slope coefficient of negative 
abnormal returns and positive abnormal returns also confirmed its validity, lending support to 
the method’s reliability as a measure of conservatism.  
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Disadvantages  
Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return measurement method, based on the difference in the 
slope coefficient/adjusted R square of negative abnormal returns and positive abnormal 
returns, also suffers from several weaknesses. 
 
First of all, Dietrich et al. (2003) criticised Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return measurement 
method from an econometric perspective, arguing that Basu’s (1997) use of share return as an 
independent variable renders his results ineffective because share return is an endogenous 
variable.  
 
Furthermore, Dietrich et al. (2007) argued Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism, which is 
based on asymmetric timeliness of earnings response to good news and bad news, produces 
results that are mostly attributable to biases in test statistics instead of conservatism. Using a 
simulated dataset constructed to lack the property of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, 
Dietrich et al. (2007) found that biases in coefficients estimated in Basu’s (1997) model may 
produce empirical results that can be interpreted as evidence of conservatism, even when the 
asymmetric timeliness of reported earnings is in fact absent. Patatoukas and Thomas (2011) 
also found evidence suggesting that results produced by the Basu measure of conservatism 
might contain biases due to the existence of a scale effect. More specifically, Patatoukas and 
Thomas (2011) suggested that there is a negative correlation between share price and share–
return variance, as well as between share price and deflated accounting earnings. Such 
negative correlations, according to Patatoukas and Thomas (2011), generate positive 
coefficients of differential timeliness in Basu’s (1997) model, thus producing false indications 
of conservatism.  
 
The problem in Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return method has also been pointed out by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005). According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Basu’s (1997) earnings–
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share return method of conservatism cannot separate temporary changes of earnings and 
losses from accruals. Instead, temporary changes of earnings and losses are treated effectively 
as random errors in Basu’s (1997) method. Furthermore, temporary changes of earnings and 
losses in Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return method of measuring conservatism also cannot 
be separated from the effects of earnings management. Therefore, the accuracy of Basu’s 
(1997) method of measuring conservatism is vulnerable to the effects of temporary changes of 
earnings and losses and possibly earnings management as well.  
 
Another potential problem with Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return method of measuring 
conservatism is that it has been found to be negatively correlated with other measures of 
accounting conservatism. Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan (2003), for example, found that Basu’s 
(1997)’s earnings–share return measure of conservatism has negative correlations with other 
important empirical measures of conservatism, such as the ratio of market value to book value 
of equity. This means that Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return method of measuring 
conservatism produces contradictory results with the MTB method. Richardson and Tinaikar 
(2004) explained that the discrepancy between Basu’s (1997) method and the MTB method 
results from their different approaches to measuring conservatism. The MTB method 
measures the ex-ante or unconditional conservatism, whereas Basu’s (1997) earnings–share 
return measure of conservatism measures ex post or conditional conservatism through 
earnings asymmetric responses to bad news and good news. Therefore, one potential 
weakness of Basu’s (1997) earnings–share return measure of conservatism is its inadequacy 
for measuring unconditional conservatism.  
 
5.3 Accrual model specification for measuring impacts of 
IFRS-adoption 
Following former research such as Chen et al. (2010) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005), this 
thesis used an interaction term between the treatment of IFRS-based standards and the 
conditional conservatism to investigate the effect of new Chinese standards on the extent of 
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firms’ conservatism. This effect will be measured by the following econometric model: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (3) 
where ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before 
extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the cash flow 
from operation, which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary items – Δ(working 
capital+ depreciation)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current 
assets) minus Δ(cash) minus Δ(current liability) and plus Δ(current portion of long-term loan). 
DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the operating cash flow  < 0 and equal to 
0 if otherwise. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt 
IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. The variable in equation (3) that needs 
attention here is the three-way interaction term between CFO, DCFO, and IFRS, which is 
measured by 𝛽𝛽6  representing the influences of IFRS-based standards in China on 
conditionally-conservative accounting. 
 
5.4 Basu model specification for measuring impacts of 
IFRS-adoption   
Similar to equation (3), this thesis also introduced an interaction term between the treatment 
of IFRS-based standards and the conditional conservatism into Basu’s model for examining 
the impacts of new Chinese GAAP on the extent of firms’ conservatism. This effect will be 
measured by the following econometric model: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (4) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  stands for the earnings per share for company i in fiscal year t, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 stands for 
the market price per share at the start of fiscal year t, and 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the return of company i 
from nine months before the end of fiscal year t to three months after. 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dummy 
variable, which is equal to one if 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is negative and is equal to zero if otherwise. The 
variable in equation (4) that needs attention here is the three-way interaction term between 
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RET, DRET, and IFRS, which is measured by 𝛽𝛽6 representing the influences of IFRS-based 
standards in China on conditionally-conservative accounting. 
 
5.5 Model specification with control variables 
Khan and Watts (2009) argued that company size (SIZE), market value to book value ratio 
(MB) and financial leverage (LEV) are the main factors affecting conditional conservatism. 
Thus, these three control variables are used in the model. Meanwhile, according to the 
research conducted by Khan and Watts (2009), SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
total assets in the beginning of a corresponding year for each company, LEV is the ratio of 
total liability to total assets and MB is the market value-to-book value ratio of the equity. 
The accrual-based model with control variables can be established as following: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷
∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽18𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Basu’s model with control variables can be established as following: 
Eit/Pit = 𝛽𝛽0 + β1DRETit + β2RETit + β3DRETitRETit + β4IFRS + β5IFRS ∗ RETit + β6IFRS
∗ DRETitRETit + β7SIZE + β8SIZE ∗ DRET + β9SIZE ∗  RET + β10SIZE
∗ DRET ∗ RET + β11MB + β12MB ∗ DRET + β13MB ∗ RET + β14MB
∗ DRET ∗ RET + β15LEV + β16LEV ∗ DRET + β17LEV ∗ RET + β18LEV
∗ DRET ∗ RET + εit 
Additionally, the changes in the economic environment during the sample period might have 
also affected the conservatism choices. The economy before 2007 was generally considered to 
be prosperous and growing rapidly. The subprime mortgage crisis brought the world economy 
into recession, and China’s economic growth slowed down due to its export-oriented and 
investment-oriented economic system. This makes it possible for a company to change its 
conservatism to improve its profitability or business performance. Therefore, in order to 
distinguish between the impact of the standards change and the macroeconomic change, this 
thesis also introduces the year (∑ 𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=0 ) and industry variables (∑ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=0 ) as control 
variables. 
 
5.6 Book value-to-market value (BTM) method 
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After Feltham and Ohlson (1995; 1996) began to adopt the term ‘conservative accounting’ to 
refer to the accounting phenomenon in which the market value of a company’s equity exceeds 
its book value in the long term, the widely-used book value-to-market value (BTM) and its 
variants have become an important way to evaluate the degree of conservatism, as has been 
suggested by Beaver and Ryan (2000), Givoly and Hayn (2000), etc.  
 
The core idea of the BTM measurement method is that, if the companies follow the principle 
of accounting conservatism, it will be easier for them to overestimate liabilities and 
underestimate assets. That will lead to the underestimation of the book value of net assets. 
The BTM measurement method relies on the premise of an efficient market, meaning that the 
market value of the net assets of a company is not affected by the different accounting method 
(aggressive or conservative) that is adopted by the accounting personnel. This differs from the 
valuation model, which measures the market value of a firm’s assets by the present value of 
its expected net cash flows in the future, making the market value of a firm dependent on the 
accounting policy adopted as it can affect the present value of future cash flows.  
 
In the BTM measurement method, if the net book value of assets is undervalued when 
compared to the market value, the accounting policy is considered to be more conservative. In 
other words, if the ratio of book value to market value of net assets is smaller than one, then 
the accounting policy is conservative. Conversely, if this ratio is larger than one, the 
accounting is more unbiased than conservative. In much research, the ratio of book value to 
market value is employed to measure the degree of conservatism, such as in Wakil’s study 
(2012; 2014). The ratio of book to market value can also be used interchangeably with the 
market to book ratio. If the market to book ratio is larger than one, accounting is conservative. 
Conversely, if this ratio is smaller than one, the accounting is aggressive. 
 
Beaver and Ryan (2000) used the ratio of book to market value as an index to estimate the 
level of conservatism and found evidence of the existence of accounting conservatism. They 
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believed that the book to market ratio has two characteristics: bias and lags. The bias here 
refers to the phenomenon in which the book value of a company’s assets is consistently lower 
than their market value. There are many reasons that cause this bias to occur, such as 
conservatism and historical cost in accounting, and the impact of inflation and expected 
positive present value projects in the economic environment. The lags refer to the 
phenomenon that the unexpected economic gain or loss is not confirmed immediately in the 
book value of assets but recognised over time. As a result of such lags, the ratio of book to 
market value is temporarily higher or lower than its actual value. However, over a longer time 
frame, this ratio will slowly converge with its actual value. Because the bias under the BTM 
measurement method relates to accounting practices that persistently generate unrecorded 
goodwill and is ex-ante and news-independent in nature, it is a form of unconditional 
conservatism. Therefore, knowledge-intensive industries usually have lower BTM ratios and 
more bias, due to unrecorded intangibles. Similarly, because the lag under the BTM 
measurement method relates to the differential accounting treatment of unexpected economic 
gains or losses and is ex-post and news dependent in nature, it is a form of conditional 
conservatism.  
 
Using the regression of the BTM ratio on current and lagged returns, Beaver and Ryan (2000) 
measured the bias and lag components of the BTM ratio by the fixed firm effect and fixed 
time effect. The bias component of a firm’s BTM ratio is captured by the firm effect, i.e. the 
mean of the unexplainable part by the time effect. The lag component of a firm’s BTM ratio is 
captured by the portion of an enterprise’s BTM that is explained by the current and lagged 
returns of the firm’s securities. Alternatively, the lag component of the BTM is a proxy for 
currently unrecognised economic gains and losses. According to Beaver and Ryan (2000), the 
bias component of the BTM is associated with measures of unconditional conservatism, 
whereas the lag component of the BTM, which is a result of historical cost accounting, is not 
associated with measures of unconditional conservatism.  
 
Therefore, the fixed firm effect reflects the fixed bias: fixed time effect reflects the changes in 
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the economic level; and lagged returns reflect market impact unrecognised in the book value. 
The specific model is as follows: 
BTM𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖𝑖 +  α𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (5) 
In this equation, the variations in BTM are decomposed into the bias component, which is 
measured by the firm effect, and the lag component, which is measured by the portion of 
BTM associated with current and lagged returns. The biased component of the BTM ratio is 
captured by α𝑖𝑖, which is the firm intercepts and captures the average bias of the firm i. It is 
mainly used to measures the firm effect, i.e. the persistent component of the BTM ratio of the 
specific company. The persistent component of the BTM ratio means that some factors 
continuously affect a certain company. For example, certain enterprises adopt conservative 
accounting policies, resulting in the book value of their assets being consistently below their 
market value. The lag component of the BTM is captured by ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 , which is the 
projection of the BTM that ignores fixed effects. The lag component of the BTM, represented 
by ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0  in the model, reflects the changes in BTM caused by unrecognised past 
market returns. α𝑖𝑖 is the time intercepts and captures annual variation in the BTM of all 
companies in year t. It is mainly used to measure the annual influencing factors across firms. 
Beaver and Ryan (2000) emphasized that ‘The time intercepts affect this decomposition by 
substantially changing the 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 coefficients … the time effects are strongly associated with 
past average returns for the sample…’. Therefore, α𝑖𝑖 can be used to measure and represent 
the unconditional conservatism and is inversely proportional to unconditional conservatism. 




The derivation of the BTM model assumes that future net cash flows are known with certainty, 
as well as a perpetually steady growth rate of g in all future periods. By implication, this 
means that the BTM model also assumes a perpetually steady BTM ratio over all future 
periods. The book value of the firm is also assumed to be positive. Furthermore, while the 
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firm growth rate g has to be less than R in order to have projects with positive net present 
value, in cases where investments have zero net present value it is possible for g to be larger 
than R, although net dividends will be negative in such situations (Beaver and Ryan, 1997). 
The assumption that the growth rate g may exceed R makes the BTM model more accurate in 
practice, as many firms do grow with a higher rate than R. 
 
Advantages 
Because accounting returns lag behind market returns (Beaver et al., 1980), the BTM method 
can control deviation from the accounting lags through the regression of the BTM ratio on 
lagged returns. By utilizing the fixed effects of panel data, the persistent bias component in 
the BTM ratio can be separated from the transitory lag component in the BTM ratio. The 
BTM ratio as a proxy variable can be used to measure the degree of accounting conservatism. 
However, because continued conditional conservatism can make assets undervalued, the BTM 
as a proxy variable also includes the extent of the conditional conservatism. The advantage of 
Beaver and Ryan’s methods (2000) is that unconditional conservatism (the persistent 
component) can be separated from the BTM ratio. These methods are, therefore, more 
accurate measures of the portion associated with unconditional conservatism in the BTM 
ratio. 
 
The BTM model also provides reliable and strong predictions of future return on equity (ROE) 
and the terminal values in the discounted residual income valuation model. Beaver and Ryan’s 
(2000) empirical test of the BTM model suggested that, when the BTM is decomposed, both 
the bias and lag components of the BTM are individually and collectively powerful predictors 
of firms’ return on equity. More specifically, the bias component is more persistently and 
negatively associated with future ROE than the lag component. Furthermore, Beaver and 
Ryan (2000) also found that the association between the bias component of the BTM and 
future ROE attenuates when growth is higher, but the association between the lag component 
of the BTM and future ROE is not affected by growth. With regard to the BTM model’s 
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ability to predict the terminal values in the discounted residual income valuation model, 
Beaver and Ryan (2000) found that both the bias and component help predict the terminal 
values in the discounted residual income valuation model. However, terminal values in the 
discounted residual income valuation model are significantly more sensitive to the bias 
component than the lag component. When the BTM is decomposed into the bias and lag 
components, there is a slight (4%) increase in the BTM’s forecasting ability, which is 
measured by R square. 
 
Disadvantages  
While the BTM model demonstrates significant impacts on the valuations of firm values that 
are subject to biases or lags in their accounting return, the increase in the explanatory power 
of the BTM model after it is decomposed into the bias and lag components is very small, 
which means that the decomposed BTM model does not offer much additional power in 
predicting firm value with respect to future ROE or terminal values. Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) 
empirical test suggested that, when the BTM is decomposed into the bias and lag components, 
there is only a slight (4%) increase in the BTM’s forecasting ability, which is measured by R 
square of the estimation function. While the limited increase in the BTM model’s explanatory 
power after it is decomposed may be due to the possibility that many firms are influenced by 
largely similar degrees of bias and lags in their accounting return and book value, it may also 
be an indication of the limitations and problems in the design of the BTM model, and 
particularly in the technical distinction between bias and lag components in the regression 
model. As pointed out by Beaver and Ryan (2000), it is empirically difficult to accurately 
separate the bias and lag components of the BTM. Therefore, the BTM model has limited 
predictability of firm value in cases when it is difficult to separate the influences of bias and 
lags on the differences between book and market value.  
5.7 Book-to-market model specification for measuring 
impacts of IFRS-adoption 
Following previous studies, such as the one by Beaver and Ryan (2000), this thesis exploits 
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the coefficient term of IFRS convergence to examine the incremental effects of the new 
IFRS-based standards in China on the extent of unconditional conservatism of Chinese-listed 
companies. Therefore, equation (5) additionally includes the IFRS dummy variable to 
measure the impact of IFRS convergence on the unconditional conservatism of listed 
companies. The econometric model is in accordance with the following equation: 
 
BTM𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖𝑖 + α𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (6) 
where IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt 
IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. The variable of our interest in equation 
(6) is the IFRS dummy, which is measured by the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1, demonstrating the impact of 
new Chinese standards on unconditional conservatism. In equation (6), if 𝛽𝛽1 is negative, it 
indicates that the implementation of new Chinese standards in 2006 improved the 
unconditional conservatism of the listed companies in China. On the other hand, if 𝛽𝛽1 is 
positive, the implementation of new Chinese standards in 2006 decreased the unconditional 
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Chapter Six: Data and sample 
6.1 Data and sample for conditional conservatism  
All related data employed in this thesis is collected from the CSMAR (China Securities 
Markets and Accounting Research) Database. For the ultimate ownership information, this 
thesis additionally verifies the data validity with the WIND database, which is also widely 
used by both academic scholars and analysts in China. 
 
The initial sample includes all companies listed – and included in the CSMAR - on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2010. The admission of China to the 
WTO initiated the establishment of a series of new standards that came into force in 2001. 
China had just completed its previous accounting standards reforms and implemented 
standardized accounting practices in all industries by the year 2001. Therefore, the first year 
of the sample should be 2002, taking into account that several variables require a one-year lag 
value. Focusing on only one accounting standards reform period helps to eliminate 
confounding impacts of irrelevant GAAP change and improve the testing capabilities. 
 
Owing to insufficient data to calculate accruals, 795 observations were eliminated. 
Furthermore, 312 observations in the financial industry were removed. Of the remaining 
13,503 observations, additional 1,594 observations were removed since the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of the firms are unable to determine. The size of the final sample is 
11,909 observations. The sample for analyses, based on Basu’s method, consists of 10,591 
firm-years, which is smaller than the main sample due to a lack of observations of valid share 
return information. Because the baseline research method of this thesis is a long-window 
study, this thesis also compiled a pseudo-balanced sample by excluding firms which went 
public after the year 2006. The pseudo-balanced sample is used in the tests of this research for 
controlling any structural variations due to sample differences though the IFRS convergence 
time point. Panel A of Table 6.1 demonstrates the number of observations that meet the 
selection standards. 
Table 6.1: Sample selection and industry distribution 
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Panel A: Selection criteria 
Total firm-year observations available on CSMAR from 2002 to 2010  14,610 
Less: Firms in the financial industry  312  
          Observations with missing data to calculate accruals 795  
Subtotal:   13,503 
Less: Observations with ultimate owners’ information unavailable 1,594  
Final sample  11,909 
Sample with Basu’s measure available  10,591 
Pseudo-balanced sample (restricted to firms listed no later than the year 
2006)  10,997 
Panel B: Sample composition by industry and by ownership type 
Industry 
 Pre-IFRS period Post-IFRS period 
Full Sample SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs 
% # % # % # % # % # 
Accommodation and 
catering industry 0.5 62 0.6 16 0.5 8 0.7 27 0.3 11 
Agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry 1.6 193 1.4 40 1.6 28 1.6 64 1.9 61 
Construction 
industry 2.6 304 2.6 72 1.8 33 3.1 129 2.2 70 
Diversified industries 1.8 213 1.8 49 2.5 44 1.6 65 1.7 55 
Education 0.1 9 0.1 4 0.0 0 0.1 5 0.0 0 
Health and social 
work 0.1 15 0.0 0 0.2 4 0.0 0 0.3 11 
Industry of culture, 
sports and 
entertainment 1.7 196 2.1 58 1.2 22 1.9 77 1.2 39 
Industry of electric 
power, heat, gas a 5.7 674 8.7 241 2.0 36 8.6 352 1.4 45 
Industry of 
information 
transmission 3.2 375 1.9 54 4.1 73 2.0 81 5.2 167 
Industry of resident 
service, repair an 0.1 9 0.0 0 0.2 4 0.0 0 0.2 5 
Leasing and 
commercial service 
industry 1.3 149 1.3 35 1.2 21 1.2 50 1.3 43 
Manufacturing 





Mining industry 3.7 442 3.3 92 4.0 71 4.3 176 3.2 103 
Real estate industry 9.0 1,066 7.9 219 13.2 237 7.2 296 9.8 314 
Scientific research 
and technical service 0.2 18 0.0 0 0.2 4 0.1 4 0.3 10 
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Transport, storage 
and postal service 4.3 509 6.2 171 1.6 28 6.6 271 1.2 39 
Water conservancy, 
environment and 
public service 1.1 131 1.6 44 0.5 8 1.6 64 0.5 15 
Wholesale and retail 
industry 8.5 1,006 9.6 266 9.1 163 8.4 347 7.2 230 
Panel C: The number of companies over years  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Model 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Accrual 
model  
1,036 1,103 1,170 1,267 1,278 1,361 1,477 1,532 1,685 
Basu 
model 
965 984 1,025 1,089 1,167 1,212 1,313 1,395 1,441 
 
Note: The classification of industry is defined by China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). Source is from: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201301/t20130118_220575.html 
 
The first column in Panel B of Table 6.1 shows a detailed distribution of companies in each 
industry, which is basically consistent with the industry composition of companies on 
CSMAR. The industry with the highest proportion is the manufacturing industry (54.9% of 
sample observations). The next four columns compare the industry distribution between SOEs 
and NSOEs (non-SOEs) in the periods before and after IFRS convergence. The proportion of 
NSOE firms increased in the post-IFRS period. This thesis finds a higher proportion of SOEs 
in the Electric Power, Services, Transportation and Utilities industries. In contrast, NSOEs are 
more inclined to enter the Real Estate, Conglomerates, and Information and Technology 
industries. This pattern of industry-based disparity between SOEs and NSOEs did not change 
after the year 2006. The distinction in industry distribution is consistent with common sense, 
since SOEs usually have advantages in the more asset-intensive and traditional industries, 
such as Transportation, Utilities and Mining, industries with higher entry barriers for NSOEs. 
Moreover, Panel C of Table 6.1 lists the number of companies for single year within sample 
period. 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics for conditional conservatism 
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This thesis provides descriptive statistical data on the characteristics of the companies in the 
full sample in Panel A of Table 6.2. The average accruals and operating cash flows are -0.06 
and 0.09 respectively, which are comparable to previous studies. SOEs accounts for 57.9% of 
the sample, while companies with negative operating cash flow account for 29%. In this 
sample, the average financial leverage (0.72) is closer to the 90th percentile of leverage (0.76), 
indicating that there is a negatively skewed distribution in the financial leverage. Moreover, 
the average value of ROA even exceeds its 90th percentile, indicating that its distribution is 
more negatively skewed than the distribution of financial leverage.   
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Enterprise characteristics of the total sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. 10
th Percentile 90th Percentile # of Obs. 
CFO 0.09 0.23 -0.13 0.31 11,909 
DCFO 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 11,909 
RET -0.13 0.71 -0.69 0.35 11,284 
DRET 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 11,284 
ACCRUAL -0.06 0.20 -0.25 0.13 11,909 
NI 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.06 11,909 
LEV 0.72 8.50 0.24 0.76 11,909 
ROA 1.87 216.48 -0.03 0.90 11,909 
SIZE 21.38 1.16 20.08 22.85 11,909 
SOE 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 11,909 
 
Panel B:  Comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs in the periods around IFRS 
convergence 
 SOEs in pre-IFRS period NSOEs in pre-IFRS period NSOE-SOE 
 Mean Median 
# of 
Obs. Mean Median 
# of 
Obs. t value 
CFO 0.07 0.06 2,780 0.03 0.04 1,796 -6.33*** 
DCFO 0.30 0.00 2,780 0.39 0.00 1,796 6.71*** 
RET -0.02 -0.18 2,650 -0.02 -0.19 1,656 -0.10 
DRET 0.73 1.00 2,650 0.71 1.00 1,656 -1.54 
ACCRUAL -0.04 -0.03 2,780 -0.03 -0.03 1,796 2.68** 
NI 0.01 0.01 2,780 0.00 0.01 1,796 -9.04*** 
LEV 0.52 0.48 2,780 0.59 0.52 1,796 2.57** 
ROA 0.01 0.03 2,780 -0.02 0.02 1,796 -5.07*** 
SIZE 21.35 21.67 2,780 20.87 20.86 1,796 -17.77*** 
 SOEs in post-IFRS period NSOEs in post-IFRS period  
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CFO 0.12 0.08 4,119 0.10 0.07 3,214 -4.15*** 
DCFO 0.24 0.00 4,119 0.30 0.00 3,214 5.97*** 
RET -0.20 -0.28 3,956 -0.18 -0.31 3,022 0.73 
DRET 0.83 1.00 3,956 0.82 1.00 3,022 -0.59 
ACCRUAL -0.08 -0.05 4,119 -0.06 -0.03 3,214 4.14*** 
NI 0.02 0.02 4,119 0.14 0.14 3,214 -5.68*** 
LEV 0.61 0.54 4,119 1.10 0.50 3,214 1.94* 
ROA 0.03 0.03 4,119 6.87 0.04 3,214 1.05 
SIZE 21.86 21.72 4,119 21.08 21.04 3,214 -27.90*** 
Note: ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before 
extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the cash flow from 
operation, which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary items + depreciation – Δ(working 
capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current assets) –Δ(current 
liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if CFO < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. LEV is the financial leverage equal to total 
liability over total assets. ROA which equals earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets proxies the firm’s profitability. This thesis measures SIZE with the natural logarithm of the 
total assets at the beginning of the corresponding year for each company. SOE is one if the 
company is eventually controlled by government and zero otherwise. 
 
Panel B of Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics for SOEs and NSOEs separately. The 
differences between NSOEs and SOEs are more pronounced in the period prior to the year 
2006. Before 2006, NSOEs typically generated less cash flow from operations, reported larger 
accounting accrual numbers, suffered from more severe financial stress, experienced more 
economic losses, and had smaller firm sizes compared to their SOE counterparts. However, 
those differences, except for negative cash flow and firm size, disappeared after 2006. The 
non-tabulated results demonstrate that this intertemporal pattern also exists for the 
pseudo-balanced sample. The systematic changes in NSOEs’ firm-specific features could 
contribute to the differences in accounting conservatism observed. 
 
6.3 Data and sample for unconditional conservatism 
The initial sample includes all companies listed – and included in the CSMAR database - on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from1996 to 2010. Among them, 1996 to 2001 
is the estimation period (due to the lagged annual share returns in the past six years used by 
the BTM measurement method), whereas 2002 to 2010 is the sample period. 
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312 firm-years in the financial industry and 267 observations with a negative BTM ratio were 
eliminated. Of the remaining 13,513 observations, 6,737 missing observations for the book 
value-to-market value ratio and annual share returns were deleted. Due to the elimination of 
companies with consecutive listing records of less than seven years, the sample may have a 
survival bias. The final sample consists of 6,776 firm-year observations. 
 
6.4 Descriptive statistics for unconditional conservatism 
This thesis provides descriptive statistical data on the characteristics of firms in Panel A of 
Table 6.4. Table 6.4 describes the statistical properties of variables used by equation (5). The 
mean values of book value of equity (BV) and market value of equity (MV) in this sample are 
much higher than their median, suggesting that the distribution of BV and MV are heavily 
skewed to the right. This indicates that in this sample, most companies are smaller than the 
average size, while a small portion of the companies operate on a very large scale. As a result 
of the influence of these few large-scale companies, the mean values of BV and MV are larger 
than the median. The skewness of BTM is much lower than BVE and MVE, thereby 
suggesting that it is closer to a normal distribution. 
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics 











Skewness # of Obs. 
MV (Billion) 6.56 22.6 0.80 2.71 12.8 31.38 6,776 
BV (Billion) 2.37 10.3 0.25 1.02 4.29 30.19 6,776 
RET -0.01 1.23 -0.09 -0.01 0.06 3.11 6,776 
BTM 0.43 0.29 0.13 0.35 0.84 1.27 6,776 
SOE 0.67 0.47 0 1 1 -0.71 6,776 
Panel B: Comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs in the periods around IFRS 
convergence 
 SOEs in pre-IFRS period NSOEs in pre-IFRS period 
 Mean Median # of Obs. Mean Median # of Obs. 
MV (Billion RMB) 2.91 1.72 1,358 1.70 1.14 731 
BV (Billion RMB) 1.53 0.89 1,358 0.79 0.46 731 
RET -0.06 -0.03 1,358 0.03 -0.03 731 
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BTM 0.57 0.51 1,358 0.48 0.42 731 
 SOEs in post-IFRS period NSOEs in post-IFRS period 
MV (Billion) 9.67 4.10 3,160 5.72 2.93 1,520 
BV (Billion) 3.45 1.37 3,160 1.62 0.85 1,520 
RET -0.04 0.05 3,160 0.01 0.01 1,520 
BTM 0.40 0.32 3,160 0.34 0.28 1,520 
Panel C: The number of companies over years  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Model 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BTM 
model 
278 483 626 704 768 901 941 1,004 1,071 
Note: MV and BV represent the market value of equity and the book value of equity respectively. 
RET represents the firms’ economic performance, which is calculated as market returns on equity 
over the fiscal year adjusted by share distributions. BTM respects the book value-to-market value 
ratio of the firms. SOE is equal to one if the company is eventually controlled by government and 
zero otherwise. 
Panel B of Table 6.4 illustrates descriptive statistics for SOEs and NSOEs, respectively. Panel 
C of Table 6.4 lists the number of companies for single year within the sample period. In 
many previous researches, BTM often directly serves as an indicator of unconditional 
conservatism. Although this has been already discussed in the previous section, it may cause 
deviations if a distinction is not established between the bias and the lags components in the 
BTM. However, the BTM ratio can still provide some preliminary judgment. From Panel B of 
Table 6.4, it can be found that the BTM of both SOEs and NSOEs reduced posterior to the 
implementation of new Chinese standards in 2006 and the reduction of SOEs is higher than 
NSOEs(lower BTM ratio, higher conservatism), suggesting that the new Chinese standards of 
2006 enhances the unconditional conservatism of China’s listed companies. It also illustrates 
that this effect is more obvious for SOEs situated in China. It is consistent with the sixth and 
seventh hypotheses. Since it has been proved in the previous section that the IFRS-convergent 
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Chapter Seven: Main empirical findings for 
conditional conservatism 
7.1 Descriptive evidence for impacts of IFRS convergence  
Prior to formal regressive analyses, this thesis first used descriptive evidence to test the 
impact of IFRS convergence. This thesis employs regression equation (1) to measure the 
conditional conservatism of the whole market for a single year; the results are reported in 
Table 7.1.1. 
Table 7.1.1: Conditional conservatism over years 
Panel A: Full sample based on Accrual-based measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIAB
LES 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 



















 (0.023) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) 







 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
DCFO*
CFO 
0.27*** 0.28*** 0.09*** 0.21*** 0.00*** 0.12*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.000) (0.035) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
# of Obs. 1,036 1,103 1,170 1,267 1,278 1,361 1,477 1,532 1,685 
Adj. R2 0.743 0.920 0.824 0.782 0.772 0.764 0.702 0.875 0.846 
 
Panel B: Pseudo-balanced sample based on Accrual-based measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIAB
LES 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 



















 (0.023) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013) 
DCFO -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** 0.01 0.02** -0.02** -0.01 
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* * * 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
DCFO*
CFO 
0.27*** 0.28*** 0.09*** 0.21*** 0.00*** 0.11*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.000) (0.036) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01* 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
          
# of Obs. 1,036 1,103 1,170 1,267 1,278 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,276 
Adj. R2 0.743 0.920 0.824 0.782 0.772 0.758 0.674 0.872 0.816 
 
Panel C: Full sample based on Basu’s measure 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 2002-2005 2007-2010 
   
DRET 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
RET -0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
DRET*RET 0.06*** 0.03*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Observations 4,063 5,361 
R-squared 0.052 0.023 
 
Panel D: Pseudo-balanced sample based on Basu’s measure 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 2002-2005 2007-2010 
   
DRET 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
RET -0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
DRET*RET 0.06*** 0.03*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
   
Observations 4,063 4,809 
R-squared 0.052 0.024 
Notes: Panel A and B report results over years based on accrual-based measure of firms’ 
conservatism. Panel C and D report results over years based on Basu’s measure of firms’ 
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conservatism. For Panel A and B, column 1 to 9 report the accrual-based conditional conservatism 
from the year 2002 to 2010. The baseline regression model is established by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), and can be adopted to evaluate conditional conservatism for the companies whose share 
return information is not available or reliable. ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, 
and is defined as (earnings before extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. 
CFO stands for the cash flow from operation, which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary 
items + depreciation – Δ(working capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as 
Δ(current assets) –Δ(current liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO 
is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if CFO < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. For Panel C 
and D, column 1 presents Basu’s conditional conservatism from the year 2002 to 2005, while 
column 2 presents Basu’s conditional conservatism from the year 2007 to 2010. The 
supplementary regression method is a classical approach developed by Basu (1997), assuming 
firms’ share return denotes its true economic performance. This thesis does not present Basu’s 
conservatism for a single year because Ball et al. (2013) suggested that a longer horizon of share 
return could mitigate concerns about potential informational inefficiency of security prices. RET 
represents firms’ true economic performance, which is calculated as firms’ accumulative share 
return adjusted by market return in corresponding periods. The share return is estimated 
considering reinvestment of cash dividends. DRET is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
RET < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. The dependent variable is EP, which is measured as earning 
per share divided by share price in the beginning of the period. The standard errors are shown in 
the parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level. *, **, *** represent that 
statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
As Table 7.1.1 shows, the coefficients of DCFO*CFO are significantly positive at 1% level in 
pre-2006 periods, indicating that when cash flows are negative, the negative correlation 
between cash flows and accruals is alleviated. This illustrates that, before the implementation 
of IFRS-based standards, companies in this sample recognised unrealised losses in accruals in 
a more timely manner than unrealised gains. Conversely, the level of conditional 
conservatism rapidly reduced after the implementation of IFRS-based standards, which is 
consistent with the first hypothesis.  
 
It is possible that the systematic conditional conservatism differences between pre- and 
post-2006 periods are driven by the intertemporal variances in the composition of public 
companies in China. After the year 2006, China speeded up its capital market development, 
and more and more firms were listed on China’s domestic stock exchanges. Considering the 
possibility that those new IPO firms in China caused the decline in conditional conservatism 
after 2006, this thesis repeated the regression of Panel A for a pseudo-balanced sample which 
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consists of only those firms that went public before the year 2006. The results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 7.1.1 and are consistent with Panel A, indicating that the newly listed firms 
did not drive the observed differences around IFRS convergence after the year 2006. 
 
Although there have been criticisms regarding the approach of Basu’s (1997) measure of 
conditional conservatism, Ball et al. (2013) argued that compared to other conservatism 
measures, Basu’s regression produces valid measures of conditional conservatism, not only 
due to its intuitive appeal but also its rigorous analysis. Therefore, this thesis additionally 
reports the results over years based on Basu’s measure of firms’ conservatism in Panel C and 
D. This thesis does not present Basu’s conservatism for single year because Ball et al. (2013) 
suggested that a longer horizon of share return could mitigate concerns about potential 
informational inefficiency of security prices, which is one feature of China’s stock market 
within this sample period. 
 
As Panel C shows, the coefficients on DRET*RET are significantly positive at the 1% level in 
pre-2006 periods, suggesting that the positive correlation between earnings and share return is 
strengthened when share returns are negative. This finding illustrates that in the period before 
the implementation of IFRS-based standards, companies in this sample more timely 
recognised losses related to bad news in earnings than gains related to good news in terms of 
Basu’s conservatism measure. In contrast, the magnitude of DRET*RET rapidly reduced after 
the implementation of IFRS-based standards, which is consistent with the first hypothesis. 
The results in Panel D, which are based on the pseudo-balanced sample and Basu’s 
conservatism measure, are similar to Panel C. 
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Figure 7.1.1 shows the pattern of accrual-based and Basu’s conditional conservatism within 
the sample over the years. The left vertical axis denotes the estimated coefficient of the 
accrual-based conservatism measure each year, while the right vertical axis denotes the 
estimated coefficient of Basu’s conservatism measure. Without considering the statistical 
significance, the coefficients of conditional conservatism in both the accrual cash flow and 
Basu models significantly decreased after the implementation of IFRS-based standards. 
Therefore, the descriptive statistical result can preliminarily prove the first hypothesis. In the 
following sections, this thesis will conduct a formal regression analysis to further prove the 
first hypothesis.  
 
7.2 Regressive evidence for impacts of IFRS convergence  
For the purpose of examining the first hypothesis, this thesis ran the results on equation (3) 
and equation (4) discussed earlier in the thesis. The thesis further examined the impact of 
IFRS-based standards with regressive evidence from the accrual–cash flow and Basu’s 
measures models. This sample includes Chinese public companies from 2002 to 2010. In 
addition, the interaction between the degree of conditional conservatism and IFRS dummy 
variables can be employed to measure the impact of IFRS-based standards. The results for 
these OLS regressions are listed in Table 7.2.1.  
Table 7.2.1: Change in conditional conservatism measured by Accrual 
Cash flow model pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
Panel A: The results without controlling other factors 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Accrual-based Measure VARIABLES Basu’s Measure 
    
CFO -0.80*** RET 0.00 
 (0.004)  (0.001) 
DCFO 0.01*** DRET -0.01*** 
 (0.003)  (0.002) 
DCFO * CFO 0.18*** DRET*RET 0.04*** 
 (0.006)  (0.003) 
IFRS * CFO 0.00*** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 
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 (0.000)  (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.02*** IFRS*DRET 0.01*** 
 (0.003)  (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.18*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.03*** 
 (0.006)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.01*** Constant 0.02*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
# of Obs. 11,909 # of Obs. 10,591 
Adj. R2 0.810 Adj. R2 0.066 
 
Panel B: The results when controlling other factors 
       (1)          (2) 
VARIABLES Accrual-based Measure VARIABLES Basu’s Measure 
    
CFO -0.47*** RET -0.01 
 (0.071)  (0.019) 
DCFO 0.04 DRET -0.08** 
 (0.038)  (0.031) 
DCFO * CFO 0.14*** DRET*RET 0.07 
 (0.006)  (0.043) 
IFRS 0.00 IFRS 0.00 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
IFRS * CFO -0.04*** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 
 (0.011)  (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO  -0.02*** IFRS*DRET 0.00 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
IFRS*DCFO*CFO -0.10*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.02*** 
 (0.012)  (0.003) 
SIZE 0.01*** SIZE 0.010*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
SIZE*CFO -0.02*** SIZE* RET 0.00 
 (0.003)  (0.001) 
SIZE*DCFO  -0.00 SIZE*DRET 0.00** 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
SIZE*DCFO *CFO 0.01*** SIZE*DRET*RET -0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.002) 
MB 0.01*** MB 0.002*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000) 
MB*CFO 0.02*** MB*RET -0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.000) 
MB*DCFO  -0.01*** MB*DRET 0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
MB*DCFO *CFO -0.02*** MB*DRET*RET 0.005*** 
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 (0.002)  (0.001) 
LEV -0.02*** LEV -0.01*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
LEV*CFO -0.00 LEV*RET 0.00 
 (0.006)  (0.003) 
LEV*DCFO  0.01*** LEV*DRET -0.00 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
LEV*DCFO *CFO -0.01* LEV*DRET*RET -0.01*** 
 (0.007)  (0.003) 
Constant -0.27*** Constant -0.19*** 
 (0.021)  (0.025) 
    
Observations 11,659 Observations 10,411 
R-squared 0.865 R-squared 0.159 
Notes: Panel A and B report results of the effects of the state ownership of firms without and with 
controlling other factors including company size (SIZE), market value to book value ratio (MB) 
and financial leverage (LEV), respectively. Column 1 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based 
standards on the level of conditional conservatism based on the Accrual-based measure. The 
baseline regression models established by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) are used to evaluate 
conditional conservatism for the companies whose share return information is not available or 
reliable. ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before 
extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the cash flow from 
operation, which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary items + depreciation – Δ(working 
capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current assets) –Δ(current 
liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if CFO < 0 and zero otherwise. Column 2 presents the impacts of IFRS-based 
standards on the degree of conditional conservatism measured by Basu’s model. The 
supplementary regression model is a classical approach developed by Basu (1997) assuming a 
firm’s share return denotes its true economic performance. RET represents a firm’s true economic 
performance, which is calculated as a firm’s accumulative share return adjusted by market return 
in corresponding period. The share return is estimated considering reinvestment of cash dividends. 
DRET is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if RET < 0 and equal to 0 and zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable is EP, which is measured as earning per share divided by share price in the 
beginning of the period. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms 
adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. *, **, *** represents that statistical 
results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 7.2.1 presents the statistical results supporting the first hypothesis. Column 1 reports the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the level of accrual-based conservatism. The foremost conclusion 
of column 1 in Panel A is that the conditional conservatism of Chinese public companies 
reduced from 0.18 to 0.00 after adopting IFRS-based accounting standards. The coefficient on 
DCFO*CFO is significantly positive at 1% level, indicating that the negative correlation 
 125 / 203 
 
between accruals and cash flows is reduced when cash flows are negative. This indicates that, 
on average, the companies in the sample recognised unrealised losses via accruals more 
quickly than unrealised gains. The coefficient on IFRS*DCFO*CFO is -0.18 and significantly 
negative at 1% level. As mentioned above, this coefficient stands for the change in the level of 
conditional conservatism in the post-IFRS convergence period. As a result, compared to the 
pre-IFRS convergence period, firms in the post-IFRS convergence period accrued unrealised 
losses in cash-loss years more slowly than unrealised gains in cash-profit years. The findings 
in column 1 are in line with the first hypothesis - that Chinese public companies issued less 
conservative financial statements after the implementation of IFRS-based standards in 2006. 
 
Column 2 indicates the influences of IFRS-based standards on the level of Basu’s 
conditionally conservative accounting. The foremost conclusion in column 2 of Panel A is that 
Basu’s conditional conservatism in the Chinese public enterprises declined from 0.04 to 0.01 
after the implementation of IFRS-based standards. The coefficient on DRET*RET is positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that the positive correlation between 
earnings and share returns is alleviated when share returns are negative. This indicates that, on 
average, the firms in our sample recognised unrealised losses via earnings in a timelier 
manner than unrealised gains. However, the estimated parameter of IFRS * DRET * RET is 
-0.03 at 1% significance level. Therefore, compared to the pre-convergence period, the market 
in the post-convergence period follows conditional conservatism to a lesser extent. The 
findings in columns 1 and 2 are in line with the first hypothesis – that public companies in 
China issued less conservative financial statements after the implementation of IFRS-based 
standards in 2006. Thus, the empirical findings for the first hypothesis are robust to different 
choices of conditional conservatism estimates. 
 
The results in Table 7.2.1 are comparable with the findings of André et al. (2015) regarding 
the effects of IFRS convergence on conditionally conservative accounting. They provided 
evidence that the level of conditional conservatism in the European market dropped 
significantly from 0.038 to 0.007, after adopting IFRS. Their analyses relied on the firm-year 
level measurement suggested by Khan and Watts (2009), which is an extension of the 
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traditional Basu measure. Qualitatively, this thesis draws the same conclusion as André et al. 
(2015) - that companies issued less conservative financial statements after IFRS convergence. 
 
Given that company size (SIZE), market-to-book value ratio (MB), and financial leverage 
(LEV) in previous research are usually considered the determinants of conditional 
conservatism, this thesis introduces these factors with their respective interactions and reports 
the results in Panel B. A comparison of the two panels finds that the results of Panel B show a 
higher adjusted R-squared, suggesting that the controlled variables can improve the 
explanatory power of both models. Panel B displays the results of accrual-based and Basu’s 
measurements after other factors are controlled, which are still consistent with the results 
achieved when the other factors affecting conditional conservatism are not controlled. To 
control the effect of changes in the economic environment during the sample period and the 
impact of different industries, this thesis also introduces the year and industry variables as 
control variables; the results remain the same (un-tabulated). 
 
Considering the possibility of confounding events in the post-convergence period leading the 
results in Table 7.2.1, this thesis takes measures to shorten the sample period. In order to 
alleviate the potential noises, this thesis carried out the main tests over a shorter window, 
where the pre-IFRS-adoption period started in 2003 and the post-IFRS-adoption period ended 
in 20082. Table 7.2.2 reports sensitive results based on a shorter window from 2003 to 2008. 
Table 7.2.2: Shorter window around IFRS-adoption (from 2003 to 
2008) 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Accrual-based Measure VARIABLES Basu’s Measure 
    
DCFO 0.02*** DRET -0.01*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
CFO -0.77*** RET 0.00 
 (0.006)  (0.002) 
 
2 This thesis also tried even a shorter window around the event year or excluded the transition period of IFRS 
convergence. The results, which are non-tabulated due to the length limitation, are similar to this main report. 
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DCFO * CFO 0.14*** DRET*RET 0.04*** 
 (0.008)  (0.004) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.03*** IFRS*DRET 0.02*** 
 (0.004)  (0.002) 
IFRS * CFO 0.00*** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.14*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.03*** 
 (0.008)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.01*** Constant 0.02*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
    
# of Obs. 7,656 # of Obs. 6,790 
Adj. R2 0.793 Adj. R2 0.071 
Notes: Column 1 illustrates the impacts of new Chinese standards on the degree of conditional 
conservatism based on the Accrual-based measure. The baseline regression model established by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is used to evaluate conditional conservatism for the companies whose 
share return information is not available or reliable. ACC stands for the accruals of company i in 
year t, and is defined as (earnings before extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total 
assets. CFO stands for the cash flow from operation, which is defined as [earnings before 
extraordinary items + depreciation – Δ(working capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) 
is measured as Δ(current assets) –Δ(current liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –
Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if CFO < 0 and equal to 0 if 
otherwise. Column 2 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based standards on the level of conditional 
conservatism based on Basu’s measure. The supplementary regression model is a classical 
approach developed by Basu (1997) assuming firm’s share return denotes its true economic 
performance. RET represents firm’s true economic performance, which is calculated as firm’s 
accumulative share return adjusted by market return in corresponding period. The share return is 
estimated considering reinvestment of cash dividends. DRET is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if RET < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. The dependent variable is EP, which is 
measured as earning per share divided by share price in the beginning of the period. IFRS is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new 
standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. The standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The result in Table 7.2.2 is similar to Table 7.2.1. The coefficient on IFRS*DCFO*CFO at 1% 
significance level is -0.14. Therefore, compared to the pre-IFRS-adoption period, companies 
in the post-IFRS-adoption period accrued unrealised losses in cash-loss years in a less timely 
manner than unrealised gains in cash-profit years, which are still consistent with the first 
hypothesis of this thesis: Chinese public companies employ less conditionally conservative 
accounting policy in the post-implementation of IFRS-based standards in 2006. 
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7.3 Moderating effects of ex-ante information asymmetry 
It is critical to investigate the in-depth mechanism through which the IFRS convergence has 
affected the conditional conservatism choices of firms. Particularly, this thesis examines 
whether the ex-ante information asymmetry, which shaped the conditional conservatism 
demands (LaFond and Watts, 2008), would have a moderating function between IFRS 
convergence and conditional conservatism. This thesis partitioned firms into two and four 
subgroups based on their ex-ante information asymmetry, proxied by the business model 
complexity of enterprises. 
 
The ex-ante information asymmetry of enterprises is a complex issue. Information disclosure 
levels, information transmission mechanisms and information interpretation capabilities have 
led to information asymmetry in the capital markets in different ways. The information 
asymmetry faced by traders in the market is difficult to quantify. The information asymmetry 
is mainly based on the existence of informed trading, but informed trading is also difficult to 
observe and identify. [Informed trading refers to the trading behaviour of the informed traders 
using the private information owned by them to conduct stock trading (Bagehot, 1971; Brody 
et al., 2009). The private information here mainly includes information regarding the changes 
in the share value obtained through securities analysis, inside information, etc.] 
 
The bid-ask spread measurement and the probability of informed trading (PIN) measurement 
as two mainstream measurement methods have been widely used in related research. By 
calculating bid-ask spreads, the LSB model (Booth et al., 1995), the EKOP model (Easley et 
al., 1996) and the MRR model (Madhavan, et al 1997) are relatively mature models for 
measuring information asymmetry. Later, Corwin and Schultz (2012) simplified these 
previous models. Paperman (1996) and Easley et al. (1996) proposed a model that uses the 
binary tree to characterise the entire trading process of stocks, which is the PIN model for 
measuring the probability of informed trading. They employed the transaction data of NYSE 
stocks as a research sample to estimate the probability of the informed trading of each stock. 
They found that the probability of informed trading is lower for stocks with more active 
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transactions, while the probability of informed trading for stocks with less active stocks is 
relatively higher. After many years of verification, the PIN model became a classic model for 
measuring informed trading. 
 
However, both bid-ask spread and PIN models require the high-frequency data in the capital 
market. Both generally require the capital market to be a quote-driven and market-maker 
market. (Market makers refer to securities trading companies with reputations as franchise 
dealers in the securities market, which continuously report the buying and selling price – i.e. a 
two-way quotation – of certain securities to the public investors, and at that price accept the 
trading requirements of the public investors. Quote-driven market means the market relying 
on market makers to conduct securities transactions. For example, New York Stock Exchange 
is a quote-driven and market-maker market.) However, China’s capital market is an 
order-driven market, and there are no market makers in the market. Therefore, the 
applicability of these models in China’s capital market may be limited. Additionally, if the 
information asymmetry is measured by the bid-ask spread or PIN on the basis of the 
high-frequency data, it is necessary to construct panel data with a large time span. The 
abnormally large amount of data makes the workload large, which in turn increases the 
research difficulty. 
 
Because of the influence of other factors in the market, the bid-ask spread only roughly 
measures the degree of information asymmetry. Moreover, since the bid-ask spread method 
and PIN method are based on the market maker market, the bid-ask spread method and PIN 
method in theory are less suitable for measuring the information asymmetry of the Chinese 
order-driven market. If the limit order of many investors under China’s order-driven system is 
equated with the purchase order provided by a market maker, it might be reasonable for the 
bid-ask spread and the PIN to be applied to China’s order-driven system. However, the 
accuracy of these models measuring the information asymmetry in China is yet to be verified. 
 
Due to the lack of high frequency data and questioning the applicability of the bid-ask spread 
and the PIN method in China, this thesis adopts other indirect methods to measure the degree 
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of information asymmetry faced by traders in the market as a proxy variable for information 
asymmetry, such as MB and cash flow volatility. 
 
Smith and Watts (1992) argued that managers of growth companies have an advantage over 
the average investor in terms of information of investment opportunities and the future cash 
flows generated by the companies’ existing assets. Therefore, the companies’ investment 
opportunities can be used as a substitute variable for information asymmetry. As companies 
have higher growth, the company’s managers or insiders have better information about the 
company's value than the average investor. Therefore, there is a positive association between 
the growth of companies and information asymmetry. Melaughlin et al. (1998) used the ratio 
of book value to market value to measure a company’s future growth as proxy variables for 
information asymmetry. 
 
Since obtaining such information is costly, the volatility of cash flow positively correlates 
with information asymmetry (Goel and Thakor, 2003). As firm’s cash flows become more 
volatile, it becomes harder to monitor management. Furthermore, it is more difficult for the 
outsiders to acquire information regarding a company’s true value and its performance. This 
in turn will exacerbate information asymmetries between managers and outsiders. Therefore, 
the volatility of cash flow can be used to a certain extent as proxy variables for information 
asymmetries. Table 7 reports the results of the moderating effects of ex-ante information 
asymmetry that is measured by MB and cash flow volatility. 
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Table 7.3: The ex-ante information asymmetry’s moderating effects  
Panel A: The ex-ante information asymmetry is measured by MB 
 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure   
 High Complexity Low Complexity  High Complexity Low Complexity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
      
CFO -0.75*** -0.90*** RET -0.00 0.00 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.001) 
DCFO 0.02* -0.00 DRET -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.002) 
DCFO * CFO 0.18*** 0.16*** DRET*RET 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.009) (0.011)  (0.004) (0.003) 
IFRS * CFO 0.00*** -0.01 IFRS*RET 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.000) (0.013)  (0.002) (0.003) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.03*** -0.00 IFRS*DRET 0.00 0.01*** 
 (0.008) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.003) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.18*** -0.06*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.03*** -0.02*** 
 (0.009) (0.0207)  (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant 0.01*** 0.02*** Constant 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.002) 
      
# of Obs. 5,300 6,609 # of Obs. 4,553 6,038 
Adj. R2 0.740 0.919 Adj. R2 0.082 0.055 
Panel B: The ex-ante information asymmetry is measured by cash flow volatility 
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 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure   
 High Complexity Low Complexity  High Complexity Low Complexity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
      
CFO -0.80*** -0.81*** RET 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.001) 
DCFO 0.01** 0.01*** DRET -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.002) 
DCFO * CFO 0.18*** 0.16*** DRET*RET 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.009) (0.030)  (0.004) (0.003) 
IFRS * CFO 0.00*** 0.02** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.000) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.002) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.02*** -0.00 IFRS*DRET 0.01 0.00 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.18*** 0.00 IFRS*DRET*RET -0.03*** -0.02*** 
 (0.009) (0.037)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant 0.01*** 0.02*** Constant 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002) 
      
# of Obs. 6,025 5,875 # of Obs. 5,189 5,396 
Adj. R2 0.815 0.778 Adj. R2 0.082 0.043 
 
Panel C: Four subgroups based on their ex-ante information asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Magnitude of Complexity Reduction 
VARIABLES 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
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CFO -0.78*** -0.85*** -0.89*** -0.84*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
DCFO -0.00 0.04*** -0.00 0.00 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
DCFO * CFO 0.12*** 0.30*** 0.10** 0.06** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.045) (0.025) 
IFRS * CFO 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.019) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.12*** -0.31*** -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.057) (0.045) 
Constant 0.00 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
# of Obs. 1,507 1,510 1,499 1,502 
Adj. R2 0.758 0.853 0.908 0.886 
Notes: Panel A and B report results of the effects of ex-ante information asymmetry that is measured by MB and cash flow volatility, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 
of Panel A and B respectively report results the effects of IFRS convergence for firms with high and low information asymmetry based on accrual-based measure of 
firms’ conservatism. Similarly, Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A and B report results based on Basu’s measure of firms’ conservatism. Columns 1 to 4 in Panel C present 
the results for four degrees of complexity groups in the periods before and after 2006 and complexity is measured by MB ratio. The baseline regression model 
established by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is used to evaluate conditional conservatism for the companies whose share return information is not available or reliable. 
ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for 
the cash flow from operation, which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary items + depreciation – Δ(working capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) 
is measured as Δ(current assets) –Δ(current liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if CFO <
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0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. The supplementary regression model is a classical approach developed by Basu (1997) assuming firm’s stock return denotes its true 
economic performance. RET represents the firm’s true economic performance, which is calculated as the firm’s accumulative stock return adjusted by market return 
in the corresponding period. The stock return is estimated considering reinvestment of cash dividends. DRET is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if RET < 0 
and equal to 0 if otherwise. The dependent variable is EP, which is measured as earning per share divided by share price in the beginning of the period. IFRS is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. The standard errors are shown in the 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Panel A and B of Table 7.3 reveal that conditional conservatism of the highly complex 
business model group (Column 1 and 3) before IFRS convergence in 2006 is significantly 
higher than the conditional conservatism of the lowly complex business model group 
(Column 2 and 4) under both the accrual-based measure and Basu’s measure. This is due to 
the quality and comparability of the accounting information under the old accounting 
standards being relatively low, compared to the new standards. This increases the ex-ante 
information asymmetry, making the demand of the highly complex business model group for 
conditional conservatism greater than the lowly complex business model group. 
 
However, the conditional conservatism of the highly complex business model group after 
2006 declines significantly, and this reduction is much greater than that of the lowly complex 
business model group. Consequently, the conditional conservatism of the highly complex 
business model group after 2006 is close to the lowly complex business model group. After 
controlling the effect of other factors, year and industry, the results (untabulated) remain 
qualitatively the same. As discussed in the hypothetical development, this is mainly because 
China’s new standards improve accounting quality and comparability, which reduces the 
ex-ante information asymmetry. Therefore, the advantages of new IFRS-based standards in 
China are more beneficial to enterprises in the highly complex business model group. As a 
result, the decline of conditional conservatism in the high business model complexity group is 
much more than in the lowly complex business model group after 2006. This result supports 
the second hypothesis of this thesis: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a 
greater negative impact on companies with more complex business models in terms of 
conditionally conservative accounting than companies with less complex business models. 
 
It is worth noting that when firms were partitioned into four subgroups based on their ex-ante 
information asymmetry (Panel C), it can be found that the relationships between conservatism 
and information asymmetry may not be simple linear, and the influence of standards changes 
for firms with different degrees of information asymmetry might not be a simple linear 
relationship either. However, the reduction of the highly complex business group in the level 
of conditionally conservative accounting in the post-IFRS-adoption period, overall, is more 
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than that of the lowly complex business group. 
 
7.4 Moderating effects of state ownership of firms 
In order to examine the impacts of state ownership of companies, the entire sample is 
separated into two groups depending on the ultimate ownership of companies. The SOE group 
consists of companies controlled by government departments and governmental agents. In 
this section, based on the state ownership of Chinese public enterprise, this thesis partitioned 
firms into two subgroups, the non-SOE and the SOE, and focuses on comparing the 
coefficient on IFRS*DCFO*CFO between them. 
Table 7.4: The state ownership’s moderating effects  
Panel A: The results without controlling other factors 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure 
VARIABLES SOEs Non-SOEs VARIABLES SOEs Non-SOEs 
      
CFO -0.85*** -0.77*** RET 0.00 0.00 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.002) 
DCFO -0.00 0.02*** DRET -0.00** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.003) 
DCFO * CFO 0.16*** 0.19*** DRET*RET 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.009) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.004) 
IFRS * CFO 0.05*** 0.00*** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.010) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.01*** -0.03*** IFRS*DRET 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.18*** -0.19*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.015) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.01*** Constant 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
      
# of Obs. 6,899 5,010 # of Obs. 6,351 4,240 
Adj. R2 0.859 0.758 Adj. R2 0.058 0.077 
 
Panel B: The results with controlling other factors 
Accrual-based Measure Basu’s Measure 
 SOEs Non-SOEs  SOEs Non-SOEs 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
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CFO -0.68*** -0.56*** RET -0.03 0.05 
 (0.083) (0.132)  (0.023) (0.034) 
DCFO -0.05 -0.01 DRET -0.06* 0.04 
 (0.046) (0.071)  (0.039) (0.065) 
DCFO * CFO 0.13*** 0.16*** DRET*RET 0.012** 0.018** 
 (0.010) (0.008)  (0.060) (0.078) 
IFRS -0.00* 0.01** IFRS -0.00 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) 
IFRS * CFO 0.010 -0.034** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.014) (0.016)  (0.002) (0.002) 
IFRS * DCFO  -0.007 -0.022*** IFRS*DRET 0.00 0.00 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.004) 
IFRS*DCFO*CFO -0.025 -0.13*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.016*** -0.020*** 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.004) 
SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
SIZE*CFO -0.01*** -0.02*** SIZE* RET 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.002) 
SIZE*DCFO  -0.00 0.00 SIZE*DRET 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 
SIZE*DCFO *CFO 0.01*** 0.01*** SIZE*DRET*RET -0.00* -0.01** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.004) 
MB 0.00*** 0.00** MB 0.00** 0.00*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
MB*CFO 0.03*** 0.04*** MB*RET 0.00 -0.00*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*DCFO  0.01*** -0.00*** MB*DRET 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
MB*DCFO *CFO 0.01*** -0.04*** MB*DRET*RET 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
LEV -0.12*** -0.01*** LEV -0.006* -0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) 
LEV*CFO 0.20*** -0.16*** LEV*RET -0.00 0.01** 
 (0.013) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.005) 
LEV*DCFO  0.10*** -0.03*** LEV*DRET -0.01 0.01 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.007) 
LEV*DCFO *CFO -0.27*** 0.11*** LEV*DRET*RET -0.01 -0.01** 
 (0.014) (0.012)  (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant -0.23*** -0.30*** Constant -0.17*** -0.28*** 
 (0.024) (0.041)  (0.031) (0.053) 
      
Observations 6,799 4,860 Observations 6,267 4,144 
R-squared 0.888 0.861 R-squared 0.136 0.201 
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Notes: Notes: Panel A and B report results of the effects of state ownership of firms without and 
with controlling other factors including company size (SIZE), market value to book value ratio 
(MB) and financial leverage (LEV), respectively. Column 1 and 3 present the results for the 
state-owned firms group and Column 2 and 4 present the non-state-owned firms group in the 
periods before and after the year 2006. Column 1 and 2 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based 
standards on the level of conditional conservatism based on Accrual-based measure. The baseline 
regression model established by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is used to evaluate conditional 
conservatism for the companies whose share return information is not available or reliable. ACC 
stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before extraordinary 
items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the cash flow from operation, 
which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary items + depreciation – Δ(working capital)] 
/average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current assets) –Δ(current liability) 
+Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to 
one if CFO < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. Column 3 and 4 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based 
standards on the degree of conditional conservatism measured by Basu’s model. The 
supplementary regression model is a classical approach developed by Basu (1997) assuming 
firm’s stock return denotes its true economic performance. RET represents firm’s true economic 
performance, which is calculated as firm’s accumulative stock return adjusted by market return in 
the corresponding period. The stock return is estimated considering reinvestment of cash 
dividends. DRET is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if RET < 0 and equal to 0 if 
otherwise. The dependent variable is EP, which is measured as earning per share divided by stock 
price in the beginning of the period. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. The 
standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *, **, *** represent that statistical results are 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Column 1 and 2 illustrate the influences of IFRS-adoption on the level of conditionally 
conservative accounting for SOE and non-SOE groups. Same as the previous studies by Chen 
et al in 2010, the empirical evidence is significantly positive, based on the Accrual-based 
measurement document that the conditional conservatism in SOEs group evaluated by the 
coefficient on DCFO * CFO. However, it was lower than that in the non-SOE groups, 
indicating that non-SOE enterprises were inclined to provide financial statements in a 
conditionally conservative manner before IFRS convergence.  
 
Differing slightly from the result of Accrual-based measurement, the empirical results based 
on Basu’s conditional conservatism measure illustrate that the conditional conservatism of 
SOEs is higher than the non-SOEs before 2006. The disparity between findings of 
Accrual-based measurement and Basu’s measurement is due to these results where other 
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factors aren’t controlled. The result of Basu’s measurement after controlling the other factors 
(as shown in Panel B) is consistent with that of Accrual-based measurement as shown in the 
table. Both the findings illustrate that conditional conservatism of SOEs is lower than 
non-SOEs before 2006 and are consistent with the findings of Chen’s research (2010). 
 
The parameter of IFRS * DCFO * CFO and IFRS * DRET * RET present the impacts of 
China adopting IFRS-based standards on conditionally conservative accounting for SOEs and 
non-SOEs. In addition, the estimated parameters of DCFO * CFO and DRET * RET present 
the conditional conservatism of SOEs and non-SOEs in the pre-2006 period. Therefore, it can 
be found from the result of Table 7.4 that the conditional conservatism of the non-SOE group 
(the coefficients on IFRS * DCFO * CFO and IFRS * DRET * RET in Column 2 and 4 of 
Panel A) declines by 0.19 (Accrual-based measurement) and 0.03 (Basu’s measurement) in 
the post-2006 period. However, the conditional conservatism of the SOE group just decreases 
by 0.18 (Accrual-based measurement) and 0.02 (Basu’s measurement) in the post-2006 period. 
This result demonstrates that after IFRS convergence in 2006, the decrease of conditional 
conservatism of the non-SOE group is higher than that of the SOE group, and the conditional 
conservatism of the SOE group is lower than that of the non-SOE group either before or after 
IFRS convergence. Therefore, the differences with regard to firms’ state ownership affect 
conditional conservatism, and non-SOE firms played a significant role in the reduction of 
conditional conservatism after IFRS convergence. 
 
As discussed in the hypothetical development, state-owned enterprises enjoy potential 
government insurance (Xu et al., 2005), and SOEs need to consider more diverse social and 
political factors than non-SOEs instead of pure financial and business performance (Chen et 
al, 2010). Therefore, it can be found from the results that conditional conservatism of SOEs is 
lower than the non-SOEs before 2006, which is consistent with the findings of Chen’s 
research (2010). As China's capital market improved, there was more intense market 
competition and state-owned enterprise reform (including management systems and 
regulatory systems of various state-owned enterprises). The difference between SOEs and 
non-SOEs, however, is gradually decreasing, and their demand on conservatism is achieving a 




Thus, Table 7.4 demonstrates these results: SOE groups under standards before 2006 have a 
lower level of conditional conservatism; but, after IFRS convergence in 2006, the decrease of 
conditional conservatism of the non-SOE group is higher than that of the SOE group; and the 
difference of conditional conservatism between the non-SOE group and the SOE group has 
reduced. Thus, the findings are consistent with third hypothesis: The implementation of new 
Chinese standards has a greater negative impact on non-state-owned enterprises in terms of 
conditionally conservative accounting than state-owned enterprises.  
 
7.5 Moderating effects of financial constraints 
It would also be interesting to explore the reason behind a firms’ choice to reduce their 
conditional conservatism after IFRS convergence. Specifically, this thesis investigated 
whether the financial constraints, which lead to debtholder’s conservatism demands (Chen et 
al., 2010), would moderate the impacts of IFRS convergence. Moreover, the core of this 
problem (this has been discussed in section 4.1 of Hypotheses Development) is actually that 
IFRS adoption could affect principals’ demands (debt holders’ demands) for conservative 
accounting by shifting the monitoring costs of principals downwards. 
 
Existing research on monitoring costs of debt face a problem similar to information 
asymmetry, i.e. it is difficult to quantify. Therefore, it is also a complex problem. However, 
the amount of research related to monitoring costs of debt is far less than the research on 
information asymmetry. The monitoring costs of debt are rarely discussed and studied 
separately, which is often included in the agency cost to be studied in previous studies. In 
agency theory, agency costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss, and 
monitoring costs are a major part of agency costs. However, the amount of quantitative 
research on debt agency cost is also far less than the research on information asymmetry. 
Therefore, there is no accurate way to measure the monitoring costs of debt. In some studies, 
leverage and interest are directly adopted as indicators of debt agency costs. Therefore, 
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borrowing from these studies, this thesis will directly represent leverage and interest as the 
monitoring costs of debt. 
 
Hence, this thesis partitioned firms into two subgroups based on their financial constraints, 
using financial leverage and interest as the proxies for monitoring costs of each firm’s debt. 
Table 8 presents the results of the moderating effects of financial constraints. 
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Table 7.5: The moderating effects of financial constraints 
Panel A: The monitoring costs of debt is measured by financial leverage 
 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure   
 High Leverage Low Leverage  High Complexity Low Complexity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
      
CFO -0.79*** -0.86*** RET 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.001) 
DCFO 0.01 0.00 DRET -0.01*** -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
DCFO * CFO 0.18*** 0.08*** DRET*RET 0.05*** 0.02*** 
 (0.008) (0.017)  (0.004) (0.003) 
IFRS * CFO 0.00*** 0.08*** IFRS*RET 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.000) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.02*** -0.00 IFRS*DRET 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.18*** -0.14*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.008) (0.022)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Constant -0.00* 0.03*** Constant 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
      
# of Obs. 5,955 5,954 # of Obs. 5,437 5,154 
Adj. R2 0.791 0.864 Adj. R2 0.065 0.108 
 
Panel B: The monitoring costs of debt is measured by loan interest 
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 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure   
 High Interest Low Interest  High Interest Low Interest 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
      
CFO -0.91*** -0.88*** RET -0.00 0.00 
 (0.0110) (0.0153)  (0.002) (0.002) 
DCFO 0.01 -0.02** DRET -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007) 
DCFO * CFO 0.11*** 0.10*** DRET*RET 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.024) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.006) 
IFRS * CFO 0.02 0.04 IFRS*RET 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.025)  (0.004) (0.003) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.00 0.04*** IFRS*DRET 0.01** 0.01 
 (0.007) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.007) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.08** 0.09* IFRS*DRET*RET -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.036) (0.049)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.03*** 0.02*** Constant 0.02*** 0.01* 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.006) 
      
# of Obs. 1,300 1,287 # of Obs. 1,180 1,138 
Adj. R2 0.932 0.893 Adj. R2 0.081 0.125 
Notes: Notes: Panel A and B report results of the effects of monitoring costs of debt that is measured by leverage and interest, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel 
A and B respectively report results on the effects of IFRS convergence for firms with high and low monitoring costs of debt based on the accrual-based measure of 
firms’ conservatism. Similarly, Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A and B report results based on Basu measure of firms’ conservatism. Column 1 and 2 present the results 
for the high-leverage (interest) group and the low-leverage (interest) group in the periods before and after the year 2006. The leverage is calculated as the ratio of the 
firm’s total liabilities over total assets. The interest is equal to the loan interest of firms. The baseline regression model established by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is 
 144 / 203 
 
used to evaluate conditional conservatism for the companies whose share return information is not available or reliable. ACC stands for the accruals of company i in 
year t, and is defined as (earnings before extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the cash flow from operation, which is 
defined as [earnings before extraordinary items + depreciation – Δ(working capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current assets) –
Δ(current liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if CFO < 0 and 0 if otherwise. The 
supplementary regression model is a classical approach developed by Basu (1997) assuming a firm’s stock return denotes its true economic performance. RET 
represents a firm’s true economic performance, which is calculated as the firm’s accumulative stock return adjusted by market return in corresponding period. The 
stock return is estimated considering reinvestment of cash dividends. DRET is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if RET < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. The 
dependent variable is EP, which is measured as earning per share divided by stock price in the beginning of the period. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to 
one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. The standard errors are shown in the parentheses. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1%. *, **, *** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 7.5 indicates that the conditional conservatism of the high leverage group is 
superior to that of the low leverage group, both before and after 2006. This is consistent with 
previous studies like that of Khan and Watts (2007). These previous studies have proved that 
there is a significant positive correlation between accounting conservatism and leverage, 
indicating that this result is reasonable and reliable. This is because the highly leveraged firm 
is driven more by the demand of the debt holder for conservatism, and the lowly leveraged 
firm is driven more by the shareholder demand for conservatism, while the debt market is 
more demanding for conservatism than the equity market. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 7.5 present the conditional conservatism of the 
high-leverage group and the low-leverage group in the pre- and post-2006 periods, 
respectively. From this, it can be found that the conditional conservatism of the highly 
leveraged firms group dropped significantly from 0.18 in the pre-2006 period to 0.00 
(0.18-0.18) in the post-2006 period, while the conditional conservatism of the low leverage 
companies group decreased from 0.08 in the pre-2006 period to -0.06 (0.08-0.14) in the 
post-2006 period. From the two sets of data, it can be concluded that the new standards 
significantly reduce the conditional conservatism of both the high and low leverage groups. In 
addition, a comparison of the estimated parameters of IFRS * DCFO * CFO in the two groups 
reveals that the low leverage group is impacted less by the change in standards than the high 
leverage group. Results of the effects of monitoring costs of debt that is measured by interest 
provide the same conclusion. In addition, results based on Basu’s measure are consistent with 
results based on accrual-based measure. As discussed in the hypothetical development, the 
conservatism demands of the firms with more severe financial constraints (high leverage and 
interest) are primarily driven by debt holders, especially commercial banks. Therefore, this 
phenomenon is mainly due to China’s new standards for improving the quality of the 
accounting information and reducing the monitoring costs of debt, which declines the demand 
of debt holders (lenders) for conservatism of companies (borrowers). The response of the 
highly leveraged group to the reduced demand of debt holders for conservatism is more 
obvious than the lowly leveraged group. After controlling the effect of other factors, year and 
industry, the results remain qualitatively the same (untabulated). Therefore, IFRS convergence 
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makes the degree of reduction of conditional conservatism in the high leverage group higher 
than that in the low leverage group. This result is consistent with the fourth hypothesis of this 
thesis: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a greater negative impact on firms 
with more financial constraints in terms of conditionally conservative accounting than firms 
with less financial constraints.  
 
7.6 Moderating effects of state ownership of banks 
In order to further study the impact of the state ownership of banks (debt holders) on the 
conditional conservatism changes, this thesis employs the bank's loan database and partitions 
firms into two subgroups based on the state ownership of banks. One is a state-owned bank 
group, where the companies borrow from state-owned banks (SBs); the other is 
non-state-owned banks group, where the companies borrow from non-state-owned banks 
(NSBs) (including foreign-owned and local private banks). Table 7.6 presents the results of 
the moderating effects of state ownership of banks (debt holders). 
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Table 7.6: Context effects on bank’s state ownership 
Panel A: The results without controlling other factors 
 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure   
 State-owned Banks Non-State-owned Banks  State-owned Banks Non-State-owned Banks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
      
CFO -0.92*** -0.90*** RET -0.01*** -0.00** 
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.001) 
DCFO 0.01** 0.02*** DRET -0.01** -0.01*** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) 
DCFO * CFO 0.16*** 0.19*** DRET*RET 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.003) (0.002) 
IFRS * CFO 0.01 0.00 IFRS*RET 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.019) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO -0.01** -0.02*** IFRS*DRET 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.003) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.12*** -0.16*** IFRS*DRET*RET -0.04*** -0.02*** 
 (0.027) (0.021)  (0.005) (0.003) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.02*** Constant 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 
      
# of Obs. 3,202 5,704 # of Obs. 2,862 5,267 
Adj. R2 0.929 0.931 Adj. R2 0.098 0.075 
 
Panel B: The results with controlling other factors 
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 Accrual-based Measure  Basu’s Measure   
 State-owned Banks Non-State-owned Banks  State-owned Banks Non-State-owned Banks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) VARIABLES (3) (4) 
      
CFO -1.42*** -0.93*** RET 0.03 -0.05* 
 (0.115) (0.078)  (0.041) (0.028) 
DCFO -0.32*** -0.21*** DRET -0.13** -0.07* 
 (0.063) (0.044)  (0.0503) (0.0374) 
DCFO * CFO 0.12*** 0.13*** DRET*RET 0.05 0.17*** 
 (0.017) (0.015)  (0.082) (0.056) 
IFRS -0.00 0.01*** IFRS 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
IFRS * CFO -0.03* -0.13*** IFRS*RET 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.018) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.001) 
IFRS * DCFO  -0.03*** -0.04*** IFRS*DRET -0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) 
IFRS * DCFO * CFO -0.12*** 0.00 IFRS*DRET*RET -0.04*** -0.02*** 
 (0.024) (0.020)  (0.005) (0.003) 
SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** SIZE 0.002 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
SIZE*CFO 0.02*** 0.00 SIZE* RET -0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.001) 
SIZE*DCFO  0.02*** 0.01*** SIZE*DRET 0.006** 0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
SIZE*DCFO *CFO 0.00 -0.01*** SIZE*DRET*RET 0.00 -0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) 
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MB 0.00 0.01*** MB -0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.00140) (0.00129) 
MB*CFO 0.05*** 0.01*** MB*RET -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.001) 
MB*DCFO  0.01*** 0.01*** MB*DRET -0.00 -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
MB*DCFO *CFO -0.01 0.05*** MB*DRET*RET -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.013) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.002) 
LEV -0.10*** -0.11*** LEV -0.05*** -0.01 
 (0.009) (0.005)  (0.011) (0.009) 
LEV*CFO -0.01 0.02 LEV*RET 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.029) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.008) 
LEV*DCFO  -0.04** 0.01 LEV*DRET -0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.017) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.011) 
LEV*DCFO *CFO 0.02 0.09** LEV*DRET*RET 0.03 0.05*** 
 (0.066) (0.044)  (0.020) (0.014) 
Constant -0.07** -0.18*** Constant 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.033) (0.023)  (0.039) (0.030) 
      
Observations 3,184 5,684 Observations 2,849 5,246 
R-squared 0.947 0.949 R-squared 0.181 0.191 
Notes: Panel A and B report results of the effects of state ownership of banks (debt holders) without and with controlling other factors including company size (SIZE), 
market value to book value ratio (MB) and financial leverage (LEV), respectively. Column 1 and 3 present the results for the state-owned banks group and Column 2 
and 4 present the non-state-owned banks group in the periods before and after the year 2006. State-owned banks mainly include the big four banks. Non-state-owned 
banks mainly include foreign-owned and local private banks. Column 1 and 2 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based standards on the level of conditional conservatism 
based on the Accrual-based measure. The baseline regression model established by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is used to evaluate conditional conservatism for the 
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companies whose share return information is not available or reliable. ACC stands for the accruals of company i in year t, and is defined as (earnings before 
extraordinary items–operating cash flow) /average total assets. CFO stands for the operating cash flow, which is defined as [earnings before extraordinary items + 
depreciation – Δ(working capital)] /average total assets. Δ(working capital) is measured as Δ(current assets) –Δ(current liability) +Δ(current portion of long-term 
liability) –Δ(cash). DCFO is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if CFO < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. Column 3 and 4 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based 
standards on the level of conditional conservatism based on Basu’s measure. The supplementary regression model is a classical approach developed by Basu (1997), 
assuming firm’s stock return denotes its true economic performance. RET represents firm’s true economic performance, which is calculated as firm’s accumulative 
stock return adjusted by market return in the corresponding period. The stock return is estimated considering reinvestment of cash dividends. DRET is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to one if RET < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. The dependent variable is EP, which is measured as earning per share divided by stock price 
in the beginning of the period. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. 
The standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *, **, *** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Column 1 and 2 of both Panel A and B illustrate the effect of China adopting IFRS-based standards on 
conditional conservatism for the companies that borrow from SBs and NSBs. The estimated parameter 
of DCFO * CFO presents the conditional conservatism of SBs and NSBs group in the pre-2006 
period. Similar to previous studies (Chen et al., 2010), the empirical evidence based on the 
Accrual-based measurement document that the conditional conservatism in the state-owned banks 
group evaluated by the parameter on DCFO * CFO is significantly positive. However, it is lower than 
that in non-state-owned banks groups, indicating that SBs compared with non-SBs are less effective at 
and concerned with monitoring the default risk of borrowers before IFRS convergence. Moreover, the 
results of Basu’s model when controlling other factors also support Chen’s (2010) point of view. 
 
The estimated parameters of IFRS * DCFO *CFO and IFRS *DRET *RET stands for the impacts of 
China adopting IFRS-based standards on conditional conservatism for SBs and NSBs. Therefore, it 
can be seen from the results in Table 7.6 that the conditional conservatism of the SBs group (the 
coefficients on IFRS * DCFO * CFO in Column 1 of Panel A and B) declines by 0.12 (without and 
with controlling other factors) in the post-2006 period. However, the conditional conservatism of the 
NSBs group just decreases by 0.16 (without controlling other factors) in the post-2006 period. The 
result of accrual-based measurement illustrates that the decline of the SBs group is less than that of 
the NSBs group after IFRS convergence, given that the other factors are not controlled. However, the 
result with controlling other factors is the opposite, i.e. the decline of the state-owned bank group is 
greater than that of the non-state owned bank group. Unlike results of the accrual-based method, both 
results of Basu-based measurement remain consistent, i.e. the decline in the state-owned bank group is 
always greater than that of the non-state-owned group before and after controlling other variables. 
Therefore, it can be considered that the decline of the state-owned bank group in conservatism is 
higher than that of the non-state bank group. 
 
As discussed in the hypothetical development, state-owned banks are much more likely to be affected 
by the “soft” information and non-financial factors (e.g. national policies, local government attitudes, 
etc.) than non-state-owned banks. After the economic downturn in 2007-2008, the state-owned banks 
stepped up their lending efforts (four trillion investment plans) according to the national policies and 
priorities. Therefore, it can be interpreted that state-owned banks relaxed their demand for 
conservatism and so the conditional conservatism of the state-owned banks group declined rapidly. 
State-owned banks are more affected by policies and have lower profitability requirements. Unlike 
state-owned banks, non-state-owned banks may implement the loan review more strictly and 
increased demands for conservatism after the economic downturn in 2008 in order to reduce the risk, 
which offset the impact of IFRS adoption on reducing conditional conservatism. Therefore, after the 
IFRS convergence in 2006, the reduction in the conditional conservatism of the state-owned banks 
group is higher than that in the non-state-owned banks group. This result is consistent with the fifth 
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hypothesis of this thesis: The implementation of new Chinese standards has a greater negative impact 
on firms who borrow from state-owned banks in terms of conditionally conservative accounting than 
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Chapter Eight: Main empirical findings for 
unconditional conservatism 
8.1 Descriptive evidence for impacts of IFRS convergence on 
unconditional conservatism 
Prior to formal regressive analyses, this thesis first uses descriptive evidence to test the impacts of 
IFRS convergence. This thesis employs the regression equation (5) to measure the unconditional 
conservatism of the whole market in two periods and reports the results in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1.1: Unconditional conservatism over Years 
Panel A: Full sample based on the book-to-market method 
 (1)  (2) 
 2002-2005  2007-2010 
R -0.00143 R 0.00168 
 (-0.77)  (1.59) 











































2002 0 2007 -0.316*** 
 (.)  (-40.45) 
2003 0.0710*** 2008 0.0574*** 
 (10.32)  (6.35) 
2004 0.182*** 2009 -0.257*** 
 (20.54)  (-29.83) 
2005 0.331*** 2010 -0.220*** 
 (28.98)  (-23.83) 
Constant 0.357*** Constant 0.538*** 
 (50.36)  (81.68) 
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Observations 2,091 Observations 4,685 
R-squared (with 
Fixed Effects) 
0.517 R-squared (with Fixed 
Effects) 
     0.559 
Estimation equation is: 
BTM𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖𝑖 +  α𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (5) 
Notes: Panel A reports the results observed over years based on the book-to-market method. The baseline 
regression models are established by Beaver and Ryan (2000), and can be used to measure unconditional 
accounting conservatism. R represents the firms’ economic performance, which is calculated as market returns 
on equity over the fiscal year adjusted by share distributions. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the current and lagged annual share 
returns of firm i in the past six years.  𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. BTM is the book value-to-market value ratio of 
enterprises. *, **, *** represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 















2002-2005 -0. 00108 0. 00108 0.257 -0.306 -0.195 -0.047 0.175 0.381 2,091 
2007-2010 -0. 00140 0. 00140 0.179 -0.210 -0.136 -0.025 0.102 0.247 4,685 
Notes: α𝑖𝑖 is the fixed effect of specific companies, which is the persistent component of the book-to-market 
ratio of the company. α𝑖𝑖 represents unconditional conservatism and is inversely proportional to unconditional 
conservatism. Due to higher unconditional conservatism with a lower value of bias components (α𝑖𝑖), the mean 
value of bias components (α𝑖𝑖) is multiplied by -1 for the ease of comparison and observation. 
 
According to the research method described above, this section uses the Fixed Effects Regression 
Model for the analysis of equation (5). Panel B of Table 8.1.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
bias components. The first line of Panel B reflects the results of the bias (α𝑖𝑖) with samples from 2002 
to 2005, while the second line reflects the results of the regression with samples from 2007 to 2010. 
As demonstrated in Panel B of Table 8.1.1, the bias (α𝑖𝑖) is less than 1 at each percentile, suggesting 
that the accounting information of China’s A-share listed companies is unconditionally conservative 
from 2002 to 2010. However, since the regression sample of equation (5) excludes firms with 
consecutive listing records of less than seven years (it comprises of over half of full sample), this 
sample may depict a survival bias, and the regression results may not represent listed companies 
overall. 
 
As depicted in Panel B, the bias components (-α𝑖𝑖) in the book-to-market ratio of the Chinese-listed 
companies increased from 0.00108 to 0.00140, suggesting that the accounting information of 
Chinese-listed companies contains a more persistent bias component. In light of this, one can observe 
a clear increasing pattern for the level of unconditional conservatism before and after 2006. The 
results of these simple descriptive statistics are consistent with the sixth hypothesis regarding 
unconditional conservatism. 
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Table 8.1.2: Unconditional conservatism over years for SOEs and non-SOEs 





(-α𝑖𝑖) Std. Dev. 10th Per 
25th 
Per 






2002-2005 -0. 00116 0. 00116 0.252 -0.316 -0.207 -0.053 0.183 0.358 2,091 
2007-2010 -0. 00161 0. 00161 0.183 -0.211 -0.135 -0.033 0.098 0.250 4,685 





(-α𝑖𝑖) Std. Dev. 10th Per 
25th 
Per 






2002-2005 -0. 00127 0. 00127 0.258 -0.300 -0.202 -0.030 0.154 0.407 731 
2007-2010 -0. 00051 0. 00051 0.162 -0.185 -0.126 -0.018 0.105 0.237 1,520 
Notes: α𝑖𝑖 is the fixed effect of specific companies, which is the persistent component of the book-to-market 
ratio of the company. α𝑖𝑖 represents unconditional conservatism and is inversely proportional to unconditional 
conservatism. Due to higher unconditional conservatism with a lower value of bias components (α𝑖𝑖), the mean 
value of bias components (α𝑖𝑖) is multiplied by -1 for the ease of comparison and observation. 
 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 8.1.2 report the bias component of SOEs and non-SOEs separately in 
the periods before and after IFRS convergence. After a comparison of the mean of the bias (-α𝑖𝑖) 
between SOEs and non-SOEs, it can be found that non-SOEs before 2006 generated more persistently 
unrecorded goodwill, suggesting that the unconditional conservatism of non-SOEs, on average, is 
higher than SOEs. However, this situation changed after the adoption of IFRS in 2006. SOEs after 
2006 can be seen to generate more persistent bias than non-SOEs, suggesting that after IFRS 
convergence, the unconditional conservatism of Chinese SOEs increased more than that of non-SOEs. 
Therefore, the results of the descriptive statistical results can preliminarily prove the sixth and seventh 
hypothesis of this thesis regarding unconditional conservatism. In the following sections, this thesis 
will conduct a formal regression analysis to further prove both hypotheses. 
Table 8.1.3: Balanced Sample 





(-α𝑖𝑖) Std. Dev. 10th Per 
25th 
Per 






2002-2005 -0. 00047 0. 00047 0.245 -0.286 -0.187 -0.038 0.136 0.377 1,525 
2007-2010 -0. 00098 0. 00098 0.182 -0.204 -0.133 -0.034 0.104 0.266 1,941 





(-α𝑖𝑖) Std. Dev. 10th Per 
25th 
Per 






2002-2005 0. 00022 -0. 00022 0.237 -0.289 -0.189 -0.041 0.142 0.358 975 
2007-2010 -0. 00137 0. 00137 0.188 -0.212 -0.135 -0.035 0.103 0.281 1,301 
Panel C: Pooled sample quantiles of the bias components for the non-SOEs 
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non-SOEs Mean (α𝑖𝑖) 
Mean 
(-α𝑖𝑖) 










2002-2005 -0. 00101 0. 00101 0.248 -0.276 -0.204 -0.042 0.098 0.412 550 
2007-2010 -0. 00035 0. 00035 0.157 -0.162 -0.117 -0.030 0.091 0.235 640 
Notes: α𝑖𝑖 is the fixed effect of specific companies, which is the persistent component of the book-to-market 
ratio of the company. α𝑖𝑖 represents unconditional conservatism and is inversely proportional to unconditional 
conservatism. Due to higher unconditional conservatism with a lower value of bias components (α𝑖𝑖), the mean 
value of bias components (α𝑖𝑖) is multiplied by -1 for the ease of comparison and observation. 
 
It is worth noting in Table 8.1.1 and Table 8.1.2 that the number of samples in the pre-2006 period is 
more than twice the number of samples in the post-2006 period. Based on this observation, it may be 
said that the systematically unconditional conservatism differences between pre- and post-2006 
periods are driven by the intertemporal variances in the composition of listed enterprises in China. 
The imbalance in the sample is mainly because these firms were listed on China’s domestic stock 
exchanges only after 1996. Considering the possibility that these newly listed firms led to an increase 
in unconditional conservatism after the year 2006, this thesis repeated the regression of Panel A for a 
balanced sample consisting solely of those enterprises that went public before the year 1996. The 
results have been reported in panels A, B, and C of Table 8.1.3. Compared to Panel B of Table 8.1.1 
and panels A and B of Table 8.1.2, it can be found that the results of Table 8.1.3 are consistent with 
those of Panel B of Table 8.1.1 and panels A and B of Table 8.1.2. This indicates that the newly-listed 
firms did not depict the observed differences. 
 
8.2 Regressive evidence for impacts of IFRS convergence on 
unconditional conservatism  
For the purpose of examining the sixth hypothesis, this thesis employed equation (6) following the 
econometric models discussed earlier. This thesis, which is based on the BTM measurement method, 
further examined the impacts of IFRS-based standards with regressive evidence. The sample includes 
Chinese public companies from the year 2002 to 2010. As mentioned above, the coefficients of the 
IFRS dummy variable can be employed to measure the impact of IFRS-based standards, which is the 
focus of this thesis. The results for those OLS regressions are listed in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2: Unconditional conservatism pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
Estimation equation:   
BTM𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖𝑖 + α𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (6)  
                          Full Sample        Balanced sample 
IFRS -0.213*** -0.174*** 
 (-27.73) (-17.98) 
R 0.00352 0.00094 
 (1.65) (0.33) 
































Constant 0.554*** 0.496*** 
 (124.60) (114.63) 




Notes: Table 8.2 reports the influence of IFRS-adoption on the unconditional conservatism level of firms based 
on the book-to-market measure. R represents the firms’ economic performance, which is calculated as market 
returns on equity over the fiscal year adjusted by share distributions. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the current and lagged annual 
share returns of firm i in the past six years.  𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. BTM is the book value-to-market value ratio 
of the firms. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new 
standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. t statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, *** represent that statistical 
results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 8.2 presents the main results of this section. The foremost conclusion drawn is that the BTM 
ratio of the listed Chinese firms declined by 0.213 after the adoption of IFRS-convergent standards in 
the year 2006. As discussed above, the bias component represents an unconditional conservatism and 
is inversely proportional to unconditional conservatism. The coefficient on IFRS is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that IFRS convergence leads to an increase in the 
unconditional conservatism. This proves that Chinese-listed companies tend to generate more 
persistently unrecorded goodwill under new standards. As compared to the pre-IFRS convergence 
period, firms in the post-IFRS convergence period possess more bias in the BTM ratio and have more 
persistently unrecorded goodwill. 
 
As mentioned in the hypothesis development, the main impact of new Chinese accounting standards 
on unconditional conservatism is reflected in the changes in requirements of capitalisation and 
depreciation. The unconditional conservatism of Chinese-listed enterprises is determined by the 
impact degree of both such changes. Many scholars (such as Yang, 2014; Geng, 2013; Yang, 2012) 
found that Chinese companies in the pre-2006 period had a serious problem of idle assets which could 
not be depreciated under the former standards. Moreover, Shao and Sun (2014) discovered that the 
most listed high-tech companies still tend to expense all or most of their R&D costs after 2006. 
Therefore, the impact scope of changes in capitalisation is far less than that in depreciation and the 
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conclusions in Table 8.2 support the sixth hypothesis of this thesis: the application of IFRS 
convergence in 2006 results in an increase in the unconditional conservatism of public enterprises in 
China. 
 
8.3 Impacts of state ownership of enterprises 
In order to examine the impacts of state ownership of companies, the entire sample is divided into two 
groups depending on the ultimate ownership of companies. SOE group consists of companies 
controlled by government departments and governmental agents. The results of this effect have been 
documented in Table 8.3. This section of the thesis focuses on comparing the parameters of IFRS 
across the SOEs and non-SOEs groups. 
Table 8.3: The influence of IFRS convergence on unconditionally 
conservative accounting for SOEs and non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) 
 SOEs non-SOEs 
IFRS -0.215*** -0.210*** 
 (-23.34) (-15.12) 
R 0.00575* 0.00214 
 (2.46) (0.89) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 0.000545 0.00198 
 (0.22) (0.92) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−2 -0.00247 0.00100 
 (-0.55) (0.48) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−3 0.00225 -0.00141 
 (1.38) (-0.31) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−4 0.00287 0.0120*** 
 (1.00) (3.77) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−5 -0.000643 0.00669* 
 (-0.20) (2.24) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−6 -0.00397 -0.000751 
 (-1.63) (-0.17) 
Constant 0.578*** 0.506*** 
 (107.14) (64.41) 
Observations 4518 2251 
R-squared (with Fixed Effects) 0.544 0.522 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 present the results for state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in the 
periods before and after the year 2006. The baseline regression models are established by Beaver and Ryan 
(2000), and can be used to measure unconditional accounting conservatism. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the current and lagged 
annual share returns of firm i in the past six years.  𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. BTM is the book value-to-market 
value ratio of the firms. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt 
IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. t statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8.3 present the unconditional conservatism of SOEs and non-SOEs in the 
 159 / 203 
 
pre- and post-2006 periods respectively. From this, it can be derived that the estimated parameters of 
the IFRS of the SOEs group dropped significantly by -0.215 in the post-2006 period, while the 
estimated parameters of the IFRS of the non-SOEs group decreased significantly by -0.210 in the 
post-2006 period, which is slightly less than the reduction of the SOEs group. These estimated 
parameters are inversely proportional to unconditional conservatism. From the two sets of data, it can 
be concluded that the new standards have led to a significant increase in the unconditional 
conservatism of both the SOEs group and the non-SOEs group. In addition, a comparison of the 
estimated parameters of IFRS in the two groups reveals that the non-SOEs group is impacted less by a 
change in standards than the SOEs group.  
 
As discussed in the hypothetical development, this is mainly due to the fact that the SOEs in the 
pre-2006 period possess more idle assets, which cannot be depreciated under the former standards. 
This means that the SOEs need to depreciate more idle assets after IFRS convergence and enhance 
unconditional conservatism more than the non-SOEs. Thus, after following Chinese new standards, 
the increase in the degree of unconditionally conservative accounting is higher in SOEs compared 
with companies with non-SOEs. In light of the above observations, this result can be said to be 
consistent with the seventh hypothesis of this thesis, that The implementation of new Chinese 
standards has a greater positive impact on state-owned enterprises in terms of unconditionally 
conservative accounting than non-state-owned enterprises.  
 
8.4 Sensitivity analysis 
The robustness of the above results as compared to an alternative method for unconditional 
conservatism will be evaluated in this section. In response to some researchers’ queries on the BTM 
measurement method, Qiang (2007) made further improvements to the BTM model proposed by 
Beaver and Ryan (2000). R, as an alternative variable to news, includes both good news (positive 
annual share returns) and bad news (negative annual share returns). However, the Beaver and Ryan 
(2000) model suggests that unexpected gains (positive annual share returns) and losses (negative 
annual share returns) are confirmed by the accounting system at the same rate. That is, it is assumed 
that the book value is symmetric in reflecting the current and lagged good and bad news. It indicates 
that ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0  only captures the symmetrical lag in the book-to-market ratio to good news and 
bad news. This is obviously unreasonable and conflicts with the views put forth by Basu (1997). To 
overcome these shortcomings, Qiang (2007) modified Beaver and Ryan’s model (2000): 
BTM𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖𝑖 + α𝑖𝑖 + ∑ (𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖)+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (7) 
Where BTM is the book value-to-market value ratio of firms and 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the current and lagged 
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annual share returns of firm i in the past six years.  𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. DR is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the value of RET is negative and zero otherwise. 
 
Model (7) assumes that the book value is asymmetric in reflecting both good and bad news. Therefore, 
∑ (𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖) captures the asymmetrical lag in the book-to-market ratio 
to good news and bad news. α𝑖𝑖 can capture more accurate and reasonable bias components in the 
BTM ratio employed to measure unconditional conservatism. 
 
On the basis of model (7), an IFRS dummy variable is introduced to examine the effect of IFRS 
convergence on unconditional conservatism. The model is in accordance with the following equation: 
BTM𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖𝑖 + α𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∑ (𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖6𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖)+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (7) 
where IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new 
standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. Similar to equation (6), if 𝛽𝛽1 in equation (7) is negative, it 
indicates that the adoption of IFRS-convergent standards has improved the unconditional 
conservatism of the public enterprises in China. Otherwise, the adoption of IFRS-convergent 
standards can be said to have decreased the unconditional conservatism of the public enterprises in 
China. The regression results of the improved model are shown in Table 11.4.1. 
Table 8.4.1: Unconditional conservatism pre- and post-IFRS Adoption  
 (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Balanced sample 
IFRS -0.182*** -0.150*** 
 (-19.36) (-11.97) 
RET 0.00723** 0.00465 
 (2.98) (1.74) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1 0.00119 -0.000787 
 (0.88) (-0.52) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−2 0.000732 -0.000318 
 (0.43) (-0.23) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−3 0.00650*** 0.00349** 
 (3.36) (2.62) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−4 0.00190 0.00102 
 (0.67) (0.33) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−5 0.00143 -0.0000133 
 (0.69) (-0.01) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−6 0.00149 -0.000946 
 (0.54) (-0.34) 
DR 0.129*** 0.131*** 
 (19.26) (15.07) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1  0.0364*** 0.0558*** 
 (5.72) (7.16) 
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𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−2 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−2 0.0449*** 0.0750*** 
 (6.72) (9.56) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−3 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−3 0.151*** 0.128*** 
 (25.13) (16.82) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−4 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−4 -0.0277*** -0.00366 
 (-4.52) (-0.45) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−5 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−5 0.0429*** 0.0435*** 
 (6.48) (5.16) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−6 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−6 0.0865*** 0.0921*** 
 (14.66) (12.34) 
Constant 0.296*** 0.208*** 
 (19.03) (11.43) 





Notes: Table 8.4.1 reports the impacts of IFRS-adoption on the level of unconditional conservatism based on 
Qiang’s (2007) method. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the full sample and balanced sample 
respectively. 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the current and lagged annual share returns of firm i in the past six years.  𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6. BTM is the firms’ book value-to-market value ratio. DR is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
RET < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. IFRS is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms 
adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if otherwise. t statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent that statistical results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 8.4.1 additionally reports the results of the effects of IFRS convergence based on Qiang’s (2007) 
measure of firms’ conservatism for a full and balanced sample. As has been demonstrated in Table 
8.4.1, the coefficients on IFRS for both full and balanced samples are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. As discussed above, the bias component represents unconditional 
conservatism and is inversely proportional to unconditional conservatism. This indicates that the 
IFRS-convergent leads to an increase in unconditional conservatism, which is consistent with the 
result based on Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) model as shown in Table 8.2. Thus, the empirical finding 
for the sixth hypothesis is robust against different choices of unconditional conservatism estimated in 
both full and balanced samples. 
Table 8.4.2: The influence of IFRS convergence on unconditional 
conservatism based on Qiang’s (2007) measure for SOEs and non-SOEs  
 Full Sample Balanced Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs 
IFRS -0.179*** -0.192*** -0.156*** -0.138*** 
 (-16.33) (-10.58) (-10.59) (-5.71) 
RET 0.0116*** 0.00472* 0.0147*** 0.00361 
 (3.83) (2.17) (3.85) (1.85) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1 0.00239 0.00188 -0.00164 0.000233 
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 (1.32) (0.84) (-0.38) (0.10) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−2 0.00179 0.00175 -0.00246 0.00142 
 (0.53) (1.30) (-0.53) (1.02) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−3 0.00724* 0.00560** 0.00387* 0.00302 
 (2.24) (2.87) (2.05) (1.59) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−4 -0.00114 0.00872** -0.00193 0.00721* 
 (-0.52) (2.76) (-0.93) (1.99) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−5 0.0000508 0.00515* -0.00154 0.00388 
 (0.02) (2.07) (-0.88) (1.47) 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−6 -0.0000416 0.00520 -0.00235 0.00173 
 (-0.01) (1.91) (-0.96) (0.57) 
DR 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 
 (15.17) (11.94) (11.60) (9.65) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1 0.0359*** 0.0372*** 0.0523*** 0.0607*** 
 (4.56) (3.46) (5.24) (4.80) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−2 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−2 0.0382*** 0.0591*** 0.0655*** 0.0907*** 
 (4.59) (5.31) (6.50) (7.34) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−3 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−3 0.153*** 0.143*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 
 (19.97) (15.08) (13.48) (9.93) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−4 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−4 -0.0362*** -0.0102 -0.0138 0.0129 
 (-4.88) (-0.98) (-1.40) (0.95) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−5 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−5 0.0367*** 0.0564*** 0.0399*** 0.0500*** 
 (4.40) (5.44) (3.64) (3.93) 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−6 ∗  𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−6 0.0864*** 0.0876*** 0.0923*** 0.0876*** 
 (11.99) (8.62) (10.22) (6.50) 
Constant 0.332*** 0.223*** 0.252*** 0.128*** 
 (17.43) (8.52) (11.09) (4.26) 
Observations 4518 2251 2276 1190 
R-squared (with 
Fixed Effects) 
0.562 0.538 0.517 0.453 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 stands for the impacts of IFRS-based standards on the unconditional conservatism level 
of SOEs and non-SOEs based on a full sample. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of SOEs and non-SOEs based 
on a balanced sample. RET is calculated as market returns on equity over the fiscal year adjusted by share 
distributions. 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the current and lagged annual share returns of firm i in the past six years.   𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6. DR is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if RET < 0 and equal to 0 if otherwise. IFRS is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if Chinese-listed firms adopt IFRS-based new standards and equal to 0 if 
otherwise. t statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **, *** represent that statistical results are significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8.4.2 present the conditional conservatism of SOEs and non-SOEs for the 
full sample. As is depicted in columns 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient of IFRS of the SOEs group 
(-0.179) is slightly higher than that of the non-SOEs group (-0.192), indicating that in a full sample, 
the non-SOEs group is impacted more by the change in standards than the SOEs group. This result is 
based on Qiang’s (2007) measure, which is contrary to the previous conclusion based on Beaver and 
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Ryan’s (2000) model. However, whether it is Table 6 or columns 1 and 2 in Table 8.4.2, there is only a 
slight difference between the SOEs group and the non-SOEs group. If those firms that went public 
after the year 1996 are controlled to balance the sample, columns 3 and 4 show that the coefficient of 
IFRS of the SOEs group (-0.156) is lower than that of the non-SOEs group (-0.138), indicating that in 
a balanced sample, the non-SOEs group is impacted less by the change in standards than the SOEs 
group. This result is consistent with the result based on Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) model shown in 
Table 8.3, suggesting that balancing the sample will affect the conclusion based on Qiang’s (2007) 
measure, but it will not affect the conclusion drawn from Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) model. Thus, the 
empirical findings for the seventh hypothesis are not supported by different choices of unconditional 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions  
9.1 Summary of main findings 
Based on the extant literature on conservatism and China's special institutional background, this thesis 
uses empirical research methods to study the association between IFRS-convergent accounting 
standards and the conservatism for listed companies in China from 2002 to 2010. This thesis first 
examines the treatment effects of IFRS-based new standards on the level of conditional conservatism 
and the main findings are as follows: 
1. Either through the accrual-based measure method or Basu’s measure method, empirical evidence 
suggests that listed Chinese enterprises kept a higher level of conditional conservatism, but firms 
reduced their conditional conservatism level after the implementation of IFRS-based standards in 
2006. The impact of IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism in China is not fundamentally 
different from that in Europe. Due to improved accounting quality and comparability, IFRS 
convergence alters the ex-ante information asymmetry between management and external 
stakeholders, and shifts the monitoring costs between the principal and agent, which in turn 
reduces the demand for conservatism. This thesis therefore draws a conclusion similar to the 
research by André et al. (2015) regarding the effects of IFRS convergence on conditionally 
conservative accounting in Europe. 
 
In order to explore the detailed influencing mechanism between IFRS adoption and firms’ conditional 
conservatism, this thesis investigates the determinants of reducing demand for conditional 
conservatism in Chinese public enterprises after IFRS adoption. 
2. Since the development of markets’ information environment after the IFRS convergence reduces 
the information asymmetry, the findings of this thesis suggest that the ex-ante information 
asymmetry, which shaped conservatism demands (LaFond and Watts, 2008), plays a moderating 
role between IFRS adoption and conditional conservatism. The conditional conservatism in the 
high ex-ante information asymmetry group reduces more than in the low ex-ante information 
asymmetry group after 2006. Moreover, the conditional conservatism in both groups reaches a 
similar level after 2006. 
3. This thesis also finds that SOE groups under standards before 2006 have a lower level of 
conditionally conservative accounting, which is the same as in previous studies (Chen et al., 
2010). However, after the IFRS convergence in 2006, the decline of conditional conservatism in 
the non-SOE group is higher than that of the SOE group, and the difference in conditional 
conservatism between the non-SOE group and the SOE group reduced. This illustrates that the 
new standards take into account the differences between SOEs and non-SOEs, and increase the 
comparability of financial reports between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
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4. In addition, since the development of markets’ information environment after the IFRS 
convergence reduces the monitoring costs, the findings of this thesis suggest that the monitoring 
costs, which lead to debt holder’s conservatism demands (Chen et al., 2010), also plays a 
moderating role between IFRS convergence and conditional conservatism. IFRS convergence 
leads to a larger decline in the degree of conditional conservatism for firms with higher 
monitoring costs compared to those with lower monitoring costs. 
5. This thesis also finds that after following IFRS-based standards, the reduction in the degree of 
conditionally conservative accounting is higher with firms who borrow from state-owned banks 
compared with firms who borrow from non-state-owned banks.  
 
Thereafter, this thesis examines the treatment effects of IFRS adoption on unconditional conservatism 
and the main findings are as follows: 
1. Since Chinese companies face a serious problem due to a large number of idle assets, which have 
not depreciated under the former standards but shall depreciate under the new standards, the 
impact of change with regard to depreciation is higher than capitalisation. Therefore, this thesis 
finds that the IFRS-convergent GAAP in 2006 increases unconditional conservatism in Chinese 
public enterprises. 
2. As SOEs face more problems of idle assets, this thesis also finds the new standards have led to a 
significant increase in the unconditional conservatism of both the SOE and the non-SOE groups. 
However, the non-SOE group is impacted less by a change in standards than the SOE group. 
 
9.2 Significance 
The study of this thesis has a certain theoretical significance. With regard to the demands for 
conditional conservatism, far fewer empirical papers investigate these demands. The reason is that 
scholars lack a solidly casual experimental environment in which the determinant is exogenous. The 
traditional cross-sectional-regression analysis only shows the association between conditional 
conservatism and another variable. These early studies lacked a discussion on causal relationships. 
For example, Basu (1997) and Holthausen and Watts (2001), examined the changes in conservatism 
with the different litigation systems, but did not conduct cross-sectional tests or event studies. Other 
recent articles, such as Chen et al. (2010), Hui et al. (2012), Ahmed and Duellman (2013), and Cheng 
et al. (2015), also did not solve causality problems. Only studies that use institutional switches as the 
natural experimental setting (Jayaraman, 2012; Jayaraman and Shivakumar, 2013) have strong 
persuasiveness in causality. The caveat of this research methodology, however, is that the nature of 
institutional change must be interpreted correctly. Second, most of the research did not answer the 
question of how accounting standards affect the firm’s choice of conditional conservatism, which 
means these studies, motivated by policy analysis, lack the critical foundation. This thesis establishes 
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the causality flow based on current literature on conservatism, and then discusses the effect of China’s 
IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism.  
 
This thesis is also significant for standards-setting. For a long time, one of the main objectives of 
China's accounting standards and system reforms was to introduce internationally accepted accounting 
standards and accounting methods, and fully coordinate or converge with international standards for 
improving the quality of accounting information of listed companies. IFRS convergence improves 
accounting quality and comparability, which reduces the demand for conditional conservatism. In 
addition, a firms’ conservatism level is a function of information asymmetry, debtholder’s monitoring 
incentives, and a firm’s capital structure. Due to the difference between China, Europe and the United 
States in terms of market, the state ownership of firms and debtholders are important determinants of 
the demand for conditional conservatism. This thesis also finds that the standards and system reforms 
have considered the difference of firms’ ownership in the demand for conservatism and motivation for 
improving accounting quality, and also finds that the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs is 
decreasing. 
 
This research is also significant for the financial analysis of listed companies because a conservative 
or aggressive accounting policy will affect the reported performance, the quality of earnings, and so 
on. For instance, a company with a conservative accounting policy generally implies lower reported 
earnings and a higher quality of earnings. Therefore, when analysing the financial status of a company, 
it is necessary to first analyse the accounting policies, evaluate the company’s accounting policies, 
and then conduct valuations, credit analysis, and other uses (Palepu et al., 2002) The empirical 
evidence in this thesis demonstrates that China’s listed companies adopt less conservative accounting 
policies after IFRS convergence. Therefore, in the financial analysis, it should be considered that the 
firm may, through less conservative earnings, improve its performance after IFRS convergence. 
 
9.3 Research limitations and future perspective 
The information asymmetry of enterprises is a very complex issue. There are many measurement 
methods of information asymmetry, such as the standard deviation of companies’ operating cash flow, 
M/B ratio, pin index, Bid-ask Spread, and so on. So far, no consensus has been established with 
regard to the most suitable method for the Chinese market. Bid-ask Spread and pin index, based on 
high frequency trading data, are generally considered to be better measurements for information 
asymmetry. However, this thesis uses the standard deviation of firms’ operating cash flow (M/B ratio 
proxied ex-ante information asymmetry of firms) due to a lack of related high frequency trading data. 
Therefore, future research can adopt Bid-ask Spread and pin as indexes of information asymmetry to 
reconfirm the findings of this thesis. 
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With regard to conditional conservatism, existing conclusions indicate that it is a means to increase 
the contractual efficiency (Watts, 2003; LaFond & Watts, 2008; and Khan & Watts, 2009), but there is 
not adequate theory supporting the advantages of unconditional conservatism. Evidence from Ahmed 
(2002) shows that unconditional conservatism can reduce the conflict between shareholders and 
creditors. However, Zhang (2002) also has evidence that unconditional conservatism reduces the 
quality of accounting information. The influence of unconditional conservatism on accounting 
information requires further study. In addition, the correlation between conditional and unconditional 
conservatism is still uncertain. Beaver and Ryan (2005) show that there is no definite correlation 
between conditional and unconditional conservatism; Qiang (2007), however, finds a negative 
correlation. Since China’s new standards affect both conditional and unconditional conservatism, the 
negative correlation between conditional and unconditional conservatism will mean that a decrease in 
conditional conservatism after IFRS convergence may be overestimated. Further study would need to 
test and confirm the correlation between conditional and unconditional conservatism and separate the 
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Appendix 
Methods Review  
Measurement methods 
At present, there are five main categories of the measurement method in accounting conservatism in 
the research literature: net assets measurement method; earnings and accruals measurement method; 
earnings–share return measurement method; accrual–cash flow measurement method; and event 
research method. Table 3.1 presents these methods with the relative literatures. 
Table 3.1 Conservatism measurement method 
Categories of measurement 
method 
Specific indicators or method Representative literature 
Net assets measurement 
method 
Valuation model Ahmed (2001) 
Feltham 一 Ohlson (1995) 
The ratio of market value to 
book value (MTB) 
Beaver and Ryan (2000) 
Earnings and accruals 
measurement method 
Earnings persistence Brooks and Buckmaster 
(1976)  
Basu (1997)  
The degree of skewness and 
fluctuation of earnings and 
accruals 
Ball et al. (2000) 
Cumulative accrual Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
Earnings – share return 
measurement method 
The ratio of regression 
coefficients of earnings on the 
‘bad news’ to ‘good news’ 
Basu (1997)  
 
The ratio of R2 of earnings on 
the ‘bad news’ to ‘good news’ 
Pope and Walker (1999) 
Accrual – cash flow 
measurement method 
The ratio of regression 
coefficients and R2 of accrual 
on the ‘bad news’ to ‘good 
news’ 
Ball et al.（2005） 
Event research method  Earnings response coefficient Basu (1997) 
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measurement (ERC) 
Share returns measurement McNichols（1988） 
(Source: author) 
Net assets measurement method 
The net assets measurement method is mainly used to measure unconditional conservatism. Unconditional 
conservatism refers to a company’s tendency to the accounting treatment model of accelerated expense 
confirmation or deferred revenue confirmation at the initial recognition of liabilities or assets. The loss of 
assets is timely and adequately recognised and a delay is recognised for the increase of assets. This will 
result in the net assets being undervalued and underestimated; the amount can be used as the representative 
degree of conservatism. 
In the specific application of this method, it includes the valuation model method and the ratio of the 
market value to the book value method.  
 
Valuation model method 
The valuation method measures the market value of a firm as the sum of the book value of the firm and the 
net present value of its expected future abnormal earnings, which is measured by the firm’s accounting 
earnings minus the companies’ cost of capital, multiplied by the companies’ book value at the start of the 
reporting period (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995). In other words, in the valuation model, the market value of a 
firm is a linear function of abnormal operating earnings, operating assets at the beginning of a period, 
capital expenditures, or current investments in operating assets (Ahmed et al., 2002).  
Differences in accounting policies, i.e. whether a firm adopts an unbiased or a conservative accounting 
policy, could significantly influence the market value of a company in the valuation method through their 
influence on expected future abnormal earnings. One pioneering study of the net assets measurement 
method is Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) research on the differential application of valuation and net surplus 
accounting for financial and operating activities. They modeled the relationship between the market value 
of a company and accounting data that is generated from financial and operating activities, and indicated 
that the book value is equal to market value when only financial activities exist in the firm. Differences 
will generate if the firm has operating activities. Thus, the market value is also equal to the book value plus 
the net present value of expected future abnormal earnings under the assumption of clean surplus 
accounting. Consequently, a linear function can be established to model the dynamics of the information 
set with abnormal earnings, accounting conservatism, and growth as its parameters.  
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) propose that expected future accounting numbers have an essential function in 
the valuation of assets. Furthermore, according to Feltham and Ohlson (1995), asset values are also 
affected by current accounting numbers. Thus, both current and expected accounting numbers determine 
asset values. The key features of Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) valuation method are outlined below: 
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The dichotomy between conservative accounting and unbiased accounting 
An important concept in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model is the dichotomy between the 
conservative and unbiased accounting. According to Feltham and Ohlson (1995), under unbiased 
accounting the market value of assets is the weighted average of a ‘flow’ model and a ‘stock’ model, which 
are respectively based on the earnings and book value of the enterprise, plus the mean variable adjusting 
for miscellaneous other information. By contrast, under conservative accounting, the market value of 
assets needs an additional adjustment for the understated value of operating assets, in addition to the 
valuation function under unbiased accounting. The implication of these different valuation functions is that 
the market value is equal to the book value if accounting is unbiased, or greater than the book value if 
accounting is conservative.  
The relations between market value and earnings 
Under Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) valuation method, whether the accounting policy is unbiased or 
conservative also has implications for the relations between market value, and its changes and 
contemporaneous earnings, as well as the relations between book value and future earnings. Under 
unbiased accounting, accounting earnings and changes in the market value are equal, and the accounting 
rate of return and risk-free rate are also equal. Under conservative accounting, however, these relationships 
are more complex. When the value of operating assets is expected to increase, both the market value and 
its changes would be larger than earnings under conservative accounting. In other words, the effects of 
accounting conservatism and growth on the relations between market value and earnings are synergistic. 
As for the relations between book value to future earnings, the effects of conservative accounting are even 
more subtle. Assuming a ‘full pay-out’ dividend policy and, therefore, a constant book value, Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) demonstrate that the effect of conservative accounting on earnings (i.e. the book rate of 
return) differs depending on growth: when there is no growth, the earnings increase is finite under 
conservative accounting, whereas the earnings increase is infinite if there is growth.  
The impacts of incremental changes in earnings and assets on value 
Through their analysis, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) propose that, when accounting is conservative, the 
increments of cash earnings are worth less in terms of current period earnings than the increments in 
non-cash earnings, i.e. cash earnings have ‘lower quality’ than accrual earnings when the accounting 
measurements are conservative. The same is true for next-period earnings, i.e. the increments of cash 
earnings give rise to higher next-period earnings than the increments in non-cash earnings. 
Throughout the relations explored in Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model, a central idea is that 
accounting conservatism leads to unrecorded goodwill, which is either reflected in the underestimated 
value of existing assets or the underestimated expectation of the net present value of future investment 
projects. As a result, a firm’s investments in operating assets are fully capitalised under unbiased 
accounting, whereas such investments are partially capitalised and partially expensed under conservative 
accounting. Therefore, in Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) valuation method, an enterprise’s value under 
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unbiased accounting and its value under conservative accounting are only equal if the firm invests in 
projects with zero net present value, i.e. there is no unrecorded goodwill. In all other cases, conservative 
accounting practices lead to lower earnings in the early stages of an investment project and larger earnings 
in the later stages than unbiased accounting practices.  
Ahmed et al (2000)’s model is used for testing the relationship between conservative accounting and the 
valuation weight on operating assets, which is in turn developed from Feltham and Ohlson (1996)’s 
method. The application of this method has two steps: finding the valuation weight on operating assets, and 
determining the relationship between this valuation weight and the conservative accounting proxy.  
Step one: 
The first step of the model is to find the valuation weight on operating assets by ascertaining the 
correlation between firm-specific goodwill and operating assets. Following Feltham and Ohlson (1996)’s 
method, Ahmed et al (2000) developed the following model to ascertain this correlation: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  = o𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎+𝛼𝛼2o𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1+𝛼𝛼3 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
In this model, the market value of a firm in the year t (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) is linearly related to abnormal operating earnings 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎), operating assets at the beginning of the period (o𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1), and investments in operating assets in the 
current period (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).  
Recasting (1) for firm i in terms of goodwill (𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖), i.e. unrecorded market value of firms, the equation can 
be established as follows: 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  − o𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 








, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛼𝛼3 =
𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘 − 𝐼𝐼 + 𝛾𝛾)
(𝐼𝐼 − 𝜔𝜔)(𝐼𝐼 − 𝛾𝛾)
 
 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the goodwill per share, and goodwill is calculated based on market value minus book value. 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎  is 
abnormal earnings per share measured as earnings per share adjusted for minority interest and interest 
revenue/expenses. o𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 stands for the operating assets per share in the last period, which is measured as 
the opening book value of ordinary shares in the last period adjusted for long-term and short-term debt, 
marketable securities, minority interest and cash. 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the cash investment per share calculated 
based on changes in operating assets plus amortization and depreciation expense. Furthermore, in Ahmed 
et al’s (2000) specification of model (2), the capital cost is the one-year T-bill rate multiplied by operating 
assets at the beginning of the period plus four per cent.  
Step 2. 
In the second step of this method, the relationship is determined between valuation weight on operating 
assets and the conservative accounting proxy. Similar to Beaver and Ryan (2000), Ahmed et al (2000) 
employed four proxies of conservative accounting: one minus amortization and depreciation expense 
deflated by the sum of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets at the beginning of period, R&D 
expenditure/sales, advertising expenditure/sales, and whether or not a firm uses LIFO as its inventory 
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method for the majority of the firm-year observations in the data sample.  
 
Adapted from Ahmed et al (2000) in order to measure the impacts of these conservative accounting proxies 
on the valuation weight of operating assets, the following model is used: 
𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏3𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏4𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
where 𝛼𝛼2 stands for the firm-specific valuation parameter on lagged operating assets, which is estimated 
from model (2). 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is the depreciation parameter estimated for firm i, and is calculated as average of 1 - 
(depreciation and amortization expense / property, plant and equipment and intangible assets at the 
beginning of the period) over the data sample period. 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  is the research and development intensity 
parameter of firm i, which is evaluated as the average of development expenses deflated by sales over the 
data sample period. 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  is firm i’s advertising intensity measure, which is estimated as the average of 
advertising expenses deflated by sales over the data sample period. 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a binary measure of firm i’s 
inventory valuation method, and is equal to one if the firm employs LIFO to value its inventory more than 
half of the time in the data sample period. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is the logarithmic of firm i’s average market value of 
equity during the data sample period. 
According to Ahmed et al’s findings (2000), the coefficients of conservative accounting proxies on 
operating assets valuation in (3) show positive correlations between operating assets valuation and 
accounting conservatism, which is in accordance with the predictions of Feltham and Ohlson’s (1996) 
method and Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) results. For the purpose of this study, all four proxies of accounting 
conservatism, i.e. depreciation parameter, research and development intensity, advertising intensity 
measure and use of LIFO for inventory valuation method, are used to estimate their correlations with 
operating assets valuation.  
Assumption 
The establishment of Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) model involves a number of key assumptions. The 
valuation method is based mainly on the fundamental assumption that the measurement on accounting 
should obey the clean surplus relationship, meaning that the alterations in book value should be reflected 
as either dividends or income. First of all, under the assumption of clean surplus accounting, Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) infer that the present value of expected future abnormal earnings is equal to unrecognised 
goodwill. Consequently, expectations about future abnormal earnings can affect a firm’s goodwill and 
value of assets. Secondly, Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model incorporates Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958; 1961) corporate finance theory, which states that a company’s value is independent of its 
capital structure, implying that financing activities have zero net present value. Since the financial assets 
arising from these financing activities have no additional value except for their book value, an enterprise’s 
goodwill can only be attributed to its operating activities and is equal to the present value of the 
enterprise’s future expected abnormal operating earnings. Thirdly, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) assume that 
the market value of a company is equal to the sum of the present value of its future expected cash flows 
and the value of its financial assets. These three assumptions play a central role in Feltham and Ohlson’s 
(1996) valuation model. Taking into consideration Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) study on the differential 
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accounting treatment of operating activities and financing activities under unbiased and conservative 
accounting, one can infer that firms employing more conservative accounting policies will assign less 
positive valuation weight to financial assets than to operating assets.  
Advantages 
By separating financial assets from operating assets in valuation under unbiased/conservative accounting 
policies, the valuation model offers more accurate insights into the relations between market value, book 
value, and current/expected abnormal earnings. It thereby enhances the accuracy and effectiveness of asset 
value measurement, particularly when future cash flows are uncertain and/or the investment project has 
positive NPV. Ahmed et al. (2002) provide empirical support for the valuation model’s effectiveness, 
finding that accounting-based conservatism in the valuation model is positively related to the weight of 
operating assets in valuation, and that its explanatory power is evident even after controlling for various 
factors such as firm size, book value growth, and firm leverage. The conservative parameters in the 
valuation model also provide a good indicator of the degree of conservatism in a firm’s accounting policy, 
as the relation between the conservative parameters in the valuation model and accounting-based proxies 
for conservatism is quite strong, especially for enterprises with high levels of profitability (Ahmed et al., 
2002). 
Disadvantages 
The effectiveness of the valuation method is limited in scope. In particular, the linear information 
dynamics assumed in the valuation method provide a poor description of the degree of conservative 
accounting and the differences between book value and market value in enterprises with low growth, low 
profitability, and high intensity of assets (Ahmed et al., 2002). As a result, the valuation model is an 
unreliable predictor of the bias component of the book-to-market ratio in conservatism (Myers, 1999). The 
valuation model considers conservatism only in terms of the depreciation of operating assets and ignores 
other sources of conservatism such as delays in revenue recognition. The valuation model also fails to take 
into account the factors underlying the information dynamics, such as the rate of depreciation adopted. 
These limitations of the valuation model mean that it cannot fully capture the implications of conservative 
accounting.  
 
The book value-to-market value ratio valuation method (BTM) 
Please see section 5.6 
 
Earnings and accruals measurement method 
The earnings and accruals method of measuring the degree of accounting conservatism determines 
accounting conservatism with negative cumulative accruals. This method is based on the concept that 
losses are less persistent than gains under conservative accounting, in which the increases in expected asset 
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value are recognised in future periods rather than at the time of their occurrence. By contrast, losses are 
recognised immediately at the time they occur, rather than recognised as cash flow decreases in the future. 
As a result, accounting conservatism causes accruals to be asymmetric, as gains are only partially accrued 
and losses are fully accrued. Furthermore, the capitalisation of future cash flows associated with losses 
means that losses result in significantly larger accruals compared with gains. The implication of this is that 
accounting conservatism will result in negative cumulative accruals, as well as understated cumulated 
accruals, making them capable of measuring the degree of conservatism.  
There are two important notions in the earnings and accruals measurement method: earnings persistence, 
and the degree of skewedness and fluctuations of earnings and accruals. First, unlike earnings, losses do 
not recur in future periods under conservative accounting. This means that losses are less persistent than 
earnings, and increases of earnings and that decreases of earnings and losses are more transitory than 
earnings and earnings increases. The persistence of earnings (or the transience of losses) thus provides a 
way to measure accounting conservatism. Second, under conservative accounting, the distribution of 
earnings and accruals will be negatively skewed due to the asymmetric capitalisation of cash flows 
associated with earnings and losses. Therefore, specific measures of conservatism, earnings persistence, 
and the skewedness and fluctuations of earnings and accruals, as well as cumulated accruals, are discussed 
in detail in the rest of this section.  
 
Earnings persistence 
Measuring accounting conservatism with the persistence of earnings was based on the empirical evidence 
that negative changes in earnings are more likely to reverse, i.e. negative changes in earnings are less 
persistent than positive changes in earnings. For example, Watts (1993) and Basu (1997) predicted that, 
compared with positive changes in earnings, it is more likely for losses (negative earnings) to reverse in 
the next period. Notable research in this field includes Brooks and Buckmaster’s (1976) study on the time 
series property of accounting income, and Basu’s (1997) study of the asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
and conditional conservatism.  
Basu (1997) also predicts that unexpected decreases in earnings tend to be more temporary, while 
unexpected increases in earnings tend to be more persistent. This hypothesis was tested cross-sectionally 
with price-deflated earnings data with the following formula: 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽0Δ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷 ∗ Δ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2  
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the earnings per share for company i in fiscal year t, Δ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 and Δ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 are the 
changes in earnings of company i in the year t-1 and t-2, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 stands for the return of company i from nine 
months before the end of fiscal year t to three months after, and 𝐷𝐷 is the dummy variable, whose values 
are determined under the following conditions: 
a. D=1 if Δ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 is negative and D = 0 if otherwise; 
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b. D=1 if 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 is negative and D = 0 if otherwise; 
c. D=1 if 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is negative and D = 0 if otherwise. 
These tests were done by Basu (1997) for both negative and positive changes in earnings, using a sample 
of 36,394 firms’ year data from 1964 to 1990. The first test results show that the intercepts in (1) are 
negative, which indicates the recognition of unrealised earnings rather than the recognition of unrealised 
losses and confirms Basu’s (1997) first prediction that ‘bad news’ is reported with more timeliness than 
‘good news’. The second test results show that the coefficient of lagged earnings for positive earnings is 
almost zero, which confirms Basu’s (1997) second prediction that accounting conservatism will result in 
more permanent and non-reversing positive changes in earnings.  
The results of Basu’s (1997) study suggest that positive changes in earnings are persistent and permanent, 
whereas negative changes in earnings are totally transitory. Basu (1997) explains that this is mainly due to 
accounting conservatism, which will result in immediate write-offs of asset values in the event of ‘bad’ 
news. As losses of expected income are realised in the future, however, the effect of these write-offs on 
earnings will disappear, which means that negative changes in earnings will be transitory.  
Assumptions 
The hypotheses in Basu’s (1997) research assume that bad news is more likely to have a concurrent impact 
on earnings. Based on the findings of Brooks and Buckmaster (1976) and other studies such as Elgers and 
Lo (1994), Basu (1997) further confirms that positive changes in earnings are permanent and do not 
reverse, while losses or negative changes in earnings are totally transient. Basu’s (1997) study was 
developed based on the concept of the asymmetry in the recognition of losses and gains. Because of 
accounting conservatism, a higher standard of verification needs to be applied when recognising the effect 
of ‘good news’ (expected gains) and the effect of ‘bad news’ (expected losses) on financial statements. 
This means that earnings are recognised at a later date than losses. As a result, good news and bad news 
have asymmetric impacts on the persistence and timeliness of earnings. Furthermore, Basu (1997) assumes 
that conservatism influences the properties of earnings and cash flows differently through accruals.  
Advantages  
The presence of the various forms of earnings persistence can be quite an accurate indicator of the 
presence of conservatism. Basu’s (1997) findings suggest that, in the presence of conservatism, negative 
changes in earnings are likely to be less persistent than positive changes in earnings. This is also consistent 
with Brooks and Buckmaster’s (1976) findings, suggesting that earnings persistence can be seen as an 
indication of conservative accounting practices. More specific measures of earnings persistence, such as 
the differences between the earnings response coefficients (ERC) associated with negative earnings 
changes and positive earnings changes, may also be used as more specific and accurate measures of 
earnings persistence and, therefore, conservatism.  
Disadvantages  
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Despite clear empirical evidence that earnings persistence is an indicator of the use of conservative 
accounting principles, there is no research evidence suggesting how different forms of earnings persistence 
might be used to measure the specific degree of conservatism. While Basu (1997) implies that the 
differences between the sensitivity of earnings to positive and negative returns in the same period might be 
used as a measure of the degree of conservatism, there has been no empirical test to support this claim. 
Therefore, earnings persistence may only be reliably used as an indication of the presence of conservatism, 
rather than as a measure of the exact degree of conservatism. 
Limitations  
While the studies by Brooks and Buckmaster (1976), Basu (1997), and many others have investigated how 
earnings persistence might manifest in the time series effects of accounting income and the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings, there has been no strict test to confirm how conservative accounting practices might 
result in earnings persistence. Most of the studies assume an intuitive relationship between conservatism 
and earnings persistence. However, it is possible that earnings persistence might be caused by factors other 
than accounting conservatism, such as earnings management. 
 
The degree of skewness in earnings 
The use of conservative accounting principles suggests that the capitalisation of future cash flows 
associated with losses will generate larger accruals than gains. This suggests that the distribution of 
earnings will be negatively skewed in the presence of conservative accounting practices, which means that 
the degree of the skewedness of earnings can be used as a measure of conservatism. 
Ball et al. (2000) measured the conservative accounting and timeliness of accounting incomes based on the 
way firms’ economic incomes are incorporated into accounting incomes over an extended period of time, 
and they developed a model for incorporating economic income into accounting income. The dependent 
variable in this model is accounting income, and economic income is measured in terms of the changes in 
the market value of equity between fiscal years, adjusting for the effects of capital contributions and 
dividends. Ball et al.’s (2000) model investigates the process by which economic incomes are incorporated 
into accounting income, and the institutional factors affecting this incorporation. Accounting conservatism 
is one of the three institutional factors identified by Ball et al. (2000) that affect how accounting income is 
determined. 
Conservative accounting principles and practices result in the immediate write-offs of income when future 
cash flows are expected to decrease, even though such decreases have not happened yet. By contrast, 
increases in future cash flows or asset values are not recognised until such increases actually occur. Thus, 
the application of conservative accounting principles causes discrepancies between economic income and 
accounting income, as well as the asymmetric incorporation of economic income into accounting income. 
Therefore, Ball et al.’s (2000) model for determining how conservatism affects the asymmetric 
incorporation of economic income into accounting income is as follows: 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the earnings yield of company i in fiscal year t, and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the annual rate of return 
in fiscal year i. Here, the earnings yield 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as the accounting income of company i in fiscal 
year t scaled by the market value of firm i’s equity in the previous fiscal year. Similarly, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the changes 
in the market capitalisation of company i’s equity in fiscal year t including dividends and excluding capital 
contributions scaled by the market value of firm i’s equity in the previous fiscal year. Therefore, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent the accounting income and economic income of firm i in fiscal year t. 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dummy 
variable, whose value is based on the sign of the firm’s stock return. 𝛽𝛽2𝑗𝑗  and 𝛽𝛽3𝑗𝑗  represent the 
incorporation of negative and positive economic income in the accounting income of the current year in 
country j, respectively.  
Assumptions 
Ball et al.’s (2000) model for measuring conservatism through the incorporation of all accounting income 
is assumed to be equal to the change in the book values of equity between fiscal years. Secondly, it is 
assumed that the total sum of a company’s economic benefit and the total sum of its accounting income are 
equal over the lifetime of the firm. The validity of the model is also based on the assumption that clean 
surplus accounting is used, and any violation of clean surplus accounting is not systematically associated 
with cross-country differences in accounting standards. The changes in economic income are also assumed 
to be independent over time.  
Advantages  
Measuring the level of conservative accounting using the degree of skewedness and fluctuation of earnings 
has several advantages. First of all, it is relatively free of short-term noise such as a firm’s liquidity 
situation and the mispricing effects. Secondly, it is a comprehensive measure of conservatism as it captures 
the fundamental aspects of accounting income recognition. Using the degree of skewedness and fluctuation 
of earnings as a measure of conservatism is particularly effective when there are lags in the incorporation 
of economic income into accounting income.  
Disadvantages  
Using the degree of skewedness and fluctuation of earnings as a measure of conservatism also has several 
disadvantages. First of all, it is difficult to define what constitutes economic income, as there can be 
different appropriate definitions of economic income in different countries. For example, Ball et al. (2000) 
point out that while they used stock returns to represent economic income in measuring how the 
skewedness of earnings can reflect degrees of conservatism, they also suggest that it may not be suitable 
for firms in code law countries where there is lower liquidity and lower standards on public disclosure. The 
various definitions and measures of earnings also make it difficult to use the degree of skewedness and 
fluctuation of earnings as a measure of conservatism from an empirical standpoint as it is difficult to 
determine which measure of earnings is relevant and suitable for evaluating the degree of conservatism in 
different practical situations. For example, when examining the relationship between the skewedness and 
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fluctuations of earnings and the degree of conservative accounting, Givoly and Hayn (2000) employed 
return on assets, or the accounting rate of return, as the appropriate measure of earnings. By contrast, in 
their similar study, Ball et al. (1997) used earnings yield as the measure of earnings, or the accounting 
income of an enterprise in a given fiscal year scaled by the market value of the enterprise’s equity in the 
previous fiscal year.  
Limitations  
Similar to the earnings persistence measure of conservatism, using the degree of skewedness and 
fluctuation of earnings as a measure of conservatism also suffers from the limitation of correlated variables 
that may have been omitted. For example, differences in the proportion growth options in relation to 
existing assets may have caused the recognition of revenue to vary from one country to another. This 
means that differences in the degree of skewedness and fluctuation of earnings may have actually been 
caused by real economic effects, rather than degrees of accounting conservatism. In such cases, using the 
degree of skewedness and fluctuation of earnings as a measure of conservatism is invalid. Finally, in 
addition to conservatism, other accounting factors may also have affected how economic income is 
incorporated into accounting income, and, consequently, how the skewedness and fluctuation of earnings 
are impacted by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings recognition. Ball et al.’s (2000) study did not rule 
out the possibilities of other economic and/or accounting factors affecting the skewedness and fluctuation 
of earnings, which makes the use of the degree of skewedness and fluctuation of earnings as a measure of 
accounting conservatism somewhat dubious.  
 
Cumulative accruals 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) noted that the reported cumulative earnings of firms might decrease over time as a 
result of conservatism. Based on this finding, they argue that the sign and magnitude of cumulative 
accruals over an extended period of time can be used as an indication of conservative accounting. Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) suggest that earnings will converge with cash flows for steady-state firms with no growth 
and neutral accounting policy, which means that their cumulative accruals will also converge to zero. 
Based on this observation, they suggest that if a firm has consistently negative accruals over an extended 
period of time, it is a sign that the firm is using conservative accounting practices. Furthermore, the rate at 
which a firm’s negative accruals accumulate is a measure of how the level of conservative accounting has 
varied over time (Givoly and Hayn, 2000).  
Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) observation is derived from the expectation underlying the analysis and 
interpretation of financial statements that have been articulated conceptually in the valuation framework of 
Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995), which states that a firm’s accounting performance 
measures should converge with its economic performance (measured in terms of operating cash flows) 
over time, and that any deviations of accounting incomes from operating cash flows are transitory and 
mean reverting.  
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In many ways, the cumulative accruals approach as developed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) to examine 
degrees of conservatism is an extension of the body of research focusing on the correlation between cash 
flows and earnings and how they reflect structural factors such as conservatism in the financial reporting 
system. What is special about Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) study, however, is their detailed study on how 
changes in accruals reflect changes in the degree of financial reporting. By examining the structural 
relations between accruals, cash flows, and earnings over the second half of the 20th century, Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) find that profitability of US firms have declined during the current period, while cash flows 
have not. In the meantime, a large amount of negative non-operating accruals have accumulated. Similar to 
the findings of Ball et al. (2000), Givoly and Hayn (2000) also find that the distribution of earnings has 
become increasingly negatively skewed, suggesting that the negative effects of ‘bad news’ on earnings was 
recognised more timely than the positive effects of ‘good news’, which in turn indicates an increase in the 
level of conservatism of the financial reporting practices of US firms. Therefore, Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
hypothesised that changes in the level of non-operating accruals might be a measure of the degree of 
conservative accounting, i.e. cumulative accruals are regarded as a parameter of conservatism. 
In determining whether or not changes in reported earnings are a result of conservatism or real changes in 
firms’ economic performance, Givoly and Hayn (2000) employed the ratio of CFO-to-assets as a measure 
of firm performance and compared the changes of the CFO-to-assets ratio and earnings to determine 
whether or not changes in reported earnings are caused by changes in firms’ underlying economic 
performance. To identify the factors contributing to the increased volatility of earnings in relation to 
accounting accruals, Givoly and Hayn (2000) decomposed the variance of return on asset (ROA) in each 
firm’s yearly data with the following formula: 
Variance (ROA) 
=Variance (CFO/Assets) 
 +Variance (Accruals/Assets) 
 +2Covariance(CFO/Assets, Accruals/Assets) 
The results of this decomposition show that accounting accruals are the main factor contributing to the 
variability in earnings, rather than cash flows from operations, as the variance of the ROA’s accruals’ 
component increased more than 100% from the 1960s to the 1990s and the covariance between accruals 
and earnings has declined significantly in the last 15 years of the dataset. This result suggests that 
accounting accruals, rather than real changes in economic performance, are mainly responsible for driving 
the change in earnings. This finding also supports Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) claim that consistently 
negative accruals can be regarded as a parameter of conservatism.  
Assumptions  
The use of accruals as a measure of conservative accounting is based on the premise that conservatism is 
reflected in the sequencing and timing of the recognition of expenses and revenues relative to their 
associated cash flows. In confirming that changes in firms’ reported earnings are a result of the changes in 
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the relation between earnings and cash flows, Givoly and Hayn (2000) also assume that cash flows from 
operations (CFO) are not affected by accrual accounting and provide an independent measure of a firm’s 
economic performance.  
Advantages  
Unlike other studies on how properties of earnings can be regarded as a parameter of the level of 
conservatism in financial reporting, Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) study examined other alternative 
explanations for the relation between changes in earnings and changes in the level of cumulative accruals, 
such as restructuring and mergers and acquisition (M&A) activities. Other possible alternative 
explanations for the relationship between changes in earnings and changes in the level of cumulative 
accruals, such as increased cost of retirement benefits and pensions, inflation, and growth, were also ruled 
out. Because these alternative explanations for the relation between changes in earnings and changes in the 
level of cumulative accruals have been ruled out by empirical evidence, the use of cumulative accruals as a 
measure of conservatism is more convincing.  
Disadvantages 
While cumulative negative non-operating accruals may be a straightforward and quantitative measure of 
the level of conservatism in financial statements, it can change significantly from one financial reporting 
period to another, making it almost impossible to evaluate the level of conservative accounting in financial 
reporting in the short term with cumulative negative non-operating accruals. Indeed, it took Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) a data timeframe of 50 years to identify the structural relations between the increase in 
cumulative negative non-operating accruals and the increase in the degree of conservatism in financial 
reporting. Therefore, cumulative negative non-operating accruals may only be used as a measure of the 
degree of conservatism in financial reporting over a long period and in retrospect.  
Limitations  
One of the most obvious limitations of cumulative accruals as an indicator of conservatism is the use of 
share price changes as an indication of good news or bad news, which may be inaccurate due to the noise 
and inefficiencies in stock market trading. However, this limitation is also shared by other measures of the 
degree of conservatism, such as earnings persistence and the degree of skewedness and fluctuations of 
earnings.  
 
Earnings–share return measurement method 
The earnings-share return measurement method relies on the asymmetric timeliness of the incorporation of 
bad news and good news in earnings to evaluate the level of conservatism. This measurement method was 
first explored in detail in Basu (1997), who hypothesised and confirmed that the reflection of publicly 
available bad news in reported earnings is more concurrently sensitive and timely than the reflection of 
publicly available good news. Based on Basu’s (1997) observation, there are two measures of conservatism 
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from the earnings–share return perspective: the ratio of the bad news regression model slope coefficient 
over the good news regression model slope coefficient, and the ratio of adjusted R-squared statistics for the 
bad news regression model over that of the good news regression model.  
Basu’s (1997) analysis was later extended in the work of Pope and Walker (1999), who proposed five 
measures of conservatism that are based on the relationship between earnings and share return in addition 
to the two earnings–share return measures of conservatism. Their five earnings–share-return-based 
measures of conservatism are developed from the correlation between earnings and share return, which is 
described in detail with a regression model by Pope and Walker (1999) and is adapted from Basu (1997). 
They are the ratio of the bad news regression model slope coefficient over the good news regression model 
slope coefficient; the ratio of adjusted R-squared statistics for the bad news regression model over that of 
the good news regression model; the distinction between the sensitivity of earnings to good news and the 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news; the sensitivity of earnings to bad news; and the average 
earnings/(lagged price) bias.  
 
Earnings–share return based measures of conservatism in Basu (1997) 
Please see section 5.2 
 
Earnings–share return based measures of conservatism in Pope and 
Walker (1999) 
Inspired by the empirical analysis of Basu (1997), Pope and Walker (1999) designed a method to measure 
how the responses of reported earnings to changes in market values change with the nature of earnings 
news announcements, i.e. whether they are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Pope and Walker’s (1997) model yields several 
important observations about the measurement of accounting conservatism from an earnings–share return 
perspective. Pope and Walker’s (1999) research formalises and extends Basu’s (1997) observations and is 
based on the theoretical premises that accounting conservatism would cause the asymmetric timeliness of 
reflecting bad news and good news in earnings. In addition to inspiration from Basu (1997), Pope and 
Walker’s (1999) research also tests the conclusions of Ball et al. (1997), who extended Basu’s (1997) 
methods to the analysis of the asymmetric timeliness of earnings to seven international accounting regimes 
and found that the sensitivity of earnings to bad news for US firms is higher than UK firms due to the 
higher level of conservative accounting in the US, which is, in turn, a result of the higher costs of 
regulation and litigation in the US. Extending from Ball et al.’s (1997) research, Pope and Walker (1999) 
confirmed their conclusion and showed that the measurement of conservatism may produce different 
results in different financial reporting jurisdictions, suggesting that there are institutional differences in 
conservative accounting between different financial reporting jurisdictions.  
Assumptions 
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Pope and Walker’s (1999) model is to some extent similar to that of Basu’s (1997), but is more detailed in 
capturing the under-recognition/over-recognition of bad/good news in contemporaneous earnings. The 


















 is the cost of equity, 𝜃𝜃0 is the parameter that captures the degree to which good news is 
understated in contemporaneous earnings, and 𝑟𝑟0 is the parameter that captures the degree to which bad 
news is overstated in contemporaneous earnings. 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 represents the impact of earnings news in previous 
periods on income recognition in the current period, and captures the effects of delayed income recognition 
and the reversal of accelerated recognition of bad earnings news in multiple periods. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is equal to 
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖/𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1)− 1, i.e. 𝑘𝑘(𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 − 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖−1)− 1. 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable, which is 1 if 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is negative and 0 if 
otherwise.  
Based on this model, Pope and Walker (1999) proposed five measures of conservatism that are based on 
the correlation between earnings and share return in addition to the two earnings–share return measures of 
conservatism found in Basu (1997). They are the ratio of the bad news regression model slope coefficient 
over the good news regression model slope coefficient, the ratio of adjusted R-squared statistics for the bad 
news regression model over that of the good news regression model, the difference between the sensitivity 
of earnings to good news and the sensitivity of earnings to bad news, the sensitivity of earnings to bad 
news, and the average earnings (lagged price) bias.  
Measure 1: 






where 𝑟𝑟0 is the slope coefficient of bad news (measured by negative market-adjusted returns) and 𝜃𝜃0 is 
the slope coefficient of good news (measured by positive market-adjusted returns). 
Measure 2: 







The difference between the sensitivity of earnings to good news and the sensitivity of earnings to bad 
news: 





 or 𝐴𝐴3𝑏𝑏 = 𝑟𝑟0 + 𝜃𝜃0 
where 𝜃𝜃0 is the parameter for measuring the degree to which good news is understated in period t. On the 
other hand, 𝑟𝑟0 represents the degree to which bad news is overstated in period t; and k is the capitalisation 
rate based on the cost of equity. 
Measure 4: 




 or 𝐴𝐴4𝑏𝑏 = 1 + 𝛾𝛾0 
where 𝑟𝑟0  represents the degree to which bad news is over-recognised in period t, and k is the 
capitalisation rate based on the cost of equity. 
Measure 5: 












where 𝐷𝐷(𝐼𝐼|𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎) is the mean value of share return in company-years with good news, and 𝐷𝐷(𝐼𝐼|𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
is the mean value of share return in company-years with bad news; 𝐷𝐷(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎) is the proportion of 
company-years with good news in the data sample, and 𝐷𝐷(𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) is the proportion of company-years with 
bad news in the data sample. 𝜃𝜃0 is the parameter for measuring the degree to which good news is 
understated in period t. On the other hand, 𝑟𝑟0 represents the degree to which bad news is overstated in 
period t; k is the capitalisation rate based on the cost of equity. 
Advantage  
It is notable that first two measures (C1 and C2) in Pope and Walker (1999) (i.e. the ratio of the bad news 
slope parameter over the good news slope parameter in the regression model, and the ratio of adjusted R 
square statistics for bad news over adjusted R square statistics for good news in the regression model) are 
very similar to the earnings–share return measures of conservative accounting in Basu (1997). However, 
compared with the measures of conservative accounting in Basu (1997), the first two measures (C1 and C2) 
have a distinct advantage of being independent of 1/k (k is the capitalisation rate based on the cost of 
equity), meaning that they can be used to compare the degree of conservative accounting across different 
financial reporting regimes. In a sense, the third measure (C3) (i.e. the disparity between the sensitivity to 
bad news and sensitivity to good news in the regression model) can be seen as an improvement over the 
first two measures (C1 and C2). This is because it measures the disparity between the sensitivity of 
earnings to both good news and bad news, and does not produce extreme results in some situations like the 
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first two measures (C1 and C2), which is discussed in more detail in the next section. In Ball et al.’s (1997) 
empirical tests, the third measure (C3) is greater for accounting regimes in continental law countries than 
for accounting regimes in civil law countries, which is consistent with the observation that the recognition 
of earnings under the common law system emphasis more on the reflection of bad news than good news. 
This empirical test, therefore, confirms the usefulness of the third measure (C3) in capturing the systematic 
differences in the treatment of bad news and good news across different financial reporting regimes as a 
measure of conservatism. The fourth measure (C4b), i.e. the sensitivity to bad news, measures the 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news after potential differences in k are controlled, and can be an effective 
measure for cross-country comparison of conservatism, especially when there are distinctive differences in 
the treatment of bad news across different financial reporting regimes.  
Pope and Walker (1997) suggest that, as an alternative to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings’ response 
to good news and bad news, the average effect of asymmetric timeliness of the reported earnings ratio to 
lagged stock prices can also be used to measure conservatism. Conservatism measures C5(total), C5(bad 
news), and C5(good news) are developed based on this idea. C5 measures the total effect of the delay in 
recognising good news and the acceleration in recognising bad news, while C5 (bad news) and C5 (good 
news) measure the separate effect of the delay in recognising good news and the acceleration in 
recognising bad news, respectively. The advantage of C5, and C5(total) in particular, is that it can produce 
exceptionally accurate estimates of 1/k in a long-run stationary state, as it can be linked directly with Pope 
and Walker’s (1997) model. Therefore, C5 is a superior measure of conservatism for long-term predictions.  
Disadvantage  
There are several important limitations to Pope and Walker’s (1999) earnings–share return measure of 
accounting conservatism, which weaken its usefulness as a measure of conservatism. First of all, 
conservatism measures C1 and C2 produce extreme values in situations where there is a very low 
proportion of contemporaneous good earnings news being reflected in earnings. In these situations, using 
C1 and C2 as measures of conservatism may be misleading as all financial reporting regimes in which a 
very low proportion of contemporaneous good earnings news is reflected in earnings will be judged as 
being equally conservative, despite the differences in how earnings are responsive to bad news in these 
regimes. Secondly, C3a may not be able to produce reliable measures of conservatism, as it may not be 
able to reliably determine the speed at which bad news is recognised across different financial reporting 
regimes. For example, when 𝜃𝜃0 > 0 and 𝑟𝑟0 = 1, the value of C3a would be positive, although the 
incorporation of bad news and good news in financial reporting regimes is actually unbiased. Furthermore, 
C3a is very sensitive to the value of k. Therefore, Pope and Walker (1999) suggest that C3b would be a 
more effective measure of conservatism for comparing conservatism across financial reporting regimes if 
the estimated value of k is given for each financial reporting regime. With regard to measure C4, the 
limitation of C4b is that it requires a precise estimate of k to be effective. Similar to C3 and C4, C5 also 
suffers from the limitation of being sensitive to the value of K as the calculation of all three measures of 
C5 requires an estimated value of K.  
 185 / 203 
 
In summary, all of the five measures of conservatism in Pope and Walker (1999) have their own limitations. 
C1 and C2 may produce extreme and unreliable values. Furthermore, if differences in the treatment of 
good news and bad news reflect other distinctly different features of a financial reporting regime, rather 
than the degree of conservatism, then C1 and C2 would fail to properly identify the impact of conservatism. 
This means that C1 and C2 are not valid measures of conservatism in these situations. Measures C3, C4, 
and C5 overcome these two limitations, but require an accurate estimate of the cost of capital to be 
effective.  
 
Accrual–cash flow measurement method 
Please see section 5.1 
 
Event-driven measurement method 
This method of measuring conservatism uses market responses to earnings-related events, e.g. earnings 
announcements, to measure the degree of conservative accounting. The rationale of the event-driven 
method of measuring accounting conservatism is that conservative accounting will result in the different 
timeliness/persistence with which bad news/good news is reflected in earnings, which in turn will have 
different impacts on how the market responds to the good news/bad news in earnings announcements. 
Therefore, by measuring the difference in the market reactions to the bad news/good news in earnings 
announcements, we can measure the degree of accounting conservatism. This measurement method was 
first found in McNichols’s (1988) research, who finds that share returns are more negatively skewed 
during the periods of earnings announcements than in periods in which there are no earnings 
announcements. McNichols (1988) attributed the cause of this phenomenon to the fact that bad news is 
reflected in earnings in a more timely manner than good news, which in turn is a reflection of the level of 
conservative accounting. Basu (1997) offers a more formal event-driven measurement method for 
measuring conservative accounting using the difference between the short-window earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) for good and bad earnings news.  
 
The skewness of the stock return distribution measure of conservatism in 
McNichols (1988) 
Using individual stock returns and daily equally weighted returns index from the Centre for Research and 
Security Prices (CRSP), McNichols (1988) documents that prediction errors of stock return distribution are 
skewed more negatively during periods of earnings announcements than in periods in which earnings are 
not announced. The rationale for McNichols’s (1988) research stems from Beaver’s (1968) finding that the 
variance of changes in stock prices tends to increase in the week when earnings reports are released. 
According to Beaver (1968), this finding suggests that investors tend to revise their belief about the value 
 186 / 203 
 
of a stock as they learn about the earnings announced by the company. Such revision is then reflected in 
the more drastic changes in stock prices around the earnings announcement date. Furthermore, Beaver 
(1968) also suggests that the pattern of stock price revisions around an earnings announcement date is 
different from the pattern of stock price revisions during non-earnings announcement periods, with the 
proportion of extreme negative to positive share price adjustments being more significant during earnings 
announcement dates than in non-earnings announcement dates. On the basis of Beaver’s (1968) findings, 
McNichols (1988) infers that extreme bad earnings news tends to be disclosed more often in the annual 
mandatory earnings report than in random and discretionary disclosures of information in 
non-earnings-announcement dates.  
Assumptions 
The development of McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return distribution measure of conservatism is 
based on the assumption that the investors learn about the information of a firm through its voluntary 
disclosures and their own discretionary information search during non-earnings announcement dates. This 
assumption allows McNichols (1988) to establish a causal relationship between the unwillingness of firms 
to disclose bad news about their earnings with the increased variance of changes in stock prices and, 
consequently, the more negatively skewed distribution of prediction errors in stock returns in earnings 
announcement periods than in non-earnings announcement periods. The implication of this is that the more 
negative skewness of stock return distribution during earnings announcement dates than during 
non-earnings announcement dates is associated with bad news being reflected in earnings in a less timely 
manner than good news, which is a counter-measure of the conservative principle. Therefore, the degree to 
which stock return distributions are more negatively skewed during earnings announcement dates than 
during non-earnings announcement dates is an indicator of the level of conservative accounting: the more 
stock return distributions are negatively skewed during earnings announcement dates than during 
non-earnings announcement dates, the lower the degree of accounting conservatism.  
Another assumption in McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return distribution measurement of 
conservatism is that investors have rational expectations of the relationship between firms’ disclosure of 
earnings information and stock prices. Under this assumption, investors believe that management in firms 
are more likely to provide early disclosure of good earnings news and delayed disclosure of bad earnings 
news, and, therefore, tend to interpret delayed or non-disclosures as bad news. Therefore, firms that reveal 
good earnings news before the annual earnings report and bad news on the report date will have positively 
skewed stock returns in the interim disclosure period, and negatively skewed returns at the earnings report 
date, while non-disclosing firms will have negatively skewed returns in both the interim disclosure period 
and at the earnings report date.  
McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return distribution measurement of conservatism 
McNichols (1988) developed five measures of skewness to evaluate the difference between the stock 
return distribution in the time period around earnings announcements and in time periods where there are 
no earnings announcements. The first measure is: 
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𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 1 = �
1
𝐼𝐼∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑟)3]𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
� /(𝜎𝜎�(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖))3 
where r denotes the prediction errors of stock return distribution over a time interval and N denotes the 
number of firms used in the data sample, ?̅?𝑟 denotes the average of 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, and 𝜎𝜎� is the standard deviation of 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖. Other measures of McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return distribution are: 




𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 3 =  
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 1% 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒
99% 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 − 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 4 =  
25% 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 − 1% 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒
99% 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 − 75% 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒
 




where ‘mean’ refers to the estimated mean value of 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, ‘median’ refers to the estimated value of the median 
in 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, and ‘standard deviation’ refers to the estimated standard deviation of 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖. The numerical fractiles in 
measures 3, 4, and 5 refer to the value of distributions for which fractions of the data sample of 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 are 
below.  
The first measure captures the skewness coefficient and represents the degree of symmetry of the stock 
return distribution during non-earnings announcement and earnings announcement periods, as the 
skewness coefficient of a perfectly symmetric distribution would be zero, and positively/negatively skewed 
stock return distributions would have positive/negative skewness coefficients. According to McNichols 
(1988) and Givoly and Hayn (2006), the skewness coefficient of stock return distribution represents the 
degree to which stock return distributions are asymmetric during non-earnings announcement and earnings 
announcement periods, which in turn is associated with the use of conservative accounting principles. 
Therefore, the skewness coefficient in measure 1 is regarded as a measure of conservative accounting. 
Measure 2 is another measure of skewness, which has been proposed as an alternative to the skewness 
coefficient; measure 3 and measure 4 focus on capturing the distance from the median or the 75% fractile 
to the 99th percentile. This distance measures the degree to which the tails of the stock return distribution 
are symmetric, which in turn is a measure of accounting conservatism according to McNichols (1988) and 
Givoly and Hayn (2006). Measure 5 measures the distance between the maximum and the median and the 
minimum and the median, and is another version of measure, which is appropriate for analysing skewness 
of stock return distribution at the firm level.  
Advantage 
The most important strength of McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return distribution measure of 
conservatism compared to other measures of conservative accounting discussed in this chapter, is that it is 
affected by specific accounting relations based on which accounting data in financial statements are 
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produced. A common weakness of other measurement methods based on accounting data is the difficulty 
of adjusting the effects of different accounting rules used by firms in the data sample, as the specific 
accounting policy may differ from firm to firm. By focusing exclusively on the market responses to 
earnings information through stock return distributions, McNichols’s (1988) skewness of share return 
distribution measure of conservatism has the advantage of systematically measuring the effects of firms’ 
tendency to delay disclosures of bad news (which reflects the degree to which accounting conservative 
principles are employed) without being impacted by the differences in the accounting policies of individual 
firms.  
Disadvantage and limitations 
A potential problem of McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return distribution measure of conservatism, 
as noted by McNichols (1988) herself, is that the difference between the stock return distribution during 
earnings announcement periods and non-earnings announcement periods tends to be systematically smaller 
for small and medium companies than for large companies. This means that McNichols’s (1988) skewness 
of stock return distribution measure of conservatism may provide different information about the 
accounting conservatism of small and large firms. Therefore, McNichols’s (1988) skewness of stock return 
distribution can only be used reliably in the time series analysis of the changes in the conservatism of the 
financial reporting practices at one firm, and is not applicable for the horizontal analysis of the degree of 
accounting conservatism across firms when their sizes differ. Therefore, the application of McNichols’s 
(1988) skewness of share return distribution measure of conservatism is limited to the time series analysis 
of the changes of accounting conservatism in individual firms or groups of firms in similar sizes. 
Another important limitation of this method is that it is an indirect measure of accounting conservatism. 
The skewness of stock return distribution essentially measures the degree to which stock return 
distributions during earnings announcement periods and non-earnings announcement periods are 
asymmetric. While McNichols (1988) attributes the cause of this asymmetry to firms’ tendency to delay 
disclosure of bad news until the mandatory earnings announcement date, Givoly and Hayn (2000) suggest 
that such a tendency is also a reflection of the degree to which conservative accounting principles are used 
by a firm, i.e. the higher the tendency to delay disclosure of bad news until the mandatory earnings 
announcement date, the lower the level of conservative accounting in a company. However, the association 
between firms’ tendency to delay disclosure of bad news and their use of conservative accounting 
principles is based on intuition and lacks empirical evidence.  
 
Basu’s (1997) earnings response coefficient (ERC) measurement method 
In Basu’s (1997) research about the relationship between the conservative principle and the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings, he also developed a measure of accounting conservatism based on market events, 
which is based on the abnormal share return as a result of earnings news. The rationale for this measure of 
accounting conservatism is that the abnormal return per dollar from unexpected earnings, which is 
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captured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC) around the time of the earnings news, is larger for 
good earnings news than for bad earnings news. According to Basu (1997), when a firm discloses 
earnings-related news, the market will be surprised by the news if it is not in line with their expectations, 
regardless of whether they are good or bad, and react to the earnings news in relation to its implications for 
current and future earnings. Therefore, the market will react more significantly to more persistent earnings 
news. Because of accounting conservatism, Basu (1997) suggests that the persistence of positive earnings 
news is longer than negative earnings news. Therefore, the market’s reaction (evaluated by the earnings 
response coefficient) to good earnings news, which is more persistent in the presence of accounting 
conservatism, will be greater than the market reaction to bad earnings news. The more fundamental 
theoretical foundation of Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting is the observation that 
the timeliness of earnings is asymmetrically smaller for good earnings news than for bad earnings news. As 
the share market adjusts rationally for the impacts of conservative accounting on reported earnings, the 
ERC will be asymmetrically higher for positive changes in earnings than for negative changes in earnings. 
The asymmetry of ERC for positive earnings news and negative earnings news at the time of the earnings 
announcement captures the effects of accounting conservatism on the market’s reaction to earnings news, 
and can, therefore, be employed as an indicator of conservative accounting.  
Assumptions 
Several important assumptions underlie Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting. The first 
and most fundamental assumption in Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting is that the 
short-window ERC, defined as the abnormal stock return per unit of unexpected earnings at the earnings 
announcement date, captures the information content of earnings news. Basu (1997) derived this 
assumption from the random walk model developed by Ball and Watts (1972) to determine earnings 
expectations. Based on this model, Basu (1997) argues that changes in earnings represent unexpected 
earnings. Furthermore, Basu (1997) found that negative changes in earnings tend to be less persistent than 
positive changes in earnings. Relating this finding to the observation that more persistent earnings 
surprises lead to higher earnings response coefficient (Miller and Rock, 1985; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; 
Collins and Kothari, 1989), Basu (1987) suggests that firms announcing positive earnings news will have 
higher coefficients of earnings response than firms announcing negative earnings news. Another 
assumption of Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting is the changes in earnings proxy for 
the nature of earnings news, i.e. whether it is considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’ by the market.  
Basu’s (1997) ERC measurement method 
In order to separate the reaction of the market to the earnings-related news communicated by the earnings 
announcement, Basu (1997) used the short-window abnormal return around the earnings announcement 
date, and hypothesized that the slope of positive changes in earnings tends to be higher for negative 
changes in earnings in the regression of abnormal returns during the earnings announcement period on 
earnings changes. Theoretically, the difference between the slope of negative changes in earnings and the 
slope of positive changes in earnings in this regression is the ERC measurement of conservative 
 190 / 203 
 
accounting. In the regression model, the abnormal return during the earnings announcement period is 
specified as the dependable variable, and the earnings change is specified as the independent variable:  





∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (a) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is firm i’s earnings in the year t, ∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the earnings change for company i from year t–1 to 
year t, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is the stock price at the start of the year. The dependent variable 𝜇𝜇, or more specifically 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖+1,𝑖𝑖+2), measures firm i’s abnormal return in the first three months after the end of the fiscal year, with 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 being the abnormal return in the first three months after the end of the fiscal year. 𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is the dummy variable, which is equal to one if ∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
 is greater than zero and is equal to zero if otherwise. 
Basu (1997) found that the slope coefficient of abnormal returns on positive earnings news during the 
announcement period, 𝛽𝛽1, is obviously higher than the slope coefficient of abnormal returns on negative 
earnings news during the announcement period, 𝛽𝛽0, confirming his hypothesis that the slope of positive 
changes in earnings tend to be higher for negative changes in earnings in the regression of abnormal 
returns during the earnings announcement period on earnings changes as a result of the market’s rational 
adjustment of the effects of conservatism on earnings. Therefore, Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of 
conservative accounting is the difference between 𝛽𝛽0 and 𝛽𝛽1 (𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1) in regression model (a). 
Advantage 
Similar to McNichols (1988), the strength of Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of accounting conservatism lies 
in its focus on market reactions to earnings announcements to analyse the effects of accounting 
conservatism. By using a short window data timeframe in stock abnormal returns to positive changes in 
earnings and negative changes in earnings, Basu (1997) employs an event-driven method to measuring the 
effects of conservative accounting on earnings through the market’s interpretation of earnings 
announcements, which is reflected in the differences in earnings response coefficient relating to positive 
and negative changes in earnings. Because Basu (1997) assumes that the market will adjust rationally for 
the impacts of conservative accounting on earnings, Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative 
accounting relies on the aggregate wisdom of the market in interpreting the accounting information 
embedded in earnings announcements, rather than on analysis of specific items in the financial statements, 
which might be considered more straightforward and more accurate, depending on the efficiency of the 
market.  
Disadvantage and limitations 
There are several weaknesses and limitations of Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting. 
First of all, a potential weakness of Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting is whether or 
not changes in earnings can be considered as reliable proxies for the nature of earnings news. In particular, 
changes in earnings may be better proxies for good earnings news than bad earnings news. Secondly, 
Basu’s (1997) ERC measure of conservative accounting also suffers from the same weaknesses of the other 
indicators of conservatism proposed by Basu (1997), i.e. the possibility that factors other than accounting 
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conservatism might be the cause of the asymmetric earnings response coefficient to positive and negative 
changes in earnings. For example, Basu’s (1997) own study on how the impacts of conservative accounting 
on earnings varies with the length of the measurement interval shows that the impact of conservative 
accounting on earnings will decrease as the measurement interval increases. Therefore, Basu’s (1997) 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) may not be a reliable indicator of conservative accounting, especially 
when measurement intervals are long, as the impacts of conservative accounting on the ERC after earnings 
announcements vary with the measurement interval. Thirdly, Basu (1997) also listed the increased 
exposure of auditors to legal liabilities as a possible explanation for the asymmetric earnings response 
coefficient to positive and negative changes in earnings after earnings announcements. Because there are 
factors other than conservative accounting affecting the degree to which the earnings responses coefficient 
to negative and to positive changes in earnings are asymmetric, using Basu’s (1997) ERC as a measure of 
accounting conservatism is inaccurate unless all other factors affect the difference in the earnings 
responses coefficient to positive and to negative changes in earnings are held constant. Therefore, the 
application of this method of measuring accounting conservatism is limited to when this is possible.  
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